

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS
CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

Regarding a low level mission he flew on AV047 along with Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he knew 1000 ft AGL was briefed, and he would remember it if anything other than this was briefed. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said this route was a very popular route and said it was the best low level route he had ever been on. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said it was popular primarily due to the beautiful scenery along the route.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) asked Reporting Agent (RA) if there was information about an "under the wire club" coming out in the investigation. RA told [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the only information he had heard about this came from a VMAQ-2 pilot (Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) who had mentioned it on an earlier interview by stating it was ridiculous. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he had never heard of anything like this in his squadron, though he had heard rumors of pilots years ago flying under the bridge at Whidbey Island.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was asked what he would do if in an aircraft with an emergency like this. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said the immediate concern would be to gain altitude, and he would have his hand close to the ejection seat control in case it became necessary to eject. They would then assess the controllability of the aircraft and get the big picture of the damage. Once this was established they would insure they were on a heading for home. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said the priorities are Aviate, Navigate, and Communicate. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he would then start going through an emergency checklist and perhaps the ejection seat checklist. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he would likely have already "squawked" emergency, but if not would do so at this time. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said as soon as you have control and are headed in the right direction you would call Aviano and ask them to have crash crew standing by and to rig the arresting gear. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said this could take as long as 5-10 minutes, and you might not want to call in right away because you could be overcome with radio transmissions.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: Captain, USMC, VMAQ-2, Cherry Point, NC

SSAN [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
OFFICE: NCISFO Carolinas
DATE TYPED: 21APR98

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

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CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INTERVIEW OF CAPT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 17Apr98, reporting agent and participating agent [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) interviewed Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC regarding the VMAQ-2 EA6B mishap which occurred near Cavalese, Italy on 03Feb98. This interview was conducted at the request of the USMC Trial Counsels assigned to this case. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at the NCISRA Cherry Point office located aboard MCAS Cherry Point, NC.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is an Electronic Countermeasure Officer (ECMO) assigned to VMAQ-2, MAG-14, 2DMAW, MCAS Cherry Point, NC. His collateral duties are Assistant Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) and TEAMS Officer.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he was first assigned to VMAQ-2 on 01Mar96. He was with VMAQ-2 when the squadron deployed to Aviano between Mar96 - Sep96. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he flew the low level training route AV047 one time on that first deployment to Aviano. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he knew that route as AVI047 vice AV047, but he acknowledged AVI047 was the same route on which the 03Feb98 mishap flight occurred.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled the pilot on his first flight on AV047 was Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and the ECMO-1 was Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that flight was briefed and flown at 500' AGL.

According to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) he made that flight in early Aug96. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he did not see any ski areas along that route (AV047) when he flew it then. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) noted he did not see any towers, cables, cable cars or ski lifts along that route when he first flew it.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he also made the Aug97 - Feb98 deployment to Aviano with VMAQ-2. He was on the Advance Party which arrived there around 7-8Aug97. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled he flew one low level training flight on route AV047 during the last deployment there. He indicated he flew that route on 23Oct97.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related LTCOL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was the pilot on that flight. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was the ECMO-1 and Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was an ECMO in the back seat. In addition, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised a Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a Pilot on exchange from VMAQ-1, also rode in the back seat on that flight.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) noted his 23Oct97 low level flight on AV047 was briefed at 1000' AGL by both LTCOL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and himself. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added LTCOL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also briefed the RADALT setting at 950' AGL. Due to poor weather conditions, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled flying most of that route at 2000' AGL or higher, especially the latter legs of the route where they couldn't see the ground.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he saw no cable cars nor ski areas while conducting

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his 23Oct97 flight on AV047 NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also stated that there were no cable cars, nor any indications of ski resorts, depicted on the chart his aircrew used during their pre-flight brief.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also recalled there was snow on the mountain tops during his 23Oct97 flight along AV047; however, he stated there was no brief given about staying at or above 2000' AGL over snow covered mountains.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he used the USAF 31st Fighter Wing Pilot Aid Handbook, also called the "Air Force In-Flight Guide," for guidance on altitude restrictions while deployed to Aviano. According to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) that publication indicated a 1000' AGL minimum altitude and a max speed of .9 mach in snowy terrain over any Italian air space.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related he went through training at the Replacement Air Group (RAG) at Whidbey Island with Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). He noted NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was ahead of him at the RAG by about one month. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he did not fly with NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at the RAG, except in flight simulators. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) described NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as having a very good confidence level, but no cocky or "Cowboy" attitude. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he has never heard of nor observed any unprofessional attitude or actions by NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). He estimated he has flown with NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) VMAQ-2 approximately 30 times in both the front and back seats. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he has never been in a plane with NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) has flown low over a school, a town, a neighborhood or any other building.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he did not go through any training with Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) or Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). But he had flown with all of them except NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) while at VMAQ-2. He described NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as very knowledgeable, with a "teacher" attitude. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was new to the squadron, so he was still learning the intricacies of the job and the airplane, as well as the tactical basis on how they do business. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he never witnessed any unprofessional attitude/behavior when he flew with NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) described how he would plan for a low level training flight the following way. He would retrieve a chart for the route out of the chart file and then check the route on the chart. He would then get on the TEAMS machine, call up the route and type up a route card. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) explained his route card would contain information such as fuel planning, headings, airspeed, distances and altitude. He related he usually entered 500' AGL for the altitude on his route card. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reasoned that more fuel is used at a lower altitude, so if planned his fuel for 500' AGL, and he flew the route at a higher altitude, he would not have to worry about running out of fuel. He noted the altitude on the route card is not necessarily the altitude that is flown during the flight.

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He stated "you fly what you brief," and the altitude listed in the box on the route card is "nominal." NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated there is no altitude restriction on the TEAMS card, but they may be on the chart. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added the altitude restrictions are briefed when the aircrew covers the route portion of the pre-flight brief. According to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the minimum altitude was 1000' AGL for low level training flights. He indicated that 1000' AGL restriction was listed in the 31st Fighter Wing Pilot In-Flight Guide.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated the pilot always briefs the emergency procedures during flight. According to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) either the pilot or the ECMO-1 usually give the pre-flight brief, depending on what they decide among themselves. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated the ECMO-2 has sometimes given the flight brief. He indicated all of the aircrew go over the chart together during the pre-flight brief.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he uses a kneeboard on low level flights. Normally, his kneeboard contains the Lat/Long's for all points on the route, headings, distances and times. He related this information is usually on his TEAMS card, but sometimes he writes it on a sheet of paper. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated altitude restrictions, if there are any, are not on the kneeboard; rather, they are written on the chart. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he was taught that at the training command.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) remarked on AV047, there were no "noise sensitive" areas, the minimum altitude was 1000' AGL and that's what they flew it at. He claimed he had no idea what the 2000' AGL on the mishap aircrew's kneeboards represents. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he did not know about the 2000' AGL low level restriction in Italy until after the mishap occurred.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised low level training flights are normally planned and briefed at speeds of 360 or 420 knots. He believed the chart for route AV047 showed an air speed of 420 knots. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related an increase in speed from 420 to 550 knots, at 1000' AGL, and the plane at a straight and level attitude, probably wouldn't be noticeable. He explained the increase would be gradual, and he guessed it would take about 2 or 3 minutes. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also stated the throttle would pretty much have to be at full power. He did not think the plane could reach 550 knots without the throttle at full power.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he was not familiar with the term "Cross Compartment." He explained he was familiar with the term "Cross Compartmentalize," which he defined as scanning his area and the area in the next compartment (of the cockpit) in order to take all of the information in.

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NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) related the INS system on the EA6B Prowler aircraft flown by VMAQ-2 is very unreliable. He estimated 60% - 70% of the ECMO-1's time in flight is devoted to keeping the INS accurate.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) described LTCO NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) as an excellent CO, the best he ever served under. He characterized LTCO NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) as very knowledgeable about the airplane and tactically sound. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) opined the CO "had his hands in everything...and he knows Safety, OPS and Maintenance." He claimed the CO did things by the book. According to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) when it came to the flight schedule and training codes, if it wasn't written down in black and white, the CO wasn't going to allow it. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) advised LTCO NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) and MAJ NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) OPS) were the same as the CO. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) added that he felt VMAQ-2 was at its absolute best and very professional in all areas during the Aviano deployment.

When asked who he thought the best pilot in the squadron was, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related he had equal confidence in all of them. He opined the best ECMO was Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) noted he was on the Advance Party at Cherry Point when the mishap occurred. He stated he has spoken to the four mishap aircrew since their return, but he claimed he has not asked them about the mishap. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) related the four mishap aircrew have not volunteered any information to him about the mishap. He also indicated he has not heard any second or third hand information about what the mishap crew said happened during the mishap flight.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) indicated he was TAD to Spangdalm, Germany between 08-15Dec97, so he was not at the All Officers Meeting (AOM) where Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) held up the Deliberate Guard binder and advised the squadron to read it. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) noted Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was TAD with him in Germany at that time.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) was asked what actions he would take if faced with an in-flight emergency. In response, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) explained he would fly the plane, point it towards home (the landing field), see what the problem is (with the plane) and then call in to the Air Traffic Control (ATC) tower to declare an emergency. He summarized his response by saying he would "Aviate, Navigate and Communicate."

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) related the type of situation he had would dictate how long it would take him to call in the emergency and talk to the ATC.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) stated he did not wish to sign a sworn statement. He explained that if he were to testify, it would be on behalf of the mishap aircrew, and he did not want to sign a statement for the prosecution's case. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(e) provided no additional information pertinent to this investigation during this interview.

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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

[REDACTED] /Capt USMC
SSN: [REDACTED]
DOB: [REDACTED]
POB: [REDACTED]
UNIT: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
WKPHN [REDACTED]

PARTICIPATING AGENT

[REDACTED] SA, NCISFO Carolinas, CLNC

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED]
OFFICE: NCISFO CAROLINAS

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INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RECEIPT OF AVIATOR TRAINING JACKET SUMMARY CARDS

On 17Apr98, participating agent [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) obtained copies of flight training records for the four USMC Prowler aircrew members involved in the mishap near Cavalese, Italy on 03Feb98. Specifically, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) obtained the USN Aviator Training Jacket Summary Cards which detail the aviators' flight student pilot training. Summarized on these cards are the aviators' academic and flight proficiency, flight summaries, student progress, flight violations and/or accidents, incidents and any resulting board action. The training jacket summary cards for the aforementioned aircrew are appended as enclosures (1) through (4).

ENCLOSURES

- (1) USN Summary Card/[REDACTED] Various dates...(Copy)
- (2) USN Summary Card/[REDACTED] Various dates...(Copy)
- (3) USN Summary Card/[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Various dates...(Copy)
- (4) USN Summary Card/[REDACTED] Various dates...(Copy)

PARTICIPATING AGENT

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SA, NCISRA Corpus Christi, TX

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
OFFICE: NCISFO CAROLINAS

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Pages 318 through 335 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosures (1 - 4) to Exhibit (13): Referred to the United States Marine Corps

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INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INQUIRIES WITH THE MISSISSIPPI DPS

On 20Apr98, Reporting Agent (RA) telephonically contacted
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Drivers Service Bureau, Mississippi Department of
Public Safety (DPS), Jackson, MS at (601) 987-1278 requesting DPS
investigative assistance concerning this investigation. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Enclosure

(1) MS Uniform Accident Report Case NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

REPORTED BY: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
OFFICE: NCISRA NEW ORLEANS, LA
DATE TYPED: 21APR98

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Exhibit 11

14

Page 337 redacted for the following reason:

Enclosure (1) to Exhibit (14): Contact the Mississippi Department of Public Safety (DPS) to obtain

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INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: ACQUISITION OF FLIGHT TRAINING RECORDS

On 20APR98, Flight Training Records (FTR) for the below identified marines were obtained from LCOL [REDACTED] USMC, Executive Officer, VAQ-129, NAS Whidbey Island, WA. The records were entered into the NCIS Whidbey Island, evidence custody system under log #047-98.

The FTR's for [REDACTED] shows he attended training during the 3/96 class. The record shows that [REDACTED] was an average student with some above average and some below average marks/comments. Areas where he received below average marks and comments were related to communications, jammer management, following checklists, navigation, instrument approaches.

The FTR's for [REDACTED], shows he attended training during the 1/95 class. The record shows that [REDACTED] was an average student with some above average and some below average marks/comments. Areas where he received below average marks/comments included his knowledge of malfunctions, instrument takeoff and departure, breakups and rendezvous, landings, and instrument approach.

The FTR's for [REDACTED], shows he attended training during the 8/96 class. The record shows he was an average student with some above average and below average marks/comments. Areas where he received below average marks/comments included checklists, system operations, jammer management, harm execution, in flight malfunctions, climbing/enroute procedures, formation procedures, situational awareness, and NATOPS knowledge.

The FTR's for [REDACTED] shows he attended training during the 7/92 class. The record shows he was an average student with some above average and some below average marks/comments. He also received one unsatisfactory mark in take off emergencies. Areas where he received below average marks/comments included ground procedures, in flight malfunctions, and jammer management.

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED]
OFFICE: WHIDBEY ISLAND

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EXHIBIT (15)

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Statement

PLACE: Aviano AFB, Italy

DATE: 22 April, 1998

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I, Captain [REDACTED] USMC, make the following free and voluntary statement to [REDACTED] whom I know to be a Special Agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of events and/or circumstances involving the 03FEB98 incident near Cavalese, Italy, in which twenty civilian skiers died after their cabled gondola crashed to the ground. I also am aware that a USMC JAGMAN investigation determined that incident was caused by an EA-6B aircraft piloted by a crew from VMAQ-2, TDY to Aviano until FEB98.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

For purposes of identification, I am [REDACTED] years old, born in [REDACTED] I have [REDACTED] eyes. My SSN# is [REDACTED] and I presently am assigned to VMAQ-4 (DSN DUTY PHONE [REDACTED]) and my rate is O-3 in the United States Marine Corps. I have a top secret security clearance. My unit is TDY to Aviano from Cherry Point, NC, and has been in Italy since around 09FEB98. However, I arrived in Italy with the advance party and in fact arrived here in late JAN98, I cannot recall the exact date, but it was between five and fourteen days before this incident happened.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I am aware that the aircrew of the mishap flight included four USMC Captains, named [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] is actually a member of VMAQ-4 and was part of the unit's advance party to Aviano also. I have known him since we were in Aviano on our first deployment (this is our second) and would have met him about DEC96 or so.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I have known [REDACTED] the longest and perhaps the best of any of the aircrew in question. We met in OCS as college students around 1988, and went through TBS in JUN-DEC91 together. We have also been assigned together at Pensacola (1992-3), Whidbey Island, WA (1994), and Cherry Point, NC, since DEC95. We are friends and have shared a lot of times together. I know he [REDACTED] and with whom he keeps in contact. I also know he has an [REDACTED] who I think works at the rec center here on base), as well as [REDACTED] whom I cannot fully identify but who I believe works for a utility company in Morehead City, NC. Another good friend of [REDACTED] a Harrier pilot from Cherry Point who is currently out with a MEU. I saw [REDACTED] Italy after this accident on a port visit at Vincenza, and he knew less about this whole incident than I do, which is very little. JH

[REDACTED] is [REDACTED] and I know nothing about that relationship. I am unaware of a girlfriend in his life now. [REDACTED] and has no kids. He is not involved with anyone else that I am aware of. [REDACTED] is single, has no known girlfriends, and is good buddies with CAPT [REDACTED] from our unit.

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT (16)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
 At Aviano, I reside in "tent city," the temporary houses for the Marine units here. I am now in a hooch different than that to which I originally occupied. My first hooch was shared with [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
 [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) There is/was a phone in that hooch to which we all had access for calls, incoming and outgoing. I cannot state [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) used that phone at any time in particular.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
 In our profession, we utilize call signs, that is, nicknames, for security reasons, ie, military purposes. I am aware of the nicknames of this crew, they are [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
 for [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is an adaptation to his last name, as best I know it's origin, as he was probably called [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) or something like that. I am unaware of any other reason for his call sign. Getting a name from your real name is common, as in [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) case and my own, [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
 AS TO [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reputation, I have never flown with him as we are both pilots and would have no reason to. His reputation is excellent as he had been recently selected to fly F-18's, not something a pilot with an other than excellent reputation would get. I have never known or heard of him to be wild or reckless as a pilot, or do anything endangering to anyone. As to rumors about rites of passage and cowboy flying, as spoken of on CNN reports and things like that, I state that this is not the case and I have never known it to be. First of all, the EA-6B community is a very conservative one and it is not in their nature to be, and secondly, I cannot imagine three ECMO's going along with such a thing. I can't even imagine an ECMO going along with such an idea, even if a pilot were foolish enough to try a stunt like that. I also cannot imagine [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the lone pilot in the crew, attempting such a thing. The reputations of all these aviators are excellent, based on my personal knowledge and things I have heard about them. [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
 I was asked by Special Agent [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to comment about videotapes or photographs of the flight in question. I have witnessed such things but am unaware of one being used in this flight. I did hear there had been one camcorder on the flight, but have heard absolutely nothing about any results of this and am unaware if one was ever even made. I am unaware of [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) purchasing such a tape (blank) or any related equipment prior to the flight. I know nothing relative to any still photography from this flight. [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
 I am aware of the [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) identified on Hard Core. However, I was aware of it via rumor before the show released it, as I heard through someone in Aviano, I can't recall whom, that heard about it from someone else back in NC. This was after the third of February, but before it aired. [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
 As to AV047, I may have flown it during my last deployment here as I flew a few low levels, but I cannot recall for sure. I have not flown it since this deployment began. As to low levels, I am aware of the 1000' limit, but was unaware of the 2000' limit until after this incident. I attended the in briefs, but do not recall a 2000' level being taught. [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I know that a lot of us are skiers. [redacted] and I have skied here twice on our last deployment, but we have never used Cermis, as we did not know about it. It is also too far to drive by car and there are other closer resorts. I also know [redacted] have skied here in Italy too, although I don't know where, but probably not Cermis for the same reasons. I have never heard of the resort there, and have no reason to think anyone on the crew knew it either.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On the day in question, I was delayed in traffick on base for an unknown reason due to a runway clearing. Afterwards, I saw the plane on the runway was a prowler and went straight to the ready room (RR). There were about 20 people there, including the flight crew who were all white as sheets. Once there I learned from someone, not a crew member, that some wire or something had been struck. I did hear

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

and only [redacted] say to the group, words to the effect of "I saw a line come up in my face, and I pushed over it to avoid it." These may not have been his exact words, but were the gist of what he said. By "push over it," as I explained to Agent [redacted] he meant to "bunt," that is, go down below it to evade it. Many people heard this, CAPT

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] may have been one, as I know he was there.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

After we were all in the RR for maybe five minutes or so, the CO called the four aircrew out of there to speak with them. It was after that I learned of the twenty deaths, and the phones were ringing like crazy and I stayed in the RR and helped out with related duties. I assume it was with the CO then that they learned of the fatalities. I do not recall seeing them at all again that day. I believe [redacted] returned to our hooch later that night after I was asleep, but I am not certain. I did not discuss anything with him in any case, as I was asleep. I saw him the next day, but first saw [redacted] and asked him what happened, because as a friend and pilot I was very curious. He told me his attorney had advised him not to say anything at all about it. As a friend, I respected that and asked nothing further. I am pretty sure he called [redacted] and told him about the incident, but do not know for sure.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I later spoke casually with [redacted] along the lines of "how are things going?" He told me he was supposed to talk to Italian authorities later that day, but said nothing to me about the incident. I am pretty sure that at some point he spoke with [redacted] I also believe he later spoke with [redacted] though I did not see him make either of these calls and don't know when they were made. I do not know which phone he would have used.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I also spoke with [redacted] and possibly [redacted] in very general terms about it, only about things like the CNN reports that were very incorrect. For example, I recall saying how false one report was, I mean, screwed up facts about Prowlers. We never discussed the incident, it's causes, or any details at all about what happened. I admit I was and am curious and want to know the truth, and feel the victims families have the right to know, but also respected the crews right to privacy upon the advice of their lawyers and did not push them for any questions or answers.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

AS TO the 72 hour window before the flight, I cannot recall any specifics or anything remarkable happening at all. The only event I can recall is the day before asking NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) if he wanted to have a beer with us and he said no because he was flying the next day. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) were business as usual too, looking forward to going home the following week as their deployment was nearly up. I was unaware NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was even scheduled to fly until just before the actual flight. He was excited about beginning this deployment and is truly one of the most qualified and respected ECMO's in the unit NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

AS TO the following 72 hours after the flight, I have no additional recollection of what the crew did aside from what's been stated above. I am unaware who else any of them may have called or spoken with regarding this incident. I do recall that each of the crew had defence attorney's in what seemed like twelve hours of the incident which I thought was odd. I believed that pilots were required to tell the Mishap board any and all details of what happened following such an incident, and was surprised to see it take the course of defense attorneys so quickly without such a board. I do not know why such a Board was not held. It seemed like once the crew had legal counsel present, they spent every waking moment with their attorneys NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

The only other thing I wish to add is that one evening after the mishap, I cannot recall which night, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I were having a beer and he told me very sincerely that if the pilot had been screwing around and that caused twenty deaths, he NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) would have to come out and tell the truth, but that was not the case. I believe this is very important because of all the people I know, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is among the top in terms of integrity and honesty. I feel that he was being very truthful with me when he said that. I know him to be a very "stand up kind of guy" who would put the truth before unit loyalty and Marine Corps bravado NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

is a retired DEA agent and raised me to tell the truth, and to be an honest individual. I know and understand the difference between right and wrong and certainly understand the severity of this investigation and it's potential repercussions, and in no way am I distorting the facts or misleading the investigation. I maintain that there may be differences in the above statement regarding quotes, and my intention is that these comments are the gist of what people said or told me, not that they represent exact words, times, dates and the like. Had I been interviewed about this incident more promptly, perhaps my memory would be more clear. I believe it is reasonable to say such a thing as it's been almost two months since the incident occurred NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

CONTINUED ON NEXT AND LAST PAGE

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

for the record, as a pilot I would say I could generally easily tell the difference between 300' and 1000' feet on flat terrain, but would have a more difficult time telling the difference in varying terrain. Between 500 and 300 feet, depending on the speed, weather conditions, terrain, and things like that, the differences would be more difficult to tell apart that the prior examples (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I have read the preceding 5 page statement prepared for me at my request by Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from information that I provided. I have been allowed to make any necessary changes that I see fit. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Date: 22 APR 98 Time: 2113

Subscribed and sworn before me this 22nd day of April, 1998 at Aviano AFB, Italy.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

22 April 98
Special Agent, NCIS

AUTHORITY: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

SUP

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: //MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: REVIEW OF TURNOVER BINDER AT VMAQ-4

On 22APR98, Major [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, Executive Officer, Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 4 (VMAQ-4), USAF Aviano, Italy, provided reporting agent with the VMAQ-4 "turnover" binder. As background, the "turnover" binder contains significant documentation relative to commands and personnel deployed to Aviano. In the case of VMAQ squadrons assigned to Aviano, the binder is passed from the departing squadron to the incoming squadron.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that the "turnover" binder's original VMAQ-4 sign-off sheet consisted of a yellow sheet of lined paper. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled that Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, had initialed the rules of engagement/special instruction; VMAQ-2 standard operating procedures; and emergency procedures portion(s) of the original sign-off sheet. After the 03FEB98 mishap, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) aims to have handwritten a Flight Crew Information File (FCIF) sign-off section on the original sign-off sheet. As this was after the mishap, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not initial this portion of the sign-off sheet. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) considered that the original sign-off sheet be replaced by a computer generated sign-off sheet, which appeared more professional. The original sign off sheet was apparently discarded subsequent to it's replacement.

An examination of the "turnover" binder revealed that it was separated into five (5) sections, which are listed below. Significant excerpts from these sections were photocopied and are appended as enclosures (1) through (4).

1. Flight Crew Information File (FCIF)
 - A) FCIF table of contents/14APR98
 - B) Deliberate Guard (DG) read file review memo/11DEC97
 - C) Decisive Edge read file review memo/18SEP96
 - D) FCIF 97-21: Theater Indoctrination Program for TDY Aircrew memo/15NOV97
 - E) USAF FCIF 97-24: Theater Indoctrination Program for TDY Aircrew message/05NOV97
 - F) FCIF 97-16: Low level flight restriction over the Trentino Alto Adige Region memo/29AUG97
 - G) Italian message regarding low level flight restrictions in the Trentino Alto Adige Region/16AUG97
2. Deliberate Guard (DG) read file
 - A) DG read file table of contents/03MAR98
3. Deliberate Guard (DG) Operating Instructions (DG-OIS)
 - A) DG Operating Instructions table of contents/04MAR98

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE**TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS****CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS**

- B) DGOI-2: Aircrew Inbrief Requirements/03FEB97
- C) Italian Telex message(s) regarding altitude restrictions in Northern Italy/12FEB98

- 4. Aviano Air Base 31st Fighter Wing Support Plan
 - A) 31FW OPLAN 4682 table of contents/01SEP97

- 5. Balkin Crisis (History and terminology)

ENCLOSURES:

- (1) Excerpts from the FCIF file (Enclosures 1a-1g)
- (2) DG read file table of contents (Enclosure 2a)
- (3) Excerpts from the DG operating instructions (Enclosures 3a-3c)
- (4) 31st Fighter Wing Support Plan table of contents (Enclosure 4a)

REPORTED BY: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
OFFICE: NCIS Naples, Italy
DATE TYPED: 23APR98

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Pages 346 through 360 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosures (1 - 4): to Exhibit (17): Referred to the Department of the Air Force

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: ATTEMPT TO INTERVIEW COL [REDACTED] USAF

On 22APR98, an attempt was made to interview Col [REDACTED] USAF, Aviano Air Force Base, Aviano, IT. On this date, reporting agent met with Staff Sergeant (SSGT) [REDACTED] USAF, who is Col [REDACTED] Administrative Assistant. SSGT [REDACTED] indicated Col [REDACTED] was currently on a Temporary Duty (TDY) in the United States and would be returning back to work aboard Aviano Air Force Base, Aviano, IT on Monday, 04MAY98. In addition, SSGT [REDACTED] provided Col [REDACTED] travel itinerary while in the States, enclosure (1) pertains, to include appropriate telephone numbers and points of contact.

ENCLOSURES:

- (1). Col Ga [REDACTED] Travel Itinerary/19APR98

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: [REDACTED]
SSAN: [REDACTED]
DOB: [REDACTED]
POB: [REDACTED]
RESID: [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED]
OFFICE: NCISFO Europe, Naples, Italy

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Pages 362 through 364 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosures (1 - 4): to Exhibit (17): Referred to the Department of the Air Force

STATEMENT

PLACE: NCISRA CHERRY POINT, NC

DATE: 23APR98

I, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) , make the following free and voluntary statement to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of issues related to VMAQ-2 and the EA6B Prowler mishap on 03Feb98 in Italy.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) For the purpose of identification, I am [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) tall, weighing approximately [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) pounds. I have [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hair and [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) eyes. My social security number is [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I was born on [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I am a Major in the USMC and I'm currently an Electronic Countermeasures Officer and Assistant Operations Officer at VMAQ-2, MAG-14, 2DMAW, MCAS, Cherry Point, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) This statement is the result of an interview I had with Special Agents [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at NCISRA Cherry Point, NC on 15Apr98 [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I checked into VMAQ-2 in approximately May97. Prior to that, I had been at the RAG in Whidbey Island between Aug96 and Feb97, and before that I was a Flight Instructor at Pensacola, FL from Mar93 to Aug96 [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I was deployed to Aviano, Italy with VMAQ-2 between Aug97 and Jan98. I was on the Advance Party to Aviano from our squadron, and I was also on the Advance Party back to Cherry Point at the end of our deployment. I was not in Italy on 03Feb98 [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I flew one low level training flight on route AV047. This occurred in mid-Oct97 or mid-Nov97. I recall there was snow on the high mountains. I was the ECMO-1 on this flight. LTC [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was the pilot, Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) were in the back seats. LTC [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) briefed the emergency procedures and the conduct of the flight. I briefed the route structure and the altitude of 1000' [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I planned for that flight by reviewing the chart for that route. I had kneeboard cards with frequency information and generic procedures for flight. I had a kneeboard size copy from the chart file with the necessary information on it. I referred to the General Planning Manual (GP-1) which covered 'noise sensitive areas'. This manual is similar to the AP1-B we utilize in the U.S. I reviewed the low level procedures from VMAQ-3 which are in the Operations turnover binder. That is not a common source of reference in the squadron, and it's mainly used by those of us in OPS. I also generated

altitudes from previous directives resulting from the VMAQ-1 accident in Yuma, AZ and COL ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ order. ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ was not in training with any of the four mishap aircrew. ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ was an Instructor for both Capt ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ and Capt ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ at Flight School in Pensacola. Both of them were solid, average students. I recall they both had quiet, businesslike and professional attitudes. I can't recall any problems with either of them at Flight School. Neither ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ had a reputation for being loose or wild. ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ have only known Capt ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ since I've been with this squadron. I did not fly with him often. I did some time with him and Lt ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ hiking in the mountains just north of Aviano AFB. He came to the squadron with good qualifications, and I do not know of him having any negative reputation. ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ now I flew as ECMO-1 on two AOR missions over Bosnia with Capt ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ I think he is a natural pilot. He's good at maneuvering the plane. His technical skills in maneuvering the plane are better than most pilots. He is a real good pilot. ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ recall he was talked to about a low transition in Jan98. I was in the back seat of that flight. We were the third plane in a 3 plane formation. On take-off, we stayed below the second plane to avoid the jet wash. In my opinion it was not a low transition. I told the OPSO, MAJ ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ that I didn't think it was a low transition, and that I thought it was the safe thing to do at the time. ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ do not know of any negative information regarding Capt ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ minimum altitude on low level flights was 1000' AGL. At the lower corner of AV047, near Lake Garda, the minimum was 500' AGL, but that did not apply to us because USMC Prowlers can not drop below 1000' AGL. I also recall there were some small towns on that route that we had to avoid by 1,500' or 3 miles. ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ Before the mishap, I was not aware of the 2000' AGL low level restriction, nor did I know about the 2000' AGL restrictions over snow covered mountains. That information may have been available to the squadron, but I would not have looked for it if it was not something I needed for a particular flight. ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ use a kneeboard when I am flying. They are required in flight. The ECMO-1 has the most need for the information on the kneeboard. On a low level flight, my kneeboard would contain headings, distances, fuel planning information, turn points and times. I would have an altitude restriction on the kneeboard only if there was a particular reason for it,

such as if there were different altitudes on the route. Otherwise, I would simply have the altitude which we briefed as our flight altitude on the kneeboard. All of the above information should be on a computer generated TEAMS Card, which I carry on my kneeboard. The pilot and back seaters should have the same information on their kneeboards as the ECM cards [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] not sure what the 2000' AGL, which is supposedly on the mishap aircrew's kneeboards, represents. I would have to actually see the kneeboards. I've heard from second hand sources that Capt [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and Capt [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) made those kneeboard cards [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] low level training flights are usually planned at speeds of 360 knots, 420 knots and 480 knots. A low level at 480 knots is considered a fast low level. The plane has the best turning ability between 420-480 knots [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] 550 knots is a very fast low level flight speed. It is an option, along with changing your times, or route of flight. 550 knots is the maximum airspeed allowed by NATOPS with pods on board. 550 knots is not a speed I would fly at on this particular low level training mission. It is not a speed that you would not realize you were going. In other words, you would have to know you were going 550 knots. The throttles would have to be up in order to get to that speed [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] "Cross Compartment" is a commonly used term. A basic definition for that term is when the plane is flying in a valley along side a ridge line, and then it crosses the ridge line to fly into the valley on the other side of the ridge line [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] would describe LTCO [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as very, very conscientious. He knows everything that's going on with the airplane. He is the most knowledgeable aviator I've ever met. I would never, ever link him to any kind of behavior outside what the book says you can do in the airplane. He won't put up with it. He is very "by the book...by the rules." He is a model Marine Corps leader, cares greatly about his Marines and he is an individual to be emulated [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is also very conscientious and very professional. He's quiet, but he will speak up when something needs to be said. He and LTCO [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) are very similar [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is very similar to LTCO [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) He's a very smart person. He re-wrote the T&R Manual for the Prowler community. He will be LTCO [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in five years [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] CO, XO and OPSO all have zero "Cowboy" mentality among them. They are all very, very "by the book" [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] best pilot in the squadron is LTCO [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and the best

ECMO is [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) have not discussed the mishap with any of the four aircrew involved. Immediately after it occurred, we could not get any information about what happened because we were talking to our squadron over the telephones. The security over the phones was a concern. I have not heard any rumors about what the crew said, or what happened on their mishap flights. [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) As far as the RADALT is concerned, if it is not working it should be "griped," especially on a low level. It is just common sense to do so. Below 5000' AGL it needs to work properly, and if there's a problem with it, that problem should be griped. A slight fluctuation in the RADALT above 5000' AGL is not real dangerous. In that case, if the problem isn't griped, the crew may want to mention it to Maintenance so the next crew flying that plane can be aware of it and check it for themselves. [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

A "Hot Mike" is SOP for all Take-offs, Landings and Low Level Flights. So on a low level training flight, all of the aircrew would hear each other. The back seat ECMO's have an Air Speed indicator and an Barometric Altimeter. [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The back seat ECMO's primary function is to look for hazards of flight. The only time that I would reference the instruments would be if the front seat had trouble with timing on the route or if the RADALT went off. Forward visibility is negligible from the back seat.

This statement, consisting of this page and 3 other was typed for me by Special Agent [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) after we discussed its contents. I have read and understand the above statement. I have been given the opportunity to make any changes or corrections I desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes or corrections. This statement is true and correct.

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

23 Apr 98 1118
Date Time

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 15th day of April, 1998 at NCISRA CHERRY POINT, NC.

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Special Agent, U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
AUTH: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

STATEMENT

PLACE: NCISRA Cherry Point, NC

DATE: 23APR98

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) _____, make the following free and voluntary statement to _____ NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of the aircraft mishap involving my squadron while deployed to Aviano, Italy. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) For the purpose of identification, I am _____ NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male. My social security number is _____ NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I was born on _____ NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I am a Major in the USMC currently assigned to VMAQ-2 at MCAS Cherry Point, NC. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Items discussed in this statement are the result of an interview with Special Agents _____ NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and _____ NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) conducted at NCISRA Cherry Point, NC on 08Apr98. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I am an Electronics Counter Measures Officer (ECMO) in my squadron, and have been assigned to VMAQ-2 since 28Dec95. Prior to our most recent deployment to Aviano, I had been deployed there once previously as part of the command during Mar96-Aug96. Other than my ECMO duties I am also the squadron Aviation Maintenance Officer (AMQ). NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I did not personally fly any low level training flights during our recent deployment. I did fly the mishap route (AV047) on our previous deployment to Aviano in 1996. I flew this specific route as ECMO1 with Captain _____ NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) pilot, however, we were unable to complete this route at low level through the mishap leg due to weather conditions not allowing it. Although I never completed a low level through the specific area where the mishap occurred, I have knowledge this area did have ski areas throughout it. I am a recreational skier and skied while in Italy, but not in this specific area. I have flown a number of times with all the crew members involved in the mishap flight except Captain _____ NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I was never involved in any formal aviation training with any of the crew members. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) As ECMO1 my primary duties would involve navigation, making sure we were on our timing points, and backing up everything the pilot was doing though not actually manipulating the aircraft in any way. It is normally the pilot, ECMO1, or a qualified Mission Commander who briefs the flight. Any ECMO can be the Mission Commander if he has this qualification. Things briefed include general administration, call sign, take off time, route, emergency data, communication plan, crew coordination, and a specific brief of each leg of the flight. The pilot is always _____ NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) responsible for briefing the emergency portion of the brief even if he is not the Mission Commander. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Regarding the knee boards that are used by flight crews, they can have a number of different things on them including longitude, latitude, course, distance, heading, etc. Generally speaking the card is a fuel planning card, and any altitudes listed on the card are for proper fuel consumption to insure there is enough fuel to complete the mission. I do not know if there was an altitude of 2000 ft AGL printed on the knee boards of the mishap crew, but if it was I would not interpret this as an altitude restriction, rather a fuel planning altitude. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have been asked if I know what the term "cross compartment" means as related to flying. I have heard this term used before, but it is not a common term utilized. My understanding of this term is when an aircraft crosses over a ridge line across the grain from one low area into another low area. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I was in the All Officers Meeting (AOM) when Captain held up the Deliberate Guard (DG) binder and told everyone they should read it. I do not remember if he specifically said there was information relating to low level altitude restrictions, or just general need to know information for all crew members. I do not know specifically know if members of the mishap crew were present during this AOM, but unless they had other duties such as leave or TAD they would have been present. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) At the time the mishap occurred I was in the Operations spaces and received a call from the CO, Lt Colonel NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) calling me 02 had an emergency. Because of my duties as AMO I jumped in the CO's car with him and we drove to the airfield. Initially I could not get anywhere near the aircraft due to Air Force Security Police not allowing it. I was parked approximately 200-250 yards away from the aircraft and the air crew had already egressed from the aircraft by the time I got to this point. I went over to the Maintenance spaces, and eventually got to go out to the aircraft to assess damage. I did not have any direct contact with the crew and am not sure exactly where they were taken after they landed. The aircraft had severe damage, and I would like to say Captain NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a superb pilot and did a great job in getting the aircraft back. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I did not see any of the crew members at all until approximately 4-5 hours later in the ready room. I did not have any conversation with any of them and did not hear anything they were saying. When I saw them they were in the ready room and were all separated. They were writing and it is my understanding they were writing statements about what had happened in the mishap for the safety officer on the interim mishap board which had been quickly formed. The NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) statements to the board were considered privileged. I think the statement ended up at the Navy Safety Center, but I know they did not go to the Jag Man Board. I was actually appointed to the interim mishap board as the maintenance representative. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was my understanding and I believe the understanding of just about everyone in the squadron that the minimum altitude restriction in the area was 1000 ft AGL based on the T&R Manual. I now know the local area restriction was 2000 ft AGL, and this restriction was documented in the DG binder, but I never read the binder after this document was added. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Captain NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is probably the most talented pilot we have in the squadron. He is definitely above average in comparison with his peers. I did hear about an incident where Captain NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) made a low transition during take-off. I do not know the specifics of the incident but know Major NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the Operations Officer (OPSO) spoke to him about it. It was my understanding that his explanation of events met with the satisfaction of the OPSO and CO. This is not something that would necessarily lead to written documentation of the incident. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Regarding Lt Colonel NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I would describe him as being absolutely by the rules, relentless on flying as well as in all other areas. He is by the book and no other way. The XO, Lt Colonel NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and the OPSO, Major NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) are also very much straight arrow and conservative in their duties. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have never experienced or heard of any instances of Captain NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) flying in any way that could be considered derogatory. I have never heard even rumors of him "flat-hatting" or "hot-dogging". Captain NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is a very solid ECMO, and probably the best Captain in the air we have. I have never heard anything derogatory about Captain NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) either. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I have been asked about the speed of the aircraft at the time of the mishap, and have been told the speed was in the 550 knots area. It is not unusual for the speed of the flight to vary throughout the flight if the aircraft is behind time to meet timing marks. However, I would consider 550 knots excessive if they were just trying to make up a little time. 550 knots is the air speed limit of that aircraft at that altitude. You would have to be trying to go this fast, it is not possible for the speed to have just crept up on them as it can do in an automobile. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I was in the aircraft with Captain NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on aircraft 02 in the flight earlier in the day prior to the mishap. I do recall the radalt not operating properly at 25,000 feet, but it worked properly later in flight in the ranges where it is designed to operate. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Statement

PLACE: Aviano AFB, Italy
OSI Office
DATE: 23 April, 1998

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, make the following free and voluntary statement to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of events and/or circumstances involving the 03FEB98 incident near Cavalese, Italy, in which twenty civilian skiers died after their cabled gondola crashed to the ground. I also am aware that a USMC JAGMAN investigation determined that incident was caused by an EA-6B aircraft piloted by a crew from VMAQ-2, TDY to Aviano until FEB98 [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) For purposes of identification, I am [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) born in [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hair and [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) eyes. My SSN# is [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I presently am assigned to VMAQ-4 (DSN DUTY PHONE [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and my rate is O-3 in the United States Marine Corps. I have a top secret (and SCI) security clearance. My unit is TDY to Aviano from Cherry Point, NC, and has been in Italy since around 09FEB98. However, I arrived in Italy with the advance party and in fact arrived here on or about 30JAN98 [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I do know the aircrew of the mishap flight included four Marine Corps Captains, named [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) All have excellent reputations and I have never heard anything contrary to their aviation abilities or professionalism at any time. I was irritated by CNN reports that painted them otherwise because those reports are inaccurate and sensationalize the whole thing [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) At Aviano, I initially resided in hooch L-1 with [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I first met [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) around 1995 while in training at Whitley Island, WA and have had no contact with him until JAN98 in Italy. As [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) we have different social circles and interests and I do not know him well. I have never flown with him or anyone else in the mishap crew except for [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a part owner of "CONFUSION," a snow-board company, possibly in Washington State, but I am not sure. I know that snow boarding and skiing and such are his interests but I have never known him to ski at Cermis, where this incident happened. It is possible he has, but I would not know. I have no knowledge of where any of the crew may ski, and I had never heard of Cermis until this incident. I have skied while deployed here, but never at Cermis. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reputation is tactically proficient and very good. He has been selected from the Prowler community to go to F-18's, not something given to average pilots. He is clearly well thought of in the aviation field and I have never heard anything about him being a reckless or careless or daredevil pilot. I am unaware of any [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) romantic relationships except that he is single [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT (2)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is actually a member of VMAQ-4 and was part of the unit's advance party to Aviano also. I have known him since he arrived in our squadron @ OCT96 while we were on our first deployment to Aviano. We are good friends and he is into hunting, bass fishing and general outdoor sports. He dates, but no one in particular, and I am unaware of any such relationships in Aviano. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) of the crew besides NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I guess I know NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) second best. He is a friend of LT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) here on deployment with our squadron, and I met him while he was in NC on leave last fall at the NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) residence. He is NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and has no children to the best of my knowledge. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) once at Cherry Point and do not know him well. I next met him here in Aviano, and as he was a former member of Q-4, he is well known in the squadron and has an excellent reputation. I have heard stories about him from other squadron members, nothing specific, and none of which paint him in a negative light. There was a story about drinking in Japan in which his name was mentioned, but it had no bearing on his professionalism or aviation capabilities. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) our profession, we utilize call signs, that is, nicknames, for camaraderie purposes only. I am aware of the nicknames of this crew, to the best of my knowledge they are as follows: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have no idea why but have never heard it had anything to do with his abilities or attitude; NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) obviously from his name; NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from the movie NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in which the character was so named NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and; NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as he was an NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) major in college and knows everything there is to know about NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was asked by Special Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to comment about videotapes or photographs of the flight in question. I know this has been done in the past and I have photographed flights myself with a still camera. However, I have no knowledge, even from rumor or the grapevine, about any such taping or pictures from the flight in question. I have no idea if any cameras were even in the aircraft, much less used. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to LTCOL NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Hard Copy tape, I first heard about it in the Ready Room (RR) from some unidentified officers in Aviano after this mishap. I have never been aware of it or it's circulation or destruction aside from the RR mention of it, which was just comments made in passing. There were no hints or orders for any such tapings to be destroyed or anything like that. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) am unaware of route AV047 aside from the mishap flight. I have never flown a low level flight on AV047 or in any way been exposed to that route prior to the mishap, including any talk of it as a preferred flight. As to the "Rites of Passage" issue, it simply is not true. It has never been done to or even mentioned to me or anyone I know, nor have I even heard of such a thing. If I was NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] ver in a situation in flight and a pilot did anything intentional endangering my life, or any crew member, I would stop him and certainly speak to him about it, and report the incident. This has never happened to me and I would think any other ECMO would react the same way in such an even [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] 03 FEB 98 I was in the RR with the ODO CAPT [redacted] from Q-2 and Q-4's CAPT [redacted] A call came in from the crew, [redacted] voice as I recall, which briefly advised there was damage to the aircraft and they were to take a trap to land, meaning the aircraft needed an arrested landing. [redacted] immediately set the wheels in motion and [redacted] and I got the NATOPS manuals for him then set out to the tower in a car where [redacted] was going to assist in the landing operation as he is qualified to do so. En route, the plane landed safely, which we witnessed, and as we saw the left side of the Prowler, we saw no damage. We returned to the RR right away [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] the RR [redacted] was starting the chronological time line for the Emergency Action Plan (EAP). CAPT [redacted] was there helping him. [redacted] and I offered but it was as if there were too many cooks in the kitchen so we basically stayed out of the way. Many about 30 minutes or so later, the crew arrived in the RR and were visibly upset. Q-2 members began asking them lots of questions about times, locations, and causes. There was lots of chaos in the room and the only answers I heard were [redacted] He circled in black ink on a chart, which was eventually given to [redacted] his estimate of the location of the incident. The chart was approximately the size of three sheets of regular paper. At this time I also heard [redacted] say words to the effect of he thought he saw a yellow gondola, that some cables were hit, and I know he repeatedly said he hoped it was not a gondola. Each crew member was speaking but I did not hear what the others were saying, or to whom they were specifically speaking. The crew was in and out of the RR, with the CO I believe for some time, and later to medical for a complete physical. I never spoke with the crew personally after the incident that day except briefly to [redacted] When asked what happened, he told me they hit some cables and climbed away from the mountains and returned to base. He was shaken and quite upset. He also told me his hands were on the ejection handle the whole time after that. I did not ask why they were low as I was well aware of the 1000' low level limit and assumed they hit cables at that height. I assumed in these mountains ski cables (because I already heard it was a gondola, probably) would be that high [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] several hours later the Q-2 Ops officer, an unidentified Major, came into the RR and told those present, including me, that it had in fact been a cable and that people had died. The crew was not in the RR at this time. I had no further contact with the crew that day and ended up going to sleep later that night in the hooch before [redacted] returns [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] the following day I saw several of the members of the crew and asked questions like "How are you?" but nothing probing into the facts. It was obvious they were being asked lots of questions and I did not want to pester them with more. As to possible reasons why the RADAL [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

could not have alerted the crew as to their altitude, there are 3 reasons. First, it was malfunctioning, and though I heard a later examination determined it was working fine during the examination, I do not know it was fine during the flight. Second, the RADALT was turned off. However, during a low level flight there is no legitimate reason for this to be the case that I know. Third, it was set lower than it should have been, but again, there is no reason it should have been the case.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

what seemed a short time after the incident, I cannot say when however, I learned from all members but that they had defense attorneys and had been advised not to speak any more about the mishap. I respected that and never asked anything more of any of them aside from status updates, ie, nothing prohib

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

my professional opinion as an aviator, I would state that I can tell the difference between 1000' and 350' altitudes quite well and easily given daytime and clear conditions, among other criteria. I have never been a front seater in a below five hundred foot mission, so cannot address with any authority the differences between 350' and 500'

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

to the 72 hour window before and after the incident, my knowledge of the crew's activities has been thoroughly addressed above. Aside from that mentioned above, there was simply nothing remarkable at all involving their activities. As I was tight with perhaps I could have been more clear as to exact words and such between us if I had been promptly interviewed, but this has been almost two months ago and so I can only provide the gist of what was said rather than direct quotes. I was raised to tell the truth and consider myself an honest person. I also realize the severity of this incident and the repercussions for lying about my knowledge of it, knowing that deliberate and misleading lies in a sworn statement is a criminal offense. Given that, I maintain that this statement is the truth to the best of my recollection.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

have read the preceding 4 page statement prepared for me at my request by Special Agent from information that I provided. I have been allowed to make any necessary changes that I see fit. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Date: 980423 Time: 1538

Subscribed and sworn before me this 23rd day of April, 1998 at Aviano AFB, Italy.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Special Agent, NCIS

AUTHORITY: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

PLACE: AVIANO AIR BASE, ITALY

DATE: 23APR98

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] USN, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED], MAKE THE FOLLOWING FREE AND VOLUNTARY STATEMENT TO NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] WHOM I KNOW TO BE A SPECIAL AGENT OF THE NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE. I MAKE THIS STATEMENT OF MY OWN FREE WILL AND WITHOUT ANY THREATS MADE TO ME OR PROMISES EXTENDED. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT THIS STATEMENT IS GIVEN WITH REGARD TO MY RELATIONSHIP WITH CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] USMC, PILOT, EA-6B PROWLER, VMAQ-2, BETWEEN OCT97 AND MAR98, WHILE HE WAS DEPLOYED AT AVIANO AIR BASE, ITALY. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES, I AM NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] FEMALE; DOB NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] POB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]; I AM CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AS THE DIRECTOR, YOUTH ACTIVITIES (BLDG 240, AREA 2) AVIANO AIR BASE, ITALY. MY WORK SCHEDULE IS MONDAY THROUGH FRIDAY 1000 TO 1900. I CAN BE CONTACTED THROUGH MY WORK TELEPHONE NUMBER AT DSN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] EMAILED ME ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO AND TOLD ME SOMEONE NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] WOULD BE COMING TO TALK TO ME. AT ANY RATE, I FIRST MET CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] ON OCT97 AT THE VMAQ-2 OFFICERS' CLUB, KNOWN AS "THE HARE," (TENT CITY, AREA F) AVIANO AIR BASE, ITALY. I DATED CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] FROM OCT97 UNTIL HE DEPARTED, WHICH WAS ON THE MORNING OF 14MAR98. REGARDING CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] HE TOLD ME HE GOT IT SOME TIME AGO, WHEN SOMEONE PLACED THE LETTER NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] AND MADE IT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] PROFESSIONALLY, I WOULD DESCRIBE CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] AS A WELL-RESPECTED PILOT. ON A PERSONAL LEVEL, HE IS VERY GOOD HEARTED, EXTREMELY FUN TO BE WITH, BUT ALSO SOMEWHAT CONFUSED. HE'S A RESPONSIBLE PERSON, BUT AN INTROVERTED PERSON AS WELL. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]

DURING THE TIME WE DATED, WE SPENT A FEW WEEKENDS TOGETHER AWAY FROM THE AVIANO BASE AREA. A DAY OR TWO AFTER THANKSGIVING (1997) WE WENT ON A DAY TRIP TO VALZADANA - NEAR CORTINA D'APPEZZO. SOMETIME IN DECEMBER 1997 WE WENT TO KARNICHE, ITALY, WHERE WE SPENT ONE NIGHT TOGETHER. BETWEEN 17 AND 19 JAN98, WE SPENT THREE DAYS IN GARMISH, GERMANY; WE STAYED AT THE PATTON HOTEL. WE'VE NEVER BEEN TO CAVALESE WHERE THE MISHAP OCCURRED, NOR DO I HAVE ANY KNOWLEDGE ABOUT HIM OR ANYONE HE KNOWS GOING THERE. HE HAS NEVER MENTIONED THAT AREA TO ME. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] THE ONLY TIMES I WOULD EVER HEAR CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] TALK ABOUT FLYING WAS WHILE TALKING TO OTHER VMAQ-2 MEMBERS IN "THE HARE." THE ONLY TIME HE EVER TALKED DIRECTLY TO ME ABOUT FLYING WAS WHEN HE WAS TALKING ABOUT A VMAQ-2 MEMBER WITH THE CALL-SIGN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] I BELIEVE HIS REAL NAME WAS NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] AND HE WAS AN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]

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NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 000377

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NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES OFFICER). AT ANY RATE, UPON ASKING CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) WHAT HE WAS TALKING ABOUT, HE EXPLAINED TO ME THAT HE CONSIDERED NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) A SAFETY HAZARD BECAUSE HE WAS NOT PROFESSIONALLY QUALIFIED TO DO HIS JOB. OTHERWISE, I DON'T RECALL ANY OTHER TIME WHEN HE TALKED TO ME ABOUT FLYING NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I RECALL THAT ON THE DAY OF THE MISHAP, ON 03FEB98, CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CALLED ME AT WORK AT 1130 HRS, AND TOLD ME HE WAS GETTING READY TO GO BRIEF AND FLY. I WISHED HIM A NICE FLIGHT. LATER THAT DAY, CIRCA 1700 HOURS, WHILE AT BURGER KING, I HEARD ON AFN TV THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCY LANDING AT AVIANO AIR BASE INVOLVING A EA-6B MARINE PROWLER. WHILE DRIVING HOME TO PORDENONE, BETWEEN 1730 AND 1740, I HEARD ON THE RADIO (AP NEWS) THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN INCIDENT INVOLVING A MARINE JET WHICH HIT A GONDOLA IN ITALY - KILLING 14 PEOPLE NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I ARRIVED HOME AT ABOUT 1745 HRS, I CALLED CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ABOUT 1900 HRS AT THE HOOCH, BUT THERE WAS NO ANSWER. I CALLED AGAIN AT ABOUT 2230 HRS, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE AVIANO AND CNN NEWS REPORTS. UPON REACHING CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SAID TO HIM "TELL ME THAT WASN'T YOU TODAY THAT HAD THE ACCIDENT!" HE REPLIED BY SAYING "YOU THINK THAT WAS ME?" I THEN SAID TO HIM "I DON'T KNOW IF THAT WAS YOU!" AND ASKED HIM AGAIN. HE THEN REPLIED "I CAN'T, I AM NOT ALLOWED TO TELL ANYONE ANYTHING!" I THEN SAID "YOU DON'T HAVE TO TELL ME THE DETAILS, JUST SAY YES OR NO!" HE REFUSED AGAIN SAYING HE COULDN'T TELL ME ANYTHING. HE THEN ASKED ME WHAT I HAD HEARD. I TOLD HIM I HAD HEARD ON THE NEWS THAT 14 PEOPLE HAD BEEN KILLED AFTER ONE OF THEIR PLANES HIT A CABLE. I THEN ASKED HIM HOW MANY PLANES HAD BEEN UP THAT DAY; HE AGAIN REPLIED HE COULDN'T TALK ABOUT IT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) TWO DAYS LATER, THROUGH AN AIR FORCE NEWS CHANNEL, I FOUND OUT HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE MISHAP WHEN HIS NAME WAS RELEASED. LATER THAT NIGHT I CALLED HIM AT THE HOOCH AND ASKED HIM WHETHER HE HAD BEEN GOOFING OFF AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. AFTER A ^{HE SAID, I} SHORT SILENCE ON THE TELEPHONE, HE SAID "IT WAS AN ACCIDENT, IT WAS ONLY AN ACCIDENT" NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

CAN'T BELIEVE YOUR ASKING ME THAT.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ON 07FEB98, I WENT TO SEE CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) HIS HOOCH. I HAD NOT SEEN HIM SINCE 01FEB98. UPON SEEING HIM I DIDN'T ASK HIM ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MISHAP BECAUSE I FIGURED HE HAD BEEN UNDER A LOT OF STRESS AND QUESTIONING. I HAD GONE THERE TO GIVE HIM SUPPORT. BASICALLY, JUST TO ASK HIM IF HE WAS OK AND IF HE WAS SLEEPING. HE TOLD ME THE DOCTORS WERE GIVING HIM MEDICINE TO SLEEP, AND THAT HE HAD BEEN KEPT BUSY NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) THE NEXT TIME I SAW HIM WAS ON 14FEB98 - VALENTINE'S DAY. BETWEEN 07 AND 14FEB98, I CALLED HIM A FEW TIMES REGARDING HOW HE WAS DOING. AT ANY RATE, I SAW HIM AT HIS HOOCH AT ABOUT 1600 HRS ON 14FEB98. I TOOK FLOWERS TO HIM THAT DAY. HE LOOKED GREAT! I WAS REALLY SURPRISED THAT HE WAS IN GREAT SPIRITS. I SPENT ABOUT EIGHT HOURS AT TENT CITY THAT DAY (1600 TO MIDNIGHT). NOT ALL NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) TIME WAS SPENT WITH HIM, HE HAD APPOINTMENTS DURING THE EIGHT HOURS THAT I WAS THERE. DURING HIS APPOINTMENTS I WOULD GO TO "THE HARE" WITH OTHER AVIATORS TO WAIT FOR HIM. AGAIN, CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NEVER SAID ANYTHING TO ME ABOUT THE INCIDENT IN QUESTION. HE'S THE TYPE OF PERSON WHO KEEPS HIS FEELINGS TO HIMSELF. NOR DID CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) EVER MENTION ANYTHING TO ME ABOUT THE OTHER AVIATORS THAT FLEW WITH HIM ON THE DAY OF THE MISHAP NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) DID SEE CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) QUITE OFTEN EITHER AT THE HOOCH OR "THE HARE" AFTER 14FEB98, BUT WE NEVER TALKED ABOUT THE PROWLER MISHAP. I TOLD CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) HE COULD TALK TO ME (ABOUT THE MISHAP) IF HE FELT IT WAS NECESSARY, BUT HE ALWAYS REFUSES NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NEVER SHOWED ME OR TALKED TO ME ABOUT ANY PICTURES OR VIDEOTAPING HE OR OTHER FLIGHT CREW MEMBERS MAY HAVE TAKEN/MADE DURING ANY OF HIS FLIGHTS WHILE ASSIGNED TO AVIANO. NOR HAS HE EVER MENTIONED ANYTHING TO ME ABOUT EVER GOOFING OFF WHILE FLYING, TO INCLUDE EVER FLYING UNDER OR NEAR ANY SKI CABINS NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I'VE TAKEN PIZZA TO CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) AS WELL AS OTHER VMAQ-2 MEMBERS BETWEEN 4 AND 6 TIMES AFTER THE MISHAP IN QUESTION OCCURRED TO THE TIME CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) AND THE AVIATORS, WHO REMAINED BEHIND, DEPARTED ITALY. I RECALL THAT A COUPLE OF TIMES AFTER THE MISHAP, WHILE HOLDING CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) IN MY ARMS IN HIS HOOCH, HE BECAME TEARY-EYED. HE LOST ABOUT 15 LBS FROM THE TIME OF THE MISHAP TO THE TIME HE DEPARTED ITALY. I RECALL THAT DURING SAINT VALENTINE'S DAY WEEKEND CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SAID TO ME THEY WERE KEEPING HIM SO BUSY WITH APPOINTMENTS THAT THEY WEREN'T GIVING HIM TIME TO GRIEVE THE PEOPLE NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SINCE DEPARTING ITALY, CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) HAS E-MAILED ME BETWEEN 5 AND 10 TIMES. ALSO, I'VE E-MAILED HIM BETWEEN 5 AND 10 TIMES. WE'VE ALSO TALKED ON THE TELEPHONE ABOUT 5 TIMES. OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS, WHICH LASTED BETWEEN 10 AND 30 MINUTES EACH, INVOLVED OUR RELATIONSHIP. WE NEVER DISCUSSED THE ACCIDENT IN QUESTION. THERE WERE ALSO TIMES WHEN I CALLED HIM, BUT HE WASN'T HOME THEREFORE I LEFT HIM MESSAGES ON HIS ANSWERING MACHINE NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I'VE BEEN STILL IN LOVE WITH CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) BUT HE'S NOT IN LOVE WITH ME. HE CARES ABOUT ME ONLY AS A FRIEND. I FIND IT VERY FRUSTRATING THAT HE KEEPS HIS FEELINGS INSIDE, AND DOES NOT SHARE THEM WITH ME NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) WITH REGARD TO DRINKING ALCOHOL, I'VE ONLY SEEN CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) INTOXICATED TWICE DURING THE 5 MONTHS THAT WE DATED. THE FIRST TIME WAS DURING A HALLOWEEN PARTY IN "THE HARE." IT WAS THE ANNIVERSARY OF HIS FATHER'S DEATH. HIS DAD DIED WHEN HE WAS 20 YEARS OF AGE. THE OTHER TIME I SAW HIM DRUNK WAS ABOUT A WEEK BEFORE HE DEPARTED AVIANO AT "THE HARE." CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) IS VERY MELLOW AND FUNNY WHEN HE'S DRUNK NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) THIS STATEMENT, CONSISTING OF 4 PAGES WAS PREPARED FOR ME, BY
SPECIAL AGENT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) AS WE DISCUSSED THE DETAILS. I HAVE
REVIEWED THIS STATEMENT AND HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO MAKE ANY
CORRECTIONS, DELETIONS, CHANGES, OR ADDITIONS AS I SEE FIT FOR
ANY REASON I SO DESIRE. I HAVE INITIALED SUCH CHANGES AND HAVE
SIGNED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE. THIS STATEMENT IS TRUE AND
CORRECT TO THE VERY BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND RECOLLECTION. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 4/27/98 11:30

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO ME THIS 27TH DAY OF APRIL 1998, AT AVIANO
AIR BASE, ITALY NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 27 Apr 98 / 1137

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) AUTHORITY: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04 JAN 93 NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

4/27/98

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

27 Apr 98

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Sunday, April 5, 1998

Compassion for crew

As a very close friend of the pilot in the incident involving the Marine EA-6B mishap, I would like to extend sincere thanks for the positive comments that the writer of "Stand up for aircrew" (March 26) wrote, and I have forwarded your kind words on to the crew members.

While this mishap is a horrendous tragedy and should never have happened, it is nevertheless a terrible accident for all involved. There are no winners here, only losers. The families of those involved in the accident have suffered tremendously and may never heal. But so, too, have those crew members and their families. Ask anyone who has ever been involved in any type of mishap that resulted in the loss of life and lived. Each and every one of those people would probably say they would trade their life for the ones they have

Having to bear the cross of this incident cannot be easy for them, their families or the families of the victims. These men did not set out to intentionally put their lives or the lives of others in jeopardy. How often have you heard of a plane or helicopter crew clipping telephone wires only to tumble to their deaths? I know it is terrible, but I can assure that this crew even survived this accident when they too should have perished with the rest of the victims. And I am sure that with each sleepless night they are asking themselves that very same question, why not me, Lord, instead of the others?

There is a reason that the good Lord allowed this tragic accident to happen and a lesson to be taught all of us, but only he knows what that lesson is right now. These men are wonderful, caring individuals and do not deserve to have people come up to them and call them "murder-

TO OUR READERS:

Let us know what you think

We encourage our readers — especially those who have never submitted a letter — to write to us. Letters expressing readers' viewpoints on any topic are published daily on this page.

Send letters to the Editor, The Star, 2000 Ave. of the Stars, Suite 2000, Ft. Belvoir, CO 80110. Country code: 1-303-425-2000. DSN 348-0245.

Letters should be typed, double-spaced, and include a return address. We cannot assume responsibility for the return of unsolicited letters.

er" to their faces - which occurred in our base exchange parking lot - nor to be written maliciously about.

They know how their actions directly impacted so many lives and they have to live with that knowledge.

To the writers of the April 1 letters "Aircrew is indeed at fault" and "Accountability counts," I ask them to recall the case of the two mechanics in Germany who were charged with the death of one of our Air Force pilots. Remember that the guilt and grief was too much to bear, and a second tragic and senseless death resulted. I am sure you can imagine a burden 20 times that, and I would hope that the next time this topic is discussed, some

compassion for the crew can be felt. We know, when all the facts are revealed, proper and deserved punishment will be administered as it should. However, I can't help but think of the pain and suffering of those left behind on both sides. Instead of arguing, pointing fingers, and speculating over facts that are not available to the public yet, wouldn't our energy be better spent in support and prayers for all involved?

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Aviano Air Base, Italy

STATEMENT

DATE: 23 APRIL 1998

PLACE: OSI OFFICES, AVIANO, ITALY

I, [redacted] SSGT USAF, make the following free and voluntary statement to [redacted] whom I know to be a Special Agent of the U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will, without any threats made to me, or promises extended. I understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of the events of 03Feb98 concerning the mishap involving the striking of a cable car by an EA-6B PROWLER aircraft.

For identification purposes, I am [redacted] born [redacted] I have a secret security clearance. I am an air traffic controller currently assigned to 31st Operations Support Squadron (OSS), Aviano, Italy. My ssn is [redacted] I arrived at this command in September of 1997.

I am currently on a trainee status working as an air traffic controller in the flight line control tower. I have been on this status since I arrived at this command. Being on a trainee status means that I am monitored by a designated training monitor during my working hours for an unspecified period of time until I have experience dealing with the traffic load on the base. During this time, I am not allowed to communicate on the radio to any aircraft in distress. This is done by my training monitor, Sgt. [redacted] I have been doing well on this training status, and I am scheduled to end my trainee period sometime next week. I have approximately nine years experience as air traffic controller with the Air Force.

I was working in the control tower on 03February 1998. I had the swing shift, and started work at around 1345. The weather at the base was clear. The day leading up to the mishap was pretty uneventful. With me on duty on that day were: Sgt. [redacted] USAF; Sgt. [redacted] USAF; SRA [redacted] USAF; MA [redacted] USAF, who was the Supervisor of Flying (SOF) on that day, and [redacted] an Italian National air traffic controller in the Italian Air Force. [redacted] works only with aircraft still on the ground. I was clearing aircraft for takeoff from the base during most of the day. I do not recall how many aircraft I cleared that day, and I don't recall specifically how many Prowler aircraft took off during my work shift. The tower is responsible for take off of aircraft, and for their activity within a five-mile radius of the base. Farther than that we do not monitor the aircraft.

I do not recall clearing the particular mishap aircraft for take off. I do not recall the time of day that I cleared them. I recall clearing this aircraft because the pilot had filed a "VFR" flight plan, as opposed to an "IFR" plan. "VFR" - visual flight rules - means that the tower does not have to constantly monitor the aircraft's flight and route, as the crew is

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flying primarily by visual orientation. VFR usually means the aircrew is only given a few advisories while in flight concerning approaching aircraft, etc. The rest of the flight is completely handled by the aircrew. IFR – instrument flight rules – means the tower and radar personnel have to monitor the flight and its route, as the crew is primarily flying by the aircraft’s instrumentation. Although I can monitor the altitudes of the aircraft while they are on radar, I do not usually notice these as the plane takes off, and flies out of my five-mile radius. I did not notice the altitude of this aircraft as it left my air space.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

There was nothing that I can recall during the clearing of the aircraft in question to take off. It was uneventful. I spoke to one of the aircrew over the radio, and cleared them. I do not know who specifically I spoke with. I do not recall anything specific about this routine flight clearing exchange over the radio. I probably have dealt with this particular aircrew before, as I have cleared many EA-6B aircraft in the past. All I know about them is that they are piloted by Marines. I have had no personal contact with any EA-6B flight crew.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Sometime later, possibly a couple of hours after I cleared the aircraft to take off, the tower received a distress call from the aircraft crew. Radar reported that the aircraft squawked an emergency code “7700”, signifying that they were in trouble. As I was still on trainee status, I was not allowed to speak to them. Someone spoke to the aircraft, while I monitored the conversation over the radio. It was a short conversation. From what I recall of that conversation, the person I assumed to be the aircraft’s pilot stated that he had sustained aircraft damage, and hydraulic failure. I did not discern that the pilot sounded distressed as he reported this. Someone told the pilot to report back to base immediately. At this point, I would say the aircraft was about five minutes out from the base. The pilot did not elaborate on the extent of the damage to the aircraft, or how he sustained that damage. Radar reported to us that he was going to “take the barrier” - an “arrested” landing – meaning that he would land by means of catching a cable on the ground with his tail hook. I also recall the pilot asking us if we could see his tail hook.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

When the aircraft approached, we visually inspected it. As far as we could tell, the hook was down. I could also see the tail of the aircraft. The tail had a very big gash through it. From that angle, I could not see the rest of the damage on the aircraft. Later on that day, as the aircraft was being towed away, I saw that the underside of the right wing of the craft looked like it had been scraped.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

The aircraft landed on the designated airstrip, where emergency vehicles were waiting. The crew reported that they were going to "egress" quickly, and I saw them do this. They quickly exited the aircraft as soon as they landed. Major [redacted] was in the tower during this time period.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Within an hour of the aircraft landing, Major [redacted] called the air squadron, wanting details of the mishap for his report. This conversation over the telephone, like the earlier conversation between the pilot and Sgt [redacted] was also recorded. I did not listen to the whole conversation, which lasted approximately one minute. I heard about 20-30 seconds of it, somewhere during the middle of [redacted] called the squadron, and identified himself as the SOF. I heard the person on the other end of the line state that he was the pilot of the mishap aircraft. Major [redacted] asked if the pilot could tell him what had happened. The pilot stated that he had seen a "gondola". He also may have stated that as soon as he saw it, he pulled up in an attempt to avoid it. The pilot did not say where this gondola was, nor did he mention the altitude he was flying at the time. He did not describe the flight path at all. The pilot then stated the he had to go, that there was "a lot going on". The pilot sounded nervous during this conversation, more nervous than he sounded when he was calling in the emergency in the air. This is as much as I can recall of that particular conversation. I believe Sgt [redacted] also heard this conversation.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I have read and understand this statement, consisting of this and 2 additional pages, typed for me by Mr. [redacted] from information we discussed. I have read and initialed any changes. This statement is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

23 April 1614

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April, 1998 at the OSI offices, Aviano, Italy.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

21 APR 1615

Authority:
SECNAVINST 5520.3B of 04JAN93

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW - COL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 23APR98, Intelligence Operations Specialist [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and Special Agent [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) interviewed Col. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in his office at Aviano AB, Italy regarding title investigation.

As background, Col. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is the senior Italian Air Force military commander in charge of the Aviano AB. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was also the Italian representative and signing board member of the U.S. Marine Corps Command Investigation Board which investigated the VMAQ-2 EA-6B mishap of 03FEB98. Additionally, the Italian Magistrate in Trento, Italy has appointed [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as the evidence custodian for items seized by Italian officials during their investigation into the mishap. These items include the aircraft and aircraft parts, the mission recorder and tape.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) disclosed that Capt. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) would be the key person to interview regarding all Q-2 and prior squadron flights and noise complaints logged at Aviano AB. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) explained that noise complaints are processed by the Italian Regional Operations Center (ROC) in Puglia, Italy. Once a noise complaint is received, the ROC issues a message to all air bases in Italy to research the possibility of aircraft originating from their base. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related that [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) investigates these complaints for the Aviano AB area of responsibility. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) then contacted his supervisors who authorized reporting agents to review Italian military reports of noise complaints with Capt. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) disclosed that currently, the Trento, Italy prosecutor is also conducting similar checks into noise complaints from low-level flights.

Reporting agents asked [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for a photocopy of the transcript of the conversation between Capt. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and the Aviano AB control tower on 03FEB98. After making a few-telephone calls, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that copies were not retained by the Italian Air Force. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) explained that his personnel assisted Carabinieri (Italian Military Police from Trento, Italy) in making a copy of the tape. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled that his personnel assisted the Carabinieri in translating the transcript from English to Italian. Reporting agents then asked to make a copy of the tape in his custody. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) replied that he was unable to do so without authorization from the magistrate's office. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) then telephoned Dr. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the Trento, Italy prosecutor, seeking permission to make the tape available to reporting agent. Dr. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) replied that initially, there were no jurisdiction issues and all evidence was

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

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AUTHORIZATION FROM THE NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
000385

EXHIBIT (24)

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

shared between Italy and the U.S. Dr. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that now, all requests pertinent to this investigation must be generated via U.S. Embassy channels and international protocol call must be followed. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related that Dr. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) emphasized that he was not to access evidence in his custody without the prosecutors authorization.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) disclosed that on 14APR98, the EA-6B Prowler and sequestered evidence parts were moved to Hanger Loop 21 or 29 at Aviano AB in order to facilitate hanger maintenance. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated that the transfer was authorized by the magistrate's office and effected under strict Carabinieri control. All loose tagged items of evidence which initially were laid out on the hanger floor were inventoried, accounted for and sealed in a large wooden crate. When the aircraft was moved by USMC personnel, a Carabinieri officer remained in the cockpit to assure nothing was removed.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

DOB: [REDACTED]

POB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

REPORTED BY: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: NCISFO EUROPE

DATE TYPED: 24APR98

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NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

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000386

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

**TITLE: MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAHP
JUDICIAL PROCESS/I**

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH COL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 23APR98, Col [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Vice Commander, 31st Fighter Wing, Aviano Air Force Base, Aviano, IT, was interviewed at the Aviano Air Force Base, Aviano, IT regarding the establishment of the Interim Mishap Investigation Board as related to this investigation.

On the above date, Col [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided a statement as to the establishment and dis-establishment of the Interim Mishap Investigation Board, as well as other details related to the board. Col [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided a statement regarding same, enclosure (1) pertains. In addition to the statement, on the above date, Col [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also provided several documents, which are also related to the Interim Mishap Investigation board. The documents are as follows; one (1) 16th Air Force Team roster, which is undated and lists the names of individuals who participated in the Interim Mishap Investigation Board as related to subject mishap, enclosure (2) pertains. One (1) 31st Fighter Wing MRP Plan 91-204 Interim Board Procedures, Board President Checklist, undated, enclosure (3) pertains. One (1) outline depicting the Formal Board President's Briefing-Col [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) undated, enclosure (4) pertains. One (1) 31st Fighter Wing Mishap Response Plan-Interim Board Procedures, dated 01JUN96, enclosure (5) pertains.

Enclosures

- (1) Col [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Statement/23APR98
- (2) One (1) 16th Air Force Team roster/undated
- (3) One (1) 31st Fighter Wing MRP Plan 91-204 Interim Board Procedures, Board President Checklist/undated
- (4) One (1) Outline depicting the Formal Board President's Briefing-Col [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) undated
- (5) One (1) 31st Fighter Wing Mishap Response Plan Interim Board Procedures/01JUN96

Reporting Agent: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Reporting Office: NCISFO Europe, Naples, IT

STATEMENT

PLACE: 31st Fighter Wing, Aviano, IT

DATE: 23APR98

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) COL [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] make the following free and voluntary statement to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of assistance related to the Aviano Mishap Judicial Process, specifically determining when the Interim Mishap Investigation board w [redacted] convened, how the participants on the board were notified and exact dates/time of the board [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] For the purpose of identification, I am NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] tall, weighing approximately NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] pounds. I have NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] hair and NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] eyes. My social security number is NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] and I was born on NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] 03FEB98, I was in a meeting in General NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] Office, Commander, 31st Fighter Wing, Aviano Air Force Base (AFB), Aviano, IT. At approximately 1500 on 03FEB98, while in this emergency meeting, we heard that there was an aircraft mishap involving an EA-6B Prowler, and a Crash Net, which is a communication link had been activated. A crash net alerts fire department personnel, as well as other flight safety emergency personnel, when an aircraft has been involved in a flight mishap and is scheduled to land. On 03FEB98, after hearing that a ski lift gondola had gone down, General NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] immediately initiated an Interim Investigation board. This is something that is standard operating procedure (SOP) after an incident of this nature. The purpose of the Interim Mishap Investigation board is to insure the preservation of data and evidence related to an aircraft mishap, as early as possible. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] 03FEB98, the flight crew involved in the EA-6B mishap talked with the Flight Safety Officer, 31st Fighter Wing, Aviano AFB, Aviano, IT, who was a member of the Interim Mishap Investigation board, regarding the mishap flight. This is considered to be privileged information. The flight crew also went to the clinic located at the Aviano AFB for a check-up and while there talked with a psychologist, who accessed the crews emotional well being in light of the mishap. The psychologist; however, did not ask the crew any questions about the mishap. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] members of the Interim Mishap Investigation board convened on 03FEB98 were as follows: myself, Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] Italian Air Force, LtCol NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] 16th Air Force, USAF, Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] 31st Fighter Wing, USAF, Lt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] VMAQ-2, USMC, Maj (NFI) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] VMAQ-2, USMC, Maj NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] VMAQ-2, USMC, Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] 31st Fighter Wing, USAF, TSgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] 31st Fighter Wing, USAF, CMSgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] 31 CES, USAF, Maj NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] 31st Fighter Wing, USAF, SSgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] 31 CS, USAF, SrA NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] 31CS, USAF, also SrA NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] LGTO, USAF, SrA NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] LGTO, USAF. The membes of this group were comprised of a Flight Safety Officer, a Pilot

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Representative, USMC Officers, a lawyer and an officer assigned to liaison with the Italians. All of the participants were notified about the initiation of the convening of the board by telephone

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the evening of the mishap (03FEB98), the Carabinieri took control of the mishap aircraft; ~~however~~, because the aircraft was locked up in a hardened aircraft shelter ~~aboard~~ ^{consequently} at Aviano AB, and the Carabinieri controlled access to it, we felt evidence custody related to the aircraft was pretty strict

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 04FEB98, several of us drove up to Trento, Italy for the purpose of meeting with the Magistrate and Carabinieri associated with the EA-6B mishap of 03FEB98, and to go to the crash site. We were denied access to the crash site. On that day, I had left Col [redacted] back in Aviano to organize and seal records for the formal investigation

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) again, the Interim Mishap Investigation Board was established on 03FEB98 by Gen [redacted] and disestablished on 05FEB98 upon the arrival of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and with the understanding that a mishap investigation board was being established by the USMC, led by Maj Gen [redacted] USMC. I am not certain of the exact times as to the beginning and ending of the Interim Mishap board

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also providing to SA [redacted] a list identifying the Interim Mishap Investigation board members and their respective telephone numbers, the 31st Fighter Wing Interim Mishap Investigation board checklist, an outline related to the Interim Mishap Investigation board and general procedure

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) statement, consisting of this page and 2 others was typed for me by Special Agent [redacted] as we discussed its contents. I have read and understand the above statement. I have been given the opportunity to make any changes or corrections I desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes or corrections. This statement is true and correct

[redacted signature block]

24 Apr 98 1648
Date Time

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 23rd day of April, 1998 at 31st Fighter Wing, Aviano, IT.

[redacted signature block] 24 APR 98 / 1648

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Special Agent, U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
AUTH: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

Pages 390 through 407 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosures (2 - 5) to Exhibit (25): Referred to the Department of the Air Force

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK,VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INFORMATION FROM IDENTITY PROTECTED WITNESS

On 23Apr98, Identity Protected Witness (IPW), NA-P-1, advised that [REDACTED] a American civilian employee of [REDACTED] had previously [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] NA-P-1 reported that [REDACTED] had worked at the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] however, was unsure if [REDACTED] was still employed there. NA-P-1 has not had recent contact with [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED]
OFFICE: NCISFO EUROPE
DATE TYPED: 23APR98

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW - CAPT. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 23APR98, Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed in his office at Aviano AB by Intelligence Operations Specialist [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and Special Agent [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) regarding complaints of low level flight noise.

As background, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is a Captain in the Italian Air Force and in charge of the Air Traffic Department at Aviano AB. In this capacity, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) explained that he is overall responsible for the flow of air traffic at Aviano, the control tower, aircraft parking, and radar operations. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he has fulfilled this position for the past nine years.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related that he fields and investigates Italian complaints of aircraft noise, which are forwarded to him from the Italian Regional Operations Center (ROC) at Monte Venda, Padova, Italy. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) explained that usually a civilian would register a complaint with local law enforcement agencies who then forward the complaint to the ROC. ROC then issues a message to all air bases in Italy asking for investigative assistance in determining if the noise complaint could be from an aircraft from their base. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that since he is responsible for all flight patterns, take off and landings, he would be knowledgeable if a flight generated from Aviano. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) disclosed that upon receipt of tasking from the ROC, he forwards a request to the Commanding Officer (CO), 31st Fighter Wing at Aviano to review flight data. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated that he usually receives a written response from the CO to either acknowledging culpability or with a negative response. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added that on some occasions he does not receive any response and his requests are ignored.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) then review his archive files of all noise complaints investigated by his office. The specific periods researched were the MAR-SEP96 time frame and the AUG97-FEB98 time frame. The majority of noise complaints investigated pertained to F-16 aircraft. There was only one noise complaint filed against USMC aircraft during the specified periods. An Alitalia pilot on vacation in Folgaria, Trento, reported noise from a low-level flight on 20AUG96. The time of the complaint was between 0830-0850 Zulu. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that records reviewed indicated the following:

EASY01 - 1A6, Route AV047, take off 0758, landing 0908
EASY02 - 1A6, Route AV047, take off 0805, landing 0908

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added that his file regarding these flights contained no

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

response or communication from the 31st FW. [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related that this was unusual.

Other low level noise complaints files reviewed by reporting agents with [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) follow:

17JUN96 1515Z Belluno, Italy, 6, F-16's.
Response from 31st - negative culpability

26JUL96 1430L Novellara, Italy, 2 F-16's
Response from 31st - plane 2 drifted off course.

25SEP97 Time unknown, Perugia, F-16's
Response from 31st - no aircraft in that area.

03FEB98 1130L Palermo, Italy
Response from 31st - no aircraft in that area.

07JUN96 0845Z [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Italy
Response from 31st - no aircraft in that area.

13SEP96 1318L Matelica, Ancona, Italy
Response from 31st - no aircraft in that area.

13SEP96 1100L Rocca Vignale, Savona, Italy
Response from 31st - no aircraft in that area.

23JUL96 1210L Udine, Italy
- Response from 31st - no aircraft in that area.

MAR-APR96 time frame [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), Modena, Italy
Response from 31st - All F-16's flying patterns
V045, AV031 and AV020.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

DOB: [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: NCISFO EUROPE

DATE TYPED: 24APR98

Statement

PLACE: Aviano AFB, Italy
OSI Office, Aviano
DATE: 24 April, 1998

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), Lt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, make the following free and voluntary statement to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of events and/or circumstances involving the 03FEB98 incident near Cavalese, Italy, in which twenty civilian skiers died after their cabled gondola crashed to the ground. I also am aware that a USMC JAGMAN investigation determined that incident was caused by a USMC Prowler aircraft piloted by a crew from VMAQ-2, TDY to Aviano until FEB98.

For purposes of identification, I am NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) born in NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). I have NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hair and NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) eyes. My SSN# is NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I presently am assigned to VMAQ-4 (DSN DUTY PHONE NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and my rate is O-2 in the United States Marine Corps. I am an ECMO (Electronic Counter Measures Officer) and I have a top secret security clearance. My unit is TDY to Aviano from Cherry Point, NC, and has been in Italy since about 13FEB98. However, I arrived in Italy with the advance party and in fact arrived here on or about 27JAN98.

I am aware that the aircrew of the mishap flight included four USMC officers, Captain NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), Captain NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), Lieutenant NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and Captain NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is the only pilot among them, as the others are ECMO's like myself.

In the aviation field, we use call signs, that is, nicknames, for each other. I am aware of the nicknames of this crew, they are NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) or NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), and NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). I am not aware of NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) call sign. The origins of the nicknames I know are basically plays on their last names. I have never heard of any other reason for being NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) other than it sounding like NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for short.

When I arrived in Aviano I had initial contact with NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) because we roomed together in one of the hooches (L-1) in the Marine's "tent city." This is where I first met NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I certainly did not get to know him well in the short time we roomed together. When I say roomed together, there were several officers sharing the hooch, also including LT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). As I just checked in with Q-4 in OCT97, I was the newest guy and knew the least about the others. I think NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) were friends or at least much longer acquaintances from prior training together. Before and after the mishap flight, my encounters with NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) remained the same, very minimal. I am unaware what he did in his spare time or who he called.

EXHIBIT (28)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

contacted about it. I do not know if he had a girlfriend or anyone he was close with in whom he may have confided. Actually, I do know he had some sort of personal relationship with an American female named [redacted] who appeared to be American-Asian. I also recall taking a phone message for [redacted] from her after the incident, but I cannot say when or how soon after the flight. As for me, after the incident the only things I had said to [redacted] were greetings and that I was glad he was okay. I was actually surprised that he stayed in our hooch after the mishap flight and did not relocate with the rest of the crew or at least closer friends. I do not know what occupied his time in those weeks afterwards, before he was returned to Cherry Point. Also, I did know he was into snowboarding as he had a snowboard in the hooch. [redacted] demeanor and reputation were fine from my limited contact with him, and I understand he was being transferred to fly Hornets next, so that indicates to me he had an excellent pilot's reputation.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] is to [redacted] I have likewise only known him since my arrival. I have never heard anything contrary about him or his reputation, or his professionalism as an ECMO, even after the mishap. I know nothing about his personal life and engaged in no conversations with him about the mishap flight. I am not aware of his activities after the flight.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] met him in flight school and of the crew, probably know him the best as we have had some personal social contact with he and [redacted] knows them a little bit too. We went to Readiness Air Group (RAG) and Flight School together, but I had no contact with him from MAY97 until I met him again in Aviano after I arrived. He was recently promoted to Captain. His reputation is excellent, professionally and personally, and I am unaware of any rumors or facts to the contrary. His best friend and confidant would be [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] is a member of my squadron (VMAQ-4) and was part of the unit's advance party to Aviano also. I have known him since I joined the unit in OCT97. I consider him a friend and know him pretty well, but our social interaction has been limited, as he is single. He has dated on occasion, but no one steadily to my knowledge. He is good friends with CAPT [redacted] from our unit.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

After the incident, I had no conversations and made no inquiries of [redacted] about it of [redacted] I had minimal conversations with [redacted] but as I recall, I never asked probing or direct questions like "What happened?" Likewise, neither offered any explanations or made any statements to me. I did later hear, but I no longer recall from what source, that the pilot saw a wire at the last second and bunted the nose quickly to get under the wire, but still made contact with the wire. I do know that this source of information was not from one of the crew. Had I been asked these questions closer to the event, my memory would be more clear and I would have given more definitive answers. I expected to have been interviewed and was surprised it has taken this long.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

First learned of this mishap on the afternoon it happened, 03FEB98. I was in the Ready Room (RR) and some unidentified Marine told me a Prowler had hit a wire, but he provided no further information. At that time the aircraft was still airborne and I do not know how he knew this information, but he was very serious. I left the RR. Later I learned of the safe landing at Aviano but did not witness it. Later still, in the RR, I learned of people having died as a result of the wire being hit, as it was a ski gondola cable wire. I do not recall the crew being there in the RR when I learned this, nor did I see any crew members that day. If I did, I know I had no contact with any of them then at all. I avoided all the commotion in the RR and left. To this day I still have not seen the Prowler but understand the crew was very lucky to have brought it back safely. I have subsequently heard through the grapevine, I can no longer remember who was the source, that the backseaters had "no clue" as to what was going on.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I am aware of the Hard Copy release of footage of a flight made by LTCOL [redacted] USMC. I know about this tape from seeing a copy of it on a VCR after one of the Marine's wives (unidentified) sent it over to [redacted] with us on deployment. I saw that version of the taping. I have never witnessed or heard of anything regarding orders or suggestions to destroy such tapes, nor have I ever heard of any recording (still or video) having been made of this flight on 03FEB98.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Regarding the possibility of "flat hatting" or acting like "space cowboys," as has been referred to in the media, I have no personal knowledge of that being the case, nor any reason to suspect it had been. However, I concede that it is a possibility given the facts as reported from the JAGMAN which was completed. As an aviator with limited experience, I certainly know the difference between 1000' and 350' altitude, and I base that on the difference between 1000' and 500' which is readily discernible, as 500' is the lowest low level flying I have done. This is based on daylight and clear conditions of course. I am confident in my ability to see that difference, and am fairly inexperienced as aviators go. I believe an experienced pilot/aviator would be able to tell the difference between 500 and 350' given clear and daylight conditions pretty well, but I can't comment personally as I have never flown below 500'. Also, I have never heard of any "rites of passage" or anything related to that associated with the Prowler community, and this flight in particular. If anything like that went on, I have absolutely no knowledge of it and know no one who does.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

So, given the facts of the JAGMAN as I understand it, there are only three reasons the RADALT would not have alerted the crew as to their low altitude (clearly below the 1000' limit we all know to be the case and which I understand has been USMC policy since the previous Prowler accident in 1996 near Yuma, AZ). They are: the RADALT was turned off, but there is no legitimate reason I know of for this to be the case as they were flying low level; the RADALT was set too low, but given the 1000' limit, there is no reason it should have been set below 900.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Page 3 of [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

...en the 10% rule, and; it malfunctioned. This is possible and the best defense I can imagine given the circumstances. However, SOP is that if a RADALT malfunctions or is inoperable during a low level mission, the plane should climb up and out of the low level immediately, especially in a training mission as this flight was

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

...ther, I flew a mission earlier that day with Q-2 Major [redacted] the pilot. We flew over Bosnia and the flight was 2 point something (2.X) hours long, arriving back around lunchtime. We had a small problem with the nose gear during it but as I understand it, it had been repaired immediately after our uneventful landing. We had no problem with our RADALT that I am aware of. Our mission was not a low level mission however. I believe that was the same Prowler flown later that day during the mishap flight, and I am unaware of any other Prowler flights that day from Aviano

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

...o Cermis, the ski resort in which this mishap happened, I had no prior personal knowledge of it. As to the crew's prior knowledge of it, I cannot say, as I do not know. Prior to flying in Aviano, I had never heard of route AV047 by name at all, but had heard about the beautiful scenery of the mountains in Northern Italy and how great the low level flights were here. I do not think I heard such comments from any of these crew members. Either way, I never heard any mention of any ski resorts to view from the Prowler or by air at all, and do not know if any of these crew members had any personal knowledge of Cermis, the resort at which the mishap occurred

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

...have read the preceding four page statement prepared for me at my request by Special Agent [redacted] from information that I provided. I have been allowed to make any necessary changes that I see fit. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Date: 24 APR 98 Time: 1534

Subscribed and sworn before me this 24th day of April, 1998 at the OSI offices, Aviano AFB, Italy.

[redacted] 24 Apr 98
Special Agent, NCIS

AUTHORITY: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

Statement

PLACE: Aviano AFB, Italy
OSI Office, Aviano
DATE: 24 April, 1998

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I, Lt [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, make the following free and voluntary statement to [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of events and/or circumstances involving the 03FEB98 incident near Cavalese, Italy, in which twenty civilian skiers died after their cabled gondola crashed to the ground. I also am aware that a USMC JAGMAN investigation determined that incident was caused by a USMC Prowler aircraft piloted by a crew from VMAQ-2, TDY to Aviano until FEB98.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) purposes of identification, I am [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male, [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) years old, born in [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hair and [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) eyes. My SSN# is [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I presently am assigned to VMAQ-4 (DSN PHONE [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) as the intelligence officer (I am not an aviator) and my rate is O-2 in the United States Marine Corps. I have a top secret/SCI security clearance. My unit is TDY to Aviano from Cherry Point, NC, and has been in Italy since around 12 to 14 FEB98. However, I arrived in Italy with the advance party and in fact arrived here on 29JAN98.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I want to say from the start that I am surprised I am being interviewed now, I mean this long after it happened, as I fully expected to be interviewed from the beginning, particularly because I hold flight's tape in my custody. I will address that issue later, but was surprised that the JAGMAN investigators never talked to me at all. I know the aircrew of the mishap flight included four USMC Captains, [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is the only pilot among them, as the others are ECMO's [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

The Prowler community, as with other military aviators, uses call signs, that is, nicknames for the aircrew, for fun as far as I know.

I am aware of the nicknames of this crew, they are [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I do not know

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I am aware of the origins of the nicknames, each being a play on their own real names. [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I am not aware and have never heard that [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was in any way related to his reputation or abilities [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

When I arrived in Aviano I had initial contact with [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) because we roomed together in one of the hooches in the Marine's "tent city." This is when I first met [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have not had the chance to get to know him well at all and basically have no formed opinion of him as to personality or character. His professional reputation is quite good as he was recently selected to be an F-18 pilot. As to comments about [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT (29)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

him flat hatting, that is, acting like some sort of wild pilot or being a "space cowboy," I have no knowledge of this ever being the case. He is single, and I know very little about his past. He has a NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) an American named NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) who works on base with the youth center or something like that. I have met her and even been out to lunch with her as part of a group. She told me NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is a NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) back in the states, as he has been up front with her, and she added that he is not as committed to their relationship as she would like to be. His hobbies and interests include skiing and snow boarding, as he is also part owner of Confusions, a snowboard company (small business), apparently in Seattle. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I recall the first night I arrived and was at the club as was NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). He seemed like a nice guy, and I remember that he had left early and gone to bed for the night as he was there when I returned. I had very little interaction with him and even less after the mishap flight. I do know that afterwards he spent his time either with his lawyer or NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (in the hooch a lot), or PTing. The night of the mishap, after I was back in the hooch, I took a phone call from his NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in the states and left him a message to that effect. I do not know if he returned the call or not, nor am I aware of any other calls he may have made or received. I do know he used the phone in the hooch afterwards because a few times I heard him on the phone and I left the hooch to give him some privacy. I do not know the context of those calls. The only post mishap conversations I had with NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) which were very few, were superficial in nature, I mean I never asked him what happened or anything about the incident other than for example, "How are you doing?" NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

As to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I had also just met him since arriving in Aviano in JAN98, and the same goes for NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I met at the Hare, the Officers' Club which has been shut down for unrelated reasons. He also seemed like a nice guy, had been with my squadron previously, before I joined, and had deployed with them to Iwakuni, Japan. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was recently promoted to O-3 before I arrived, and NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I likewise never spoke to him (or NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) about the incident nor did I get to know him well at all. I recall NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) came over here alone two or three weeks after the incident, and that the whole crew returned to the states a few weeks after that. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

belongs to our squadron and was also part of our advance party. I have known him since MAR97 in the squadron, but only professionally, ie, I have never socialized with him away from work. He is a friend and I know he loves the outdoors and anything related to it, example, hunting, fishing, boating (he owns a boat back in NC) and the like. He is single and has dated several ladies back in NC whom I cannot identify, but none seriously to my knowledge. I am not aware of him dating anyone in Italy. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is humorous, fun, dynamic, open, and very easy to get along with. He is well thought of and liked, and his professional reputation is very good. His best friend is CAPT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also from our unit and deployed in Aviano now. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Of the crew in question, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is the only one I know well at all, and the only one I have discussed the mishap with. The night it happened I visited him in his hooch and asked him how he was. He was very upset and essentially just shrugged. I did not push him due to the situation and gave him a bottle of Crown Royal. He said thanks and accepted it, but said he'd wait for better times when this is all over to drink it. I offered to help in any way. He appreciated it but there was nothing asked of me. I am unaware of any calls he made for sure, but believe he called his parents. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Some night after the incident, I don't know when for certain, I asked what happened. All that he told me was that they were flying the route the way it was intended to be flown and denied they were flat hatting or being "space cowboys." He told me he was angry during the JAGMAN because of what was going on. He never specified but indicated to me that people in the command (no names) were lying to the JAGMAN investigators, but again, he never said what the lies were. He told me I could read about it later in his book, which he plans to write after this is over, and I said I would look forward to reading it. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

In the afternoon of 03FEB98, I saw a Prowler land by taking a trap, ie, an arrested landing, which is unusual, but I paid it no further attention. I first learned of this mishap on the afternoon it happened as I was in the hallway going to the Ready Room (RR) and passed a very sullen looking LT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). He told me that CP's crew hit a cable, and I believe at this time they had already landed the aircraft. He had no other details that he told me. I went on to the RR and the crew was not there, but several others were, including CAPT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). I later learned of the gondola and the deaths, but am unsure from which source, possibly CNN. I was amazed at how quickly CNN was on the scene and reporting it, although I believe their coverage has been distorted and misleading in certain ways. In the RR, with out the crew present, the CO held an AOM and spoke of the tragedy. Shortly thereafter the crew arrived and they didn't say anything, I don't think there was anything to say. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I went about my business and coordinated (posted) security at the aircraft. I did not enter or look into the cockpit at all. I was aware that two USMC MP's from Q-2 were to be posted on the aircraft along with two USAF Security Police. There were many people around, including Italian police, and lots of aircrew maintenance folks. It is possible that many had access to the cockpit before I got to the aircraft, which was several hours after landing. However, I believe that anyone who did was authorized to be there because there were other security related folks with the plane once it landed, I just can't identify them by name. Also, the Prowler was then moved about this time, as I escorted it, from the M-loop area (I don't know how it got there) to the hangar in which I secured it. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

The Prowler has four individual tapes which are recorded during flight, which are classified "Secret, US only." I know two of the tapes are still in the aircraft, one is being held by the Italian Colonel, the base CO, and I have the fourth in my safe. My recording is that which was used by the JAGMAN investigators for analyzing the NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

flight's path. I would like to see these four tapes co-located in a secure area and in American hands. My copy was seized by CWO2 [redacted] from a source unknown to me at some time after the incident, also unknown to me. It has been in my safe and secured there since [redacted] seized it, as far as chain of custody goes [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I was asked by Special Agent [redacted] to comment about what I may know regarding videotapes or photographs of the flight in question. The truth is I have heard nothing whatsoever regarding this being the case, to include rumor and "grapevine" talk [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

As to the Hard Copy release of LTCOL [redacted] flight along route AV047 last year, I first heard about it when somebody's wife e-mailed about it and later sent a copy of the airing of it. As to this low level flight route, I had no prior knowledge of it and had never heard of it as a preferred route or particular route of interest [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

As to skiing in Italy, I know a lot of us do it. I am not aware of anyone ever skiing at Cermis but do know that at least all this crew but [redacted] at least ski. As to their professional knowledge of Cermis as aviators, I would guess they know about that resort based on low level training in the area, but can't say for certain [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

The press has spoken of "rites of passage" issues regarding flights like this. I have never heard of this from within the community at all, again to include rumors or "grapevine" talk [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I have read the preceding 4 page statement prepared for me at my request by Special Agent [redacted] from information that I provided. I have been allowed to make any necessary changes that I see fit. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief [redacted]

[redacted]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Date: 980424 Time: 11:35

Subscribed and sworn before me this 24th day of April, 1998 at Aviano AFB, Italy.

[redacted] 24 Apr 98
al Agent, NCIS

AUTHORITY: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

4 of 4

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

STATEMENT

DATE: 24APRIL 98

PLACE: AFOSI AVIANO, ITALY

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, make the following free and voluntary statement to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will, without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand this statement is given concerning my knowledge of the events on the day of the mishap with the EA-6B and the cablecar [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) For identification purposes, I am a [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male, born on [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NY. My social security number is [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have a Secret security clearance. I am currently assigned to the 31st OSS, Aviano Air Base, Aviano, Italy. My title is Air Traffic Control Watch Supervisor. I have been an air traffic controller for approximately 17 years with the U.S. Air Force [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) On duty on 03Feb98, the day of the aircraft mishap in question. I started work in the air base control tower at approximately 0545. As far as I can recall, with me on duty that day were: Ssgt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Sgt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a member of the Italian Air Force (whose name I do not recall), a Supervisor of Flying (SOF), and probably another air traffic controller, whose name I do not recall. I also do not remember the name of the SOF, although I know he was an USAF officer, Black male, and on TDY with us for a few weeks [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) One of the air control tower is to monitor aircraft on the ground in order to avoid accidents and mishaps. Once they are in the air, we will give them advisories on what paths to take in order to avoid incoming aircraft, or other aircraft taking off. We have one radar screen in the tower. The radar radius can be adjusted up to 60 miles area of coverage. On that particular day (03Mar98), I think the radar was adjusted for a 30-mile area radius. The tower, however, is only concerned with activity within a five-mile radius. So that five-mile coverage is all we really look at. An air traffic controller may or may not use the radar screen when directing an aircraft in, or out. The aircraft is usually directed visually. Radar Control or RAPCON monitors the activity of aircraft once it leaves our five-mile radius, which is located in separate facilities [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) We have no way of monitoring the weather conditions outside our immediate area. We rely on "PIREPS" - weather reports given by aircraft that have recently returned from that particular area. For example, as an aircraft comes in for a landing, the aircrew may let us know the weather conditions for a certain route, or area where they have just come from. Our role is to relay those reports to any aircrews who are anticipating flying through that particular area if they request it. We do not automatically relay Pireps. They are requested by the flight crew [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was the supervisor for that day. I recall the weather around the base was clear, great conditions for flying. I don't recall how many EA-6Bs we had cleared for take off that day. I do remember that air traffic was very light. The mishap EA-6B requested take off clearance from the base possibly sometime in the morning, although I do not recall the exact time of day. EA-6Bs, from my experience, usually take off in pairs. This particular aircraft was taking off alone. I believe Sgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) or her trainee, SSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) cleared the aircraft for takeoff. During takeoff clearance, the pilot of the aircraft, whose name I do not know, spoke with either (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). It was a quick conversation, which I monitored, as far as I can recall. The aircraft was flying VFR – Visual Flight Rules – where the air traffic control tower has a minimal role in monitoring the aircraft during takeoff. I don't believe that this particular aircrew requested any Pireps, or weather reports of any kind while being cleared for take off. The conversation between the pilot and the control tower was a short one. The aircraft was cleared quickly for takeoff (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Once the aircraft is airborne during a VFR flight, the tower just makes sure that the aircraft is not in conflict with any incoming or outgoing aircraft. After that, the plane is on it's own. After the EA-6B took off, the day was pretty uneventful. Air traffic was very light that day. Approximately an hour after the Prowler took off, we got a report from the DBRITE – a radar screen that monitors what RAPCON sees on their screen - that the EA-6B had squawked "7700" – distress call. RAPCON reported to us that the aircraft had structural damage. RAPCON was talking directly to the pilot at this point. Usually RAPCON will report to us verbatim what the pilot reports. I don't think RAPCON mentioned the aircraft's altitude, or how much fuel it had remaining. Neither the nature of the aircraft's damage, or how it was sustained was reported to us at this point. RAPCON told us to stand by for more information. The next thing that was reported to us by RAPCON was that the aircraft had a hydraulic failure. So we coordinated for the aircraft to make an "arrested" landing – where the landing aircraft hooks on to a cable to facilitate the landing. The aircraft was instructed to proceed to runway 23 for its landing (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The control tower did not initiate direct communications with the mishap aircraft until the aircraft was approximately one (1) mile out, as the aircraft was preparing to land. All of the communications between the aircraft and the airfield up to that point was done with RAPCON. When the aircraft pilot initiated communications with us at the flight tower, Sgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) spoke directly to the pilot. I monitored this transmission, which was a short one, to my recollection. The communication with the pilot was a very routine one. It was just to coordinate the landing. No mention was made of altitudes, the nature of the damage sustained by the aircraft, or how it was sustained. As the EA-6B was coming in, I noticed damage to its stabilizer. The aircraft landed without incident. I witnessed the landing, which was approximately 3000 feet away from the tower. As soon as the plane landed, I saw the aircrew rapidly exit the aircraft. Emergency vehicles were waiting as the aircraft lands (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

approximately 30 minutes later, the SOF in the tower called the aircraft's squadron in order to get some details for his report. I also monitored this conversation, which lasted approximately 90 seconds. The SOF called up and identified himself. It so happened that the pilot of the mishap aircraft answered the phone. I know this because the pilot identified himself to the SOF. The pilot sounded nervous during this conversation. The SOF explained that he needed some details for his report. The pilot stated something to the effect of: "I think I hit a gondola cable". I don't think the pilot elaborated on this. He did not mention the flight path he had been on, nor the altitude he had been flying at the time of the mishap. The pilot did not mention the ski resort, or any other details, as far as I can recall.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

have read and understand this statement, consisting of this and two additional pages, typed for me by Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from information we discussed. I have made and initialed any corrections. This statement is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

24 April 98 (1329)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of April, 1998, at the OSI offices, Aviano, Italy.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

24 April 98 1330

Authority: SECNAVINST 5520.3b of 04Jan93

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0035-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW - LT COL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 24APR98, LtCol [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed by Intelligence Operations Specialist [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at the 31st Fighter Wing, Aviano, Italy for information he had pertaining to noise complaints of low level flights in northern Italy.

As background [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is the commander of the Operations Support Squadron of the 31st Fighter Wing in Aviano AB.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that his squadron investigates aircraft noise complaints, which are forwarded from the Italian Air Force.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added that his Operations Wing Scheduling division reviews flight schedules and routes to determine if the USAF had any aircraft in the area of the complaint. Both positive and negative findings are responded to with a letter signed by the 31st Wing Commander. Reporting agent reviewed all noise complaints maintained on file at the 31st FW. Documentation pertaining to a noise complaint over the Torbole, Trento area is appended as enclosure (1). No other noise complaints pertaining to USMC aircraft during the MAR-SEP96 and AUG97-FEB98 (Q-2's deployments) time frames were noted. Enclosure (2) pertains.

ENCLOSURES

- (1) Documentation re: Torbole noise complaint/various dates.
- (2) Noise complaints documentation/various dates.

BIOGRAPHICAL Data

EMPLOYMENT: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

SSAN [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: NCISFO Europe

DATE TYPED: 25APR98

WARNING

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Pages 423 through 447 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosures (1 - 2) to Exhibit (31): Referred to the Department of the Air Force

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0035-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW - COL. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 24APR98, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Col. USAF, was interviewed by Intelligence Operations Specialist NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at the Dal Molin NATO Base, 5th Allied Tactical Air Force, Vicenza, Italy, regarding noise complaints.

As background, Col. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is the commander of the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that his responsibilities include getting NATO flights out of Italy into his area of responsibility (AOR), which is currently Bosnia.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related that he or his command has not received noise complaints of low-level flights in northern Italy. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) disclosed that his command will usually first contact an aircraft in route to Bosnia once they are half way over the Adriatic Sea. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated that there are no voice communication with an aircraft until they enter that AOR. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that his command had no contact with the EA-6B Prowler on 03FEB98.

When queried if other airports in northern Italy would have recorded the communications transmission between Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and the Aviano control tower on 03FEB98, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated that Padova Air Traffic Control (ATC) might have a copy. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) contacted his Italian counter-part at the 5ATAF, Lt Col NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) who stated the procedure for obtaining a copy of the tape is as follows: Italian Air Staff Ops Roma, 3rd Department, Plans & Policy needs to petition the request to the ITAV CSA, Rome which is the Italian equivalent to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added that the Office of Development and Cooperation, US Embassy Rome, normally processes these requests for the Air Force.

Reporting Agent asked if a copy of the AWACS data recorded on 03FEB98 was available at NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) command. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that no copies were provided to the CAOC. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated that the original tape is currently held at the NATO Airborne Early Warning Command (NAEW), Gielenkirchen, Germany. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) contacted Lt Col NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) who authorized Mr. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to deal directly with NCIS regarding the AWACS tape. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related that recorded flight data is stored on 1/2 inch magnetic media disks which dates back to 1965 technology. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that a flight simulation as well as a color layout, mapping the EA-6B's location can be made from this data.

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0035-7HMS

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) thought that a black and white data reduction had been previously made for the CAOC, however he was unable to locate a copy.

BIOGRAPHICAL Data

EMPLOYMENT: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

SSAN [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED]

POB: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

RESI [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: NCISFO Europe

DATE TYPED: 25APR98

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS
CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 24APR98, [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) District Attorney, Court of Justice, Trento, Italy, was contacted by Reporting Agent and Participating Agents with regard to this investigation. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] was informed that additional investigative inquiries were needed to support the upcoming trial in the United States; and, that the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) was respectfully requesting his authorization to re-interview Italian witnesses, obtain evidence currently held by the Italian Air Force Commander of Aviano Air Base, and conduct other investigative leads directed by trial counsels in the United States. We emphasized that his help in this investigation was deemed critical if we were to complete our leads prior to the scheduled article 32 hearing which is scheduled to commence on 05May98.

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) explained that had the U.S. Government continued to work jointly with the Italian Government on this investigation he would be able to authorize the release of evidence to us, the re-interview of Italian witnesses or any other leads which need to be accomplished. [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) however, emphasized that once the United States asserted primary jurisdiction on subject investigation, it paralyzed his ability to authorize such requests. [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) made it very clear that only through a rogatory, generated by the United States Embassy in Rome and channeled through the Italian Ministry, would he be able to authorize our requests. [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported he would gladly assist us in our investigation and in all our investigative needs once he received the rogatory.

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related he was very disappointed that U.S. officials had not responded to three of his letters (sent to the 31th Fighter Squadron, dated 16Mar98; to Major General [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, dated 01Apr98; and, to Capt [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, AmEmbassy, Rome, dated 17Apr98). According to [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) copies of the unanswered letters in question were also transmitted to the Aviano Military Prosecutor. A photocopy of [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) unanswered letters were provided to Reporting Agent by [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and are appended hereto as enclosures (1) through (3).

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
PAGE 01 OF 02 JP

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was assured we had not seen the letters in question, but would gladly find out why they had not been answered.

EXHIBIT (33)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also related that a letter sent to him by Major General NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) assured him the four members of the mishap flight crew and a pilot designated by NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) would not leave Italian territory without coordination with the proper Italian authorities. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported he was never notified of the mishap crew's departure from Italy by Major General NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and strongly felt their departure should have been coordinated through him since he is the investigating magistrate of the mishap incident in question. Enclosure (4) pertains.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also related he was disappointed that Major General NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not provide him with a report of what had been said at the post JAGMAN investigation press conference (12Mar98), which was held at Aviano Air Base by Major General NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported he was unable to attend the press conference. He also related he was never provided with a copy of the JAGMAN investigation after the completion of the mishap inquiry, and that he had been promised a copy.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was provided with a list of investigative leads which needed to be accomplished by NCIS prior to 05May98. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) accepted the list, and requested that one be faxed to him on official letterhead from Participating Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). Participating Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) informed NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to send any future correspondence, requiring a response, to him (Participating Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and that he would follow up regarding an answer to his request. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) again assured us that once he received the rogatory, he would be able to assist us in all our investigative leads.

ENCLOSURES

- (1) Ltr/ [redacted] /16Mar98
- (2) Ltr/ [redacted] /01Apr98
- (3) Ltr/ [redacted] /17Apr98
- (4) Ltr/ [redacted] /11Feb98

PARTICIPATING AGENTS

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT, NCISFO NAPLES, ITALY
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATOR, NCISFO NAPLES, ITALY

Reporting Agent: [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Office: NCISRA Sigonella, Italy
Date typed: 24Apr98

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PAGE 02 OF 2 JP

Pages 452 through 461 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosures (1 - 4) to Exhibit (33): Contact Italian Prosecutors Office to obtain

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE
AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS/I

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RECEIPT OF TELEPHONE TOLL RECORDS

On 24APR98, contact was made with LT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, VMAQ-4, Aviano, IT, who is responsible for telephone operations for USMC in Aviano. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided telephone numbers for the barracks the mishap flight crew had access to while assigned to USMC, VMAQ-2, in Aviano, IT. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related there are approximately four (4) or five (5) USMC officers assigned to one barrack. Those barracks rooms and telephone numbers are as follows: Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) initially assigned to barracks L1 and subsequently assigned to barracks K1, telephone numbers: (DSN) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (L1) and NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (K1) respectively. Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ECMO-1, barracks N1, telephone number NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ECMO-2, barracks J1, telephone number NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ECMO-3, barracks K1, telephone number NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). In addition, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided telephone numbers for other barracks located in the vicinity of mishap flight crew. Those telephone numbers are [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) barracks N2 and M1 respectively. In addition, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated the mishap crew also utilized the telephone in the USMC Ready Room, while in Aviano. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated the telephone number for the Ready Room is: (DSN) [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also indicated a Telephone Log Sheet is completed when utilizing this particular telephone. This Telephone Log Sheet requires the date and time of the telephone call, the caller's name, the city and state of the called party, the telephone number of the called party, the called party's name and the duration of the telephone call. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he did not have a photocopy of FEB98-S Telephone Log Sheet, but referred reporting agent to the Communications Office, Billing and Records, at Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT, telephone number (DSN) [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) who would be able to provide a copy of same.

On 24APR98, contact was made with Senior Master Sergeant [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, Superintendent, Planning and Implementation Flight and Communications Office, Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT. Request was made to provide telephone toll records for the above cited numbers for FEB98. Request was also made for a photocopy of Telephone Log Sheet, cited above, associated with USMC, VMAQ-2 or VMAQ-4, for FEB98. On 27APR98, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided telephone toll records for the above cited telephone numbers for the month of FEB98, enclosure (1) pertains. In reviewing enclosure (1), numero chiamante is the telephone number for the telephone being used to make the call. Concerning the information provided, data e ora represents the date and time the telephone call was made, numero chiamato represents the telephone number called, durati/scatti is the duration of the clicks (TELECOMITALIA), and importo represents the cost in Italian lire.

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AUTHORIZATION FROM THE NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE.

EXHIBIT (34)

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE
AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS/I
CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

On 28APR98, contact was made with [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Italian National, Accounting Technician, Communications Office, Aviano, IT, who provided a photocopy of Telephone Log Sheet for VMAQ-2/VMAQ-4 covering period 20JAN98 through 27FEB98, enclosure (2) pertains. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also provided corresponding toll tickets, which contain information corresponding to VMAQ-2/VMAQ-4 Telephone Log Sheet cited above, enclosure (3) pertains. The telephone toll tickets are self-explanatory.

As a note, on 23FEB98, Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) sent a facsimilie utilizing telephone extension [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to CAL (California), telephone number [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

ENCLOSURES

1. Fourteen (14) pages of telephone toll records- various numbers/27APR98 ✓
2. Two (2) photocopies of Telephone Log Sheet-VMAQ-2/VMAQ-4/20JAN98-27FEB98
3. Nine (9) pages containing photocopies of thirty-six (36) Toll Tickets, Ready Room-VMAQ-2/VMAQ-4/01FEB98-27FEB98

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

EMPLOYMENT: USMC, VMAQ-4, Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT

SSAN: [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

Senior Master Sergeant [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

EMPLOYMENT: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Flight

SSAN: [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

EMPLOYMENT: Accounting Technician-Communications Office, Customer Service, Billing and Records

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: NCISFO EUROPE, NAPLES, ITALY

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HERE TO. CONTENTS MAY NOT BE DISCLOSED TO THE PARTY(S) CONCERNED WITHOUT SPECIFIC
AUTHORIZATION FROM THE NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE.

SAMPLE

ITALTEL TELEMATICA : XTEL.4
Elaborato da 01 - Stampa dettagliata delle telefonateUS AIR FORCE IN EUROPE
Data elaborazione : 27/04/1998 - Pag 1

Parametri di estrazione : data da 01-01-1998 a 31-01-1998

numero chiamato da / a numero chiamato da 1/ 4572 a 1/ 4572

fascio/traslatore da / a / durata (hhmmss) da / / a / /

numero scatti da a access code da a

account code da a authorization code da a

tipo telefonate: private S su rete privata N altre S urbane S interurbane S internazionali S

Ordinamento per : Numero Chiamante

Data e Ora	Numero chiamato	Durata/Scatti	Importo	Chiamante	Acc.	Account code	Author.	Fascio/Trasl
DATE TIME	NUMBER CALLED	DURATION CLICKS	MONEY (LINE)	EXT. CALLING	code		code	
01/01/1998 20/17	0432905603	/00/21	2	254	1/ 4572		003	15
02/01/1998 14/07	0432905603	/00/29	1	127	1/ 4572		003	7
03/01/1998 3/21	0432905603	/01/07	2	254	1/ 4572		003	8
03/01/1998 12/31	208891	/14/30	6	762	1/ 4572		003	23
03/01/1998 15/28	03683025710	/00/38	1	127	1/ 4572		003	32
03/01/1998 15/30	0432905603	/00/23	2	254	1/ 4572		003	21
03/01/1998 15/40	036830257100	/00/15	1	127	1/ 4572		003	41
03/01/1998 15/52	03683025710	/00/22	1	127	1/ 4572		003	33
03/01/1998 15/53	03683025710	/00/28	1	127	1/ 4572		003	17
03/01/1998 15/54	03683025710	/00/43	2	254	1/ 4572		003	26
03/01/1998 16/17	03683025710	/00/54	2	254	1/ 4572		003	10
03/01/1998 16/34	3124881110	/00/05	1	127	1/ 4572		003	38
03/01/1998 18/23	0432905603	/18/00	22	2.794	1/ 4572		003	29
04/01/1998 20/10	0432905603	/18/59	24	3.048	1/ 4572		003	16
05/01/1998 14/42	656667	/05/19	2	254	1/ 4572		003	24
05/01/1998 19/09	43910	/01/18	1	127	1/ 4572		003	12
05/01/1998 19/19	43910	/08/03	4	508	1/ 4572		003	2
06/01/1998 15/15	570467	/02/00	1	127	1/ 4572		003	16
06/01/1998 22/11	03683025710	/07/43	11	1.397	1/ 4572		003	2
07/01/1998 13/18	656667	/00/39	1	127	1/ 4572		003	32
07/01/1998 14/52	051232185	/01/35	5	635	1/ 4572		003	4
07/01/1998 16/55	656667	/28/19	8	1.016	1/ 4572		003	36
08/01/1998 13/17	656667	/02/19	1	127	1/ 4572		003	27
08/01/1998 13/23	570467	/00/46	2	254	1/ 4572		003	4
08/01/1998 14/19	656667	/01/30	1	127	1/ 4572		003	23
09/01/1998 10/18	656667	/01/53	1	127	1/ 4572		003	34
09/01/1998 11/28	656667	/13/24	4	508	1/ 4572		003	31
09/01/1998 13/01	0432905603	/03/41	10	1.270	1/ 4572		003	42
09/01/1998 14/40	051232185	/00/58	4	508	1/ 4572		003	38
09/01/1998 15/29	656667	/01/06	1	127	1/ 4572		003	5
09/01/1998 16/49	570467	/01/03	2	254	1/ 4572		003	16
09/01/1998 17/53	0432905603	/03/33	5	635	1/ 4572		003	2
10/01/1998 17/23	03683025710	/03/23	5	635	1/ 4572		003	17
11/01/1998 8/29	570467	/02/06	2	254	1/ 4572		003	26
12/01/1998 6/23	656667	/00/15	1	127	1/ 4572		003	5
12/01/1998 10/25	659285	/01/00	1	127	1/ 4572		003	27
12/01/1998 10/26	656667	/06/09	2	254	1/ 4572		003	9
12/01/1998 18/42	749202	/01/15	1	127	1/ 4572		003	21
14/01/1998 8/51	590443	/12/45	11	1.397	1/ 4572		003	22
14/01/1998 10/41	656667	/02/13	1	127	1/ 4572		003	33
14/01/1998 11/25	337387639	/00/37	2	254	1/ 4572		003	19
14/01/1998 13/53	656667	/02/19	1	127	1/ 4572		003	39
14/01/1998 14/06	399612	/01/35	2	254	1/ 4572		003	28
15/01/1998 6/34	656667	/00/22	1	127	1/ 4572		003	33
15/01/1998 8/59	590443	/25/18	21	2.667	1/ 4572		003	24

SAMPLE

SAMPLE

ITALTEL TELEMATICA : XTIL.4

Elaborato da 601 - Stampa dettagliata delle telefonate

US AIR FORCE IN EUROPE

Data elaborazione : 27/04/1998 - Pag 3

Data e ora	Numero chiamato	Durata/Scatti	Importo	Chiamante	Acc. code	Account code	Author. code	Fascio/Trasl code
26/01/1998 13/40	656667	/03/27 1	127	1/ 4572			003	19
26/01/1998 18/36	054322379	/23/44 30	3.810	1/ 4572			003	11
27/01/1998 18/58	0498077970	/34/46 42	5.334	1/ 4572			003	1
27/01/1998 20/12	43910	/10/13 5	635	1/ 4572			003	38
28/01/1998 12/20	590443	/00/34 1	127	1/ 4572			003	8
28/01/1998 15/02	656667	/48/33 14	1.778	1/ 4572			003	29
28/01/1998 18/51	570467	/04/58 3	381	1/ 4572			003	41
29/01/1998 11/07	656667	/15/51 5	635	1/ 4572			003	22
29/01/1998 15/46	656667	/00/29 1	127	1/ 4572			003	30
29/01/1998 20/26	570467	/06/23 3	381	1/ 4572			003	12
30/01/1998 10/14	656667	/00/28 1	127	1/ 4572			003	38
30/01/1998 16/56	0432905603	/05/04 14	1.778	1/ 4572			003	25
31/01/1998 16/26	0432905603	/03/38 5	635	1/ 4572			003	16
31/01/1998 17/01	0432800057	/05/05 7	889	1/ 4572			003	21
31/01/1998 17/14	0432800057	/02/03 3	381	1/ 4572			003	40
31/01/1998 18/57	03388908618	/15/02 21	2.667	1/ 4572			003	30
31/01/1998 20/03	749202	/04/56 1	127	1/ 4572			003	25
Totali fine lavoro: Numero telefonate :		116 Scatti	582 Importi			73.914		

TOTAL
CLICKSTOTAL
LIRA
AMOUNT

SAMPLE

ITALTEL TELEMATICA ; XTIL 4
Elaborato da 601 - Stampa dettagliata delle telefonate

US AIR FORCE IN EUROPE
Data elaborazione : 27/04/1998 - Pag 1

Parametri di estrazione : data da 01-01-1998 a 31-01-1998
 numero chiamato da numero chiamante da 1/ 4572
 a a 1/ 4572
 fascio/traslatore da / a / durata (hhmmss) da / / a / /
 numero scatti da a access code da a
 account code da a authorization code da a
 tipo telefonate: private S su rete privata M altre S urbane S interurbane S internazionali S

Ordinamento per : Numero Chiamante

Data e Ora	Numero chiamato	Durata/Scatti	Importo	Chiamante	Acc. code	Account code	Author. code	Fascio/Trasl
01/01/1998 20/17	0432905603	/00/21	2	254	1/ 4572		003	15
02/01/1998 14/07	0432905603	/00/29	1	127	1/ 4572		003	7
03/01/1998 3/21	0432905603	/01/07	2	254	1/ 4572		003	8
03/01/1998 12/31	208891	/14/30	6	762	1/ 4572		003	23
03/01/1998 15/28	03683025710	/00/38	1	127	1/ 4572		003	32
03/01/1998 15/30	0432905603	/00/23	2	254	1/ 4572		003	21
03/01/1998 15/40	036830257100	/00/15	1	127	1/ 4572		003	41
03/01/1998 15/52	03683025710	/00/22	1	127	1/ 4572		003	33
03/01/1998 15/53	03683025710	/00/28	1	127	1/ 4572		003	17
03/01/1998 15/54	03683025710	/00/43	2	254	1/ 4572		003	26
03/01/1998 16/17	03683025710	/00/54	2	254	1/ 4572		003	10
03/01/1998 16/34	3124881110	/00/05	1	127	1/ 4572		003	38
03/01/1998 18/23	0432905603	/18/00	22	2.794	1/ 4572		003	29
04/01/1998 20/10	0432905603	/18/59	24	3.048	1/ 4572		003	16
05/01/1998 14/42	656667	/05/19	2	254	1/ 4572		003	24
05/01/1998 19/09	43910	/01/18	1	127	1/ 4572		003	12
05/01/1998 19/19	43910	/08/03	4	508	1/ 4572		003	2
06/01/1998 15/15	570467	/02/00	1	127	1/ 4572		003	16
06/01/1998 22/11	03683025710	/07/43	11	1.397	1/ 4572		003	2
07/01/1998 13/18	656667	/00/39	1	127	1/ 4572		003	32
07/01/1998 14/52	051232185	/01/35	5	635	1/ 4572		003	4
07/01/1998 16/55	656667	/28/19	8	1.016	1/ 4572		003	36
08/01/1998 13/17	656667	/02/19	1	127	1/ 4572		003	27
08/01/1998 13/23	570467	/00/46	2	254	1/ 4572		003	4
08/01/1998 14/19	656667	/01/30	1	127	1/ 4572		003	23
09/01/1998 10/18	656667	/01/53	1	127	1/ 4572		003	34
09/01/1998 11/28	656667	/13/24	4	508	1/ 4572		003	31
09/01/1998 13/01	0432905603	/03/41	10	1.270	1/ 4572		003	42
09/01/1998 14/40	051232185	/00/58	4	508	1/ 4572		003	38
09/01/1998 15/29	656667	/01/06	1	127	1/ 4572		003	5
09/01/1998 16/49	570467	/01/03	2	254	1/ 4572		003	16
09/01/1998 17/53	0432905603	/03/33	5	635	1/ 4572		003	2
10/01/1998 17/23	03683025710	/03/23	5	635	1/ 4572		003	17
11/01/1998 8/29	570467	/02/06	2	254	1/ 4572		003	26
12/01/1998 6/23	656667	/00/15	1	127	1/ 4572		003	5
12/01/1998 10/25	659285	/01/00	1	127	1/ 4572		003	27
12/01/1998 10/26	656667	/06/09	2	254	1/ 4572		003	9
12/01/1998 18/42	749202	/01/15	1	127	1/ 4572		003	21
14/01/1998 8/51	590443	/12/45	11	1.397	1/ 4572		003	22
14/01/1998 10/41	656667	/02/13	1	127	1/ 4572		003	33
14/01/1998 11/25	337387639	/00/37	2	254	1/ 4572		003	19
14/01/1998 13/53	656667	/02/19	1	127	1/ 4572		003	39
14/01/1998 14/06	399612	/01/35	2	254	1/ 4572		003	28
15/01/1998 6/34	656667	/00/22	1	127	1/ 4572		003	33
15/01/1998 8/59	590443	/25/18	21	2.667	1/ 4572		003	24

ITALTEL TELEMATICA : XTIL.4

Elaborato da 501 - Stampa dettagliata delle telefonate

US AIR FORCE IN EUROPE

Data elaborazione : 27/04/1998 - Pag 2

Data e ora	Numero chiamato	Durata/Scatti	Importo	Chiamante	Acc. code	Account code	Author. code	Fascio/Trasl
15/01/1998	9/26 590443	/43/38	36	4.572	1/	4572	003	11
15/01/1998	12/31 540099	/00/57	1	127	1/	4572	003	33
16/01/1998	1/28 0498077970	/08/19	10	1.270	1/	4572	003	31
16/01/1998	1/55 666816	/04/34	1	127	1/	4572	003	12
16/01/1998	12/21 656667	/13/30	4	508	1/	4572	003	12
16/01/1998	14/33 43910	/00/25	1	127	1/	4572	003	4
16/01/1998	16/39 0432905602	/09/05	25	3.175	1/	4572	003	5
16/01/1998	19/30 749202	/02/44	1	127	1/	4572	003	27
16/01/1998	20/05 0432800057	/14/49	19	2.413	1/	4572	003	17
17/01/1998	3/32 666805	3/15/22	3	391	1/	4572	003	10
17/01/1998	13/20 570467	/01/38	2	254	1/	4572	003	7
17/01/1998	13/34 0432800057	/12/17	15	1.905	1/	4572	003	39
20/01/1998	3/00 0498077970	/01/54	2	254	1/	4572	003	15
20/01/1998	9/16 656667	/01/46	1	127	1/	4572	003	22
20/01/1998	14/24 590443	/00/36	1	127	1/	4572	003	4
20/01/1998	14/29 656667	/02/35	1	127	1/	4572	003	32
20/01/1998	17/50 570467	/08/43	5	635	1/	4572	003	14
20/01/1998	18/22 656667	/03/54	1	127	1/	4572	003	10
20/01/1998	18/27 656667	/00/42	1	127	1/	4572	003	31
21/01/1998	9/14 656667	/03/36	1	127	1/	4572	003	37
21/01/1998	12/19 656667	/12/09	4	508	1/	4572	003	26
21/01/1998	12/39 656667	/03/46	1	127	1/	4572	003	1
21/01/1998	13/32 656667	/02/51	1	127	1/	4572	003	37
21/01/1998	17/23 656667	/02/18	1	127	1/	4572	003	30
22/01/1998	8/22 39612	/03/31	4	508	1/	4572	003	27
22/01/1998	8/27 656667	/01/04	1	127	1/	4572	003	37
22/01/1998	8/29 399612	/00/57	2	254	1/	4572	003	21
22/01/1998	8/37 399612	/01/14	2	254	1/	4572	003	24
22/01/1998	9/43 399612	/01/03	1	127	1/	4572	003	26
22/01/1998	9/46 399612	/01/32	2	254	1/	4572	003	1
22/01/1998	13/27 656667	/02/00	1	127	1/	4572	003	37
22/01/1998	15/36 399612	/00/39	1	127	1/	4572	003	18
22/01/1998	17/49 0498077970	/00/43	1	127	1/	4572	003	36
22/01/1998	17/50 0498077970	/00/37	1	127	1/	4572	003	30
22/01/1998	17/58 0498077970	/09/44	10	1.270	1/	4572	003	24
22/01/1998	19/47 366091	/10/30	6	762	1/	4572	003	18
22/01/1998	20/37 43910	/00/13	1	127	1/	4572	003	5
23/01/1998	3/25 0498077970	/32/15	39	4.953	1/	4572	003	4
23/01/1998	8/52 590443	/00/34	1	127	1/	4572	003	1
23/01/1998	9/54 652193	/00/30	1	127	1/	4572	003	10
23/01/1998	10/05 39817244145	/00/12	1	127	1/	4572	003	22
23/01/1998	10/06 0817244145	/04/16	11	1.397	1/	4572	003	3
23/01/1998	10/41 590443	/00/40	1	127	1/	4572	003	14
23/01/1998	10/42 0422752273	/00/37	2	254	1/	4572	003	17
23/01/1998	12/56 654915	/01/04	1	127	1/	4572	003	12
23/01/1998	20/00 656667	/01/24	1	127	1/	4572	003	8
24/01/1998	9/34 656667	/00/37	1	127	1/	4572	003	16
24/01/1998	15/07 43910	/04/37	3	381	1/	4572	003	14
24/01/1998	16/56 749202	/02/36	1	127	1/	4572	003	24
24/01/1998	17/17 74217	/01/22	1	127	1/	4572	003	30
24/01/1998	20/27 03475989958	/01/21	3	381	1/	4572	003	41
26/01/1998	8/20 590443	/00/33	2	254	1/	4572	003	30
26/01/1998	8/22 652193	/00/16	1	127	1/	4572	003	18
26/01/1998	12/21 656667	/01/18	1	127	1/	4572	003	11

ITALTEL TELEMATICA : XTIL.4

Elaborato da 601 - Stampa dettagliata delle telefonate

US AIR FORCE IN EUROPE

Data elaborazione : 27/04/1998 - Pag 3

Data e ora	Numero chiamato	Durata/Scatti	Importo	Chiamante	Acc. code	Account code	Author. code	Fascio/Trasl
26/01/1998 13/40	656667	/03/27 1	127	1/ 4572			003	19
26/01/1998 18/36	054322379	/23/44 30	3.910	1/ 4572			003	11
27/01/1998 18/58	0498077970	/34/46 42	5.334	1/ 4572			003	1
27/01/1998 20/12	43910	/10/13 5	635	1/ 4572			003	38
28/01/1998 12/20	590443	/00/34 1	127	1/ 4572			003	8
28/01/1998 15/02	656667	/48/33 14	1.778	1/ 4572			003	29
28/01/1998 18/51	570467	/04/58 3	381	1/ 4572			003	41
29/01/1998 11/07	656667	/15/51 5	635	1/ 4572			003	22
29/01/1998 15/46	656667	/00/29 1	127	1/ 4572			003	30
29/01/1998 20/26	570467	/06/23 3	381	1/ 4572			003	12
30/01/1998 10/14	656667	/00/28 1	127	1/ 4572			003	39
30/01/1998 16/56	0432905603	/05/04 14	1.778	1/ 4572			003	25
31/01/1998 16/26	0432905603	/03/38 5	635	1/ 4572			003	16
31/01/1998 17/01	0432800057	/05/05 7	889	1/ 4572			003	21
31/01/1998 17/14	0432800057	/02/03 3	381	1/ 4572			003	40
31/01/1998 18/57	0338890861E	/15/02 21	2.667	1/ 4572			003	30
31/01/1998 20/03	749202	/04/56 1	127	1/ 4572			003	25
Totali fine lavoro: Numero telefonate :		116 Scatti	582 Importi		73.914			

ITALTEL TELEMATICA : XTIL.4
Elaborato da 601 - Stampa dettagliata delle telefonate

US AIR FORCE IN EUROPE
Data elaborazione : 27/04/1998 - Pag 1

Parametri di estrazione : data da 01-02-1998 a 29-02-1998
 numero chiamato da numero chiamante da 1/ 4572
 a a 1/ 4572
 fascio/traslatore da / a / durata (hhmmss) da / / a / /
 numero scatti da a access code da a
 account code da a authorization code da a
 tipo telefonate: private S su rete privata N altre S urbane S interurbane S internazionali S

Ordinamento per : Numero Chiamante

Data e ora	Numero chiamato	Durata/Scatti	Importo	Chiamante	Acc. code	Account code	Author. code	Fascio/Trasl code
01/02/1998 10/06	03288908618	/04/51	7	889	1/ 4572			003 13
01/02/1998 14/38	0432800057	/09/40	12	1.524	1/ 4572			003 1
02/02/1998 10/27	651761	/03/26	1	127	1/ 4572			003 4
02/02/1998 10/30	656667	/04/14	2	254	1/ 4572			003 40
02/02/1998 12/13	656667	/05/28	2	254	1/ 4572			003 3
02/02/1998 15/10	656667	/01/49	1	127	1/ 4572			003 5
02/02/1998 17/38	656667	/00/51	1	127	1/ 4572			003 39
02/02/1998 19/19	570467	/04/56	3	381	1/ 4572			003 4
02/02/1998 19/38	74217	/05/28	1	127	1/ 4572			003 2
03/02/1998 15/09	656667	/01/24	1	127	1/ 4572			003 13
03/02/1998 15/14	656667	/00/18	1	127	1/ 4572			003 27
03/02/1998 21/13	208891	/29/15	12	1.524	1/ 4572			003 10
04/02/1998 9/33	590443	/16/38	14	1.778	1/ 4572			003 13
04/02/1998 12/08	656667	/06/39	2	254	1/ 4572			003 38
04/02/1998 13/29	656667	/04/32	2	254	1/ 4572			003 40
04/02/1998 15/03	656667	/02/52	1	127	1/ 4572			003 39
04/02/1998 16/36	0498077970	/00/52	3	381	1/ 4572			003 8
04/02/1998 16/37	0432905602	/00/43	2	254	1/ 4572			003 23
04/02/1998 17/10	656667	/00/40	1	127	1/ 4572			003 40
04/02/1998 19/26	590443	/04/06	3	381	1/ 4572			003 17
05/02/1998 5/43	656667	/00/43	1	127	1/ 4572			003 17
05/02/1998 11/47	399612	/01/36	2	254	1/ 4572			003 35
05/02/1998 12/12	399612	/00/51	1	127	1/ 4572			003 9
05/02/1998 15/27	656667	/06/48	2	254	1/ 4572			003 18
05/02/1998 18/16	03388908618	/04/55	57	7.239	1/ 4572			003 3
05/02/1998 18/34	656667	/00/33	1	127	1/ 4572			003 1
05/02/1998 21/41	656667	/05/32	1	127	1/ 4572			003 38
06/02/1998 10/02	656667	/21/53	6	762	1/ 4572			003 6
06/02/1998 12/09	652976	/00/55	1	127	1/ 4572			003 4
06/02/1998 12/33	652976	/00/52	1	127	1/ 4572			003 28
06/02/1998 12/34	652532	/01/02	1	127	1/ 4572			003 38
06/02/1998 13/51	652976	/06/13	2	254	1/ 4572			003 9
06/02/1998 15/31	656667	/03/44	1	127	1/ 4572			003 16
06/02/1998 16/10	656667	/12/31	4	508	1/ 4572			003 15
06/02/1998 16/56	656667	/00/33	1	127	1/ 4572			003 40
06/02/1998 18/03	03388908618	/08/00	93	11.811	1/ 4572			003 16
06/02/1998 18/13	03388908618	/07/07	84	10.668	1/ 4572			003 21
06/02/1998 20/37	349829	2/59/12	72	9.144	1/ 4572			003 15
07/02/1998 10/08	0336380023	/02/59	10	1.270	1/ 4572			003 35
07/02/1998 10/26	0049622455437	/00/44	6	762	1/ 4572			003 28
07/02/1998 13/27	0049622455437	/02/32	17	2.159	1/ 4572			003 7
07/02/1998 15/00	656667	/00/16	1	127	1/ 4572			003 40
07/02/1998 17/58	570467	/08/37	4	508	1/ 4572			003 19
07/02/1998 18/09	949829	1/21/34	34	4.318	1/ 4572			003 15
08/02/1998 8/28	570467	/01/55	2	254	1/ 4572			003 7

ITALTEL TELEMATICA : XTIL.4

Elaborato da601 - Stampa dettagliata delle telefonate

US AIR FORCE IN EUROPE

Data elaborazione : 27/04/1998 - Pag 2

Data e ora	Numero chiamato	Durata/Scatti	Importo	Chiamante	Acc. code	Account code	Author. code	Fascio/Trasl code
08/02/1998 11/27	6273363	/00/23 1	127	1/ 4572			003	38
08/02/1998 11/30	627363	/00/37 1	127	1/ 4572			003	13
08/02/1998 11/54	570467	/02/55 2	254	1/ 4572			003	42
08/02/1998 15/11	627363	/00/46 2	254	1/ 4572			003	12
08/02/1998 18/11	049615629	/03/40 5	635	1/ 4572			003	4
09/02/1998 9/05	656667	/20/54 6	762	1/ 4572			003	21
09/02/1998 15/12	656667	/01/29 1	127	1/ 4572			003	16
09/02/1998 18/10	570467	/07/02 3	381	1/ 4572			003	7
10/02/1998 8/46	0336380033	/03/07 16	2.032	1/ 4572			003	29
10/02/1998 12/54	0336380033	/01/32 4	508	1/ 4572			003	16
10/02/1998 13/33	656667	/09/00 3	391	1/ 4572			003	2
10/02/1998 14/04	0336380033	/00/58 3	361	1/ 4572			003	12
10/02/1998 15/29	656667	/00/21 1	127	1/ 4572			003	29
10/02/1998 21/21	949022	/00/34 2	254	1/ 4572			003	9
11/02/1998 6/57	0336380033	/00/57 3	381	1/ 4572			003	16
11/02/1998 12/02	6525522	/01/53 1	127	1/ 4572			003	22
11/02/1998 12/55	656667	/05/36 2	254	1/ 4572			003	7
11/02/1998 16/03	656667	/00/42 1	127	1/ 4572			003	19
12/02/1998 7/25	660000	/00/22 1	127	1/ 4572			003	5
12/02/1998 7/36	652976	/00/44 1	127	1/ 4572			003	34
12/02/1998 9/55	0336380033	/01/39 8	1.016	1/ 4572			003	6
12/02/1998 10/48	570467	/01/13 2	254	1/ 4572			003	24
12/02/1998 13/13	656667	/05/06 2	254	1/ 4572			003	23
12/02/1998 14/44	27901	/01/23 1	127	1/ 4572			003	36
12/02/1998 15/16	656667	/06/37 2	254	1/ 4572			003	2
12/02/1998 21/41	949022	/01/28 1	127	1/ 4572			003	15
14/02/1998 15/18	0336365716	/02/40 4	508	1/ 4572			003	14
14/02/1998 15/21	033632821	/02/01 4	508	1/ 4572			003	25
14/02/1998 15/26	749202	/00/45 1	127	1/ 4572			003	3
14/02/1998 15/30	652976	/02/12 1	127	1/ 4572			003	10
14/02/1998 18/48	749202	/07/15 2	254	1/ 4572			003	41
14/02/1998 20/56	3126354663	/01/17 1	127	1/ 4572			003	7
14/02/1998 20/59	3126354663	/00/39 2	254	1/ 4572			003	17
14/02/1998 21/06	3122631000	/00/42 1	127	1/ 4572			003	5
14/02/1998 21/13	3126354	/00/18 1	127	1/ 4572			003	4
14/02/1998 21/21	4102631110	/00/11 1	127	1/ 4572			003	2
14/02/1998 21/27	3124453000	/00/10 1	127	1/ 4572			003	23
15/02/1998 17/48	949886	/09/28 5	635	1/ 4572			003	19
15/02/1998 18/11	0016174720491	/02/25 15	1.905	1/ 4572			003	34
15/02/1998 18/32	0818047425	/02/41 4	508	1/ 4572			003	41
15/02/1998 18/35	0815269765	/17/14 22	2.794	1/ 4572			003	2
16/02/1998 7/16	656667	/00/40 1	127	1/ 4572			003	32
16/02/1998 7/37	656667	/00/31 1	127	1/ 4572			003	39
17/02/1998 3/09	656667	/01/24 1	127	1/ 4572			003	11
17/02/1998 15/51	168	/00/54 2	254	1/ 4572			003	4
17/02/1998 19/14	749202	/04/07 1	127	1/ 4572			003	6
17/02/1998 22/39	656667	/00/26 1	127	1/ 4572			003	21
18/02/1998 7/10	656667	/04/16 2	254	1/ 4572			003	13
27/02/1998 15/22	399612	/01/28 2	254	1/ 4572			003	26
Totali fine lavoro: Numero telefonate :		94 Scatti	628 Importi	79.756				

ITALTEL TELEMATICA : XTIL.4
 Elaborato da 601 - Stampa dettagliata delle telefonate

US AIR FORCE IN EUROPE
 Data elaborazione : 27/04/1998 - Pag 1

Parametri di estrazione : data da 01-02-1998 a 28-02-1998
 numero chiamato da a numero chiamante da 1/ 4585
 a a 1/ 4585
 fascio/traslatore da / a / durata (hhmmss) da / / a / /
 numero scatti da a access code da a
 account code da a authorization code da a
 tipo telefonate: private S su rete privata N altre S urbane S interurbane S internazionali S

Ordinamento per : Numero Chiamante

Data e ora	Numero chiamato	Durata/Scatti	Importo	Chiamante	Acc. code	Account code	Author. code	Fascio/Trasl code
13/02/1998 19/36	656667	/01/57 1	127	1/ 4585			003	16
16/02/1998 19/03	656667	/00/44 1	127	1/ 4585			003	36
18/02/1998 11/19	399612	/03/45 4	508	1/ 4585			003	9
28/02/1998 15/50	656667	/10/22 2	254	1/ 4585			003	19
Totali fine lavoro: Numero telefonate :		4 Scatti	8 Importi		1.016			

ITALTEL TELEMATICA : XTIL.4
 Elaborato da 601 - Stampa dettagliata delle telefonate

US AIR FORCE IN EUROPE
 Data elaborazione : 27/04/1998 - Pag 1

Parametri di estrazione : data da 01-02-1998 a 29-02-1998
 numero chiamato da a numero chiamante da 1/ 4586
 a 1/ 4586
 fascio/traslatore da / a / durata (hh:mm:ss) da / / a / /
 numero scatti da a access code da a
 account code da a authorization code da a
 tipo telefonate: private S su rete privata N altre S urbane S interurbane S internazionali S

Ordinamento per : Numero Chiamante

Data e ora	Numero chiamato	Durata/Scatti	Importo	Chiamante	Acc. code	Account code	Author. code	Fascio/Trasl
10/02/1998 10/17	0336380033	/01/49 9	1.143	1/ 4586			003	4
11/02/1998 7/14	0336380033	/04/01 13	1.651	1/ 4586			003	19
12/02/1998 12/57	0336380033	/01/11 4	508	1/ 4586			003	34
14/02/1998 18/28	652552	/02/50 1	127	1/ 4586			003	14
14/02/1998 18/33	74091	/02/04 1	127	1/ 4586			003	16
14/02/1998 18/37	748820	/00/28 1	127	1/ 4586			003	9
14/02/1998 18/37	748986	/00/21 1	127	1/ 4586			003	22
14/02/1998 18/38	999870	/00/22 2	254	1/ 4586			003	23
14/02/1998 18/40	74025	/00/44 1	127	1/ 4586			003	12
Totali fine lavoro: Numero telefonate :		9 Scatti	33 Importi		4.191			

ITALTEL TELEMATICA : XTIL.4
 Elaborato da 601 - Stampa dettagliata delle telefonate

US AIR FORCE IN EUROPE
 Data elaborazione : 27/04/1998 - Pag 1

Parametri di estrazione : data da 01-02-1998 a 28-02-1998
 numero chiamato da numero chiamante da 1/ 4587
 a a 1/ 4587
 fascio/traslatore da / a / durata (hhmmss) da / / a / /
 numero scatti da a access code da a
 account code da a authorization code da a
 tipo telefonate: private S su rete privata N altre S urbane S interurbane S internazionali S

Ordinamento per : Numero Chiamante

Data e ora	Numero chiamato	Durata/Scatti	Importo	Chiamante	Acc. code	Account code	Author. code	Fascio/Trasl
04/02/1998 22/59	565535	/02/00 1	127	1/ 4587			003	16
04/02/1998 23/00	78811	/01/39 1	127	1/ 4587			003	29
07/02/1998 20/36	0338863308	/01/07 2	254	1/ 4587			003	6
27/02/1998 16/51	651659	/02/46 1	127	1/ 4587			003	41
Totali fine lavoro: Numero telefonate :		4 Scatti	5 Importi		635			

ITALTEL TELEMATICA : XTIL.4
 Elaborato da 601 - Stampa dettagliata delle telefonate

US AIR FORCE IN EUROPE
 Data elaborazione : 27/04/1998 - Pag 1

Parametri di estrazione : data da 01-02-1998 a 28-02-1998
 numero chiamato da a numero chiamante da 1/ 4588 a 1/ 4588
 fascio/traslatore da / a / durata (hh:mm:ss) da / / a / /
 numero scatti da a access code da a
 account code da a authorization code da a
 tipo telefonate: private S su rete privata N altre S urbane S interurbane S internazionali S

Ordinamento per : Numero Chiamante

Data e ora	Numero chiamato	Durata/Scatti	Importo	Chiamante	Acc. code	Account code	Author. code	Fascio/Trasl
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Totale fine lavoro: Numero telefonate : Scatti Importi

ITALTEL TELEMATICA : XTIL.4
 Elaborato da 01 - Stampa dettagliata delle telefonate

US AIR FORCE IN EUROPE
 Data elaborazione : 27/04/1998 - Pag 1

Parametri di estrazione : data da 01-02-1998 a 28-02-1998
 numero chiamato da a numero chiamante da 1/ 4589
 a a 1/ 4589
 fascio/traslatore da / a / durata (hhmmss) da / / a / /
 numero scatti da a access code da a
 account code da a authorization code da a
 tipo telefonate: private S su rete privata N altre S urbane S interurbane S internazionali S

Ordinamento per : Numero Chiamante

Data e ora	Numero chiamato	Durata/Scatti	Importo	Chiamante	Acc. code	Account code	Author. code	Fascio/Trasl
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Totale fine lavoro: Numero telefonate : Scatti Importi

ITALTEL TELEMATICA : XTIL.4
Elaborato da 01 - Stampa dettagliata delle telefonate

US AIR FORCE IN EUROPE
Data elaborazione : 27/04/1998 - Pag 1

Parametri di estrazione : data da 01-02-1998 a 28-02-1998
 numero chiamato da a numero chiamante da 1/ 8625 a 1/ 8625
 fascio/traslatore da / a / durata (hhmmss) da / / a / /
 numero scatti da a access code da a
 account code da a authorization code da a
 tipo telefonate: private S su rete privata N altre S urbane S interurbane S internazionali S

Ordinamento per : Numero Chiamante

Data e ora	Numero chiamato	Durata/Scatti	Importo	Chiamante	Acc. code	Account code	Author. code	Fascio/Trasl
01/02/1998 12/03 168		/00/34	2	254	1/ 8625		003	36
01/02/1998 12/36 03358104436		/05/50	10	1.270	1/ 8625		003	5
01/02/1998 13/01 03358104436		/02/49	5	635	1/ 8625		003	21
01/02/1998 17/30 0336380033		/01/11	2	254	1/ 8625		003	41
02/02/1998 5/18 03358104436		/01/02	2	254	1/ 8625		003	10
02/02/1998 6/23 03358104436		/02/20	4	508	1/ 8625		003	27
02/02/1998 12/31 0336380033		/02/13	3	1.016	1/ 8625		003	34
02/02/1998 13/24 660394		/01/41	1	127	1/ 8625		003	14
02/02/1998 14/44 033		/04/55	15	1.905	1/ 8625		003	41
02/02/1998 17/47 03358104436		/08/08	16	2.032	1/ 8625		003	34
02/02/1998 19/09 0336380033		/02/01	4	508	1/ 8625		003	12
03/02/1998 6/42 0336380033		/00/53	2	254	1/ 8625		003	4
03/02/1998 12/18 0336380033		/00/27	1	127	1/ 8625		003	32
03/02/1998 14/25 0336380033		/01/54	6	762	1/ 8625		003	13
03/02/1998 14/41 0336380033		/01/04	4	508	1/ 8625		003	40
03/02/1998 15/30 168		/00/39	2	254	1/ 8625		003	4
03/02/1998 16/24 168		/00/36	2	254	1/ 8625		003	11
03/02/1998 17/24 0336380087		/00/42	2	254	1/ 8625		003	33
03/02/1998 19/03 168		/00/24	2	254	1/ 8625		003	4
03/02/1998 19/04 168		/00/36	2	254	1/ 8625		003	23
03/02/1998 19/37 0336380087		/01/21	3	381	1/ 8625		003	28
03/02/1998 19/43 0336380087		/01/35	4	508	1/ 8625		003	15
03/02/1998 19/48 033		/00/54	2	254	1/ 8625		003	10
03/02/1998 20/16 168		/00/42	2	254	1/ 8625		003	7
03/02/1998 20/39 168		/00/36	2	254	1/ 8625		003	29
03/02/1998 20/41 0336380087		/00/47	1	127	1/ 8625		003	10
04/02/1998 +8/14 0337546		/06/41	34	4.318	1/ 8625		003	28
04/02/1998 8/37 033		/05/52	28	3.556	1/ 8625		003	3
04/02/1998 10/36 168		/00/45	2	254	1/ 8625		003	4
04/02/1998 18/36 168		/00/40	2	254	1/ 8625		003	23
04/02/1998 20/13 168		/00/37	2	254	1/ 8625		003	31
04/02/1998 20/28 168		/00/46	2	254	1/ 8625		003	7
04/02/1998 22/03 565535		/00/26	1	127	1/ 8625		003	10
05/02/1998 1/05 168		/00/44	2	254	1/ 8625		003	29
05/02/1998 5/16 168		/00/44	2	254	1/ 8625		003	2
05/02/1998 9/23 168		/00/35	2	254	1/ 8625		003	4
05/02/1998 9/31 168		/00/39	2	254	1/ 8625		003	33
05/02/1998 10/09 168		/00/39	2	254	1/ 8625		003	26
05/02/1998 15/26 0444288900		/02/13	7	889	1/ 8625		003	23
05/02/1998 15/40 168		/00/38	2	254	1/ 8625		003	39
05/02/1998 15/46 0336380033		/02/20	7	989	1/ 8625		003	4
05/02/1998 15/49 168		/00/39	2	254	1/ 8625		003	36
05/02/1998 15/58 168		/00/39	2	254	1/ 8625		003	2
05/02/1998 16/49 656667		/01/28	1	127	1/ 8625		003	5
05/02/1998 20/50 0337546492		/01/14	3	381	1/ 8625		003	30

ITALTEL TELEMATICA : XTIL.4

Elaborato da 601 - Stampa dettagliata delle telefonate

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Data e ora	Numero chiamato	Durata/Scatti	Importo	Chiamante	Acc. code	Account code	Author. code	Fascio/Trasl code
06/02/1998	1/13 565535	/06/21	3	381	1/	8625	003	39
06/02/1998	5/59 168	/00/47	2	254	1/	8625	003	4
06/02/1998	10/36 565535	/00/43	1	127	1/	8625	003	12
06/02/1998	15/27 168	/00/40	2	254	1/	8625	003	40
06/02/1998	19/26 749145	/00/26	1	127	1/	8625	003	24
07/02/1998	5/07 168	/00/39	2	254	1/	8625	003	42
07/02/1998	11/39 168	/00/48	2	254	1/	8625	003	28
07/02/1998	11/46 168	/00/42	2	254	1/	8625	003	12
07/02/1998	12/16 0019194448250	/08/29	47	5.969	1/	8625	003	11
07/02/1998	23/31 168	/00/37	2	254	1/	8625	003	4
08/02/1998	9/29 570467	/00/36	1	127	1/	8625	003	22
08/02/1998	9/50 168	/00/37	2	254	1/	8625	003	19
08/02/1998	18/09 0336380033	/02/08	4	508	1/	8625	003	9
08/02/1998	20/47 168	/00/38	2	254	1/	8625	003	7
08/02/1998	21/07 168	/00/39	2	254	1/	8625	003	40
09/02/1998	5/45 168	/00/41	2	254	1/	8625	003	9
09/02/1998	6/56 0336380033	/00/46	2	254	1/	8625	003	42
09/02/1998	9/35 168	/00/41	2	254	1/	8625	003	3
09/02/1998	10/54 0336380033	/00/49	5	635	1/	8625	003	10
09/02/1998	11/10 0336380033	/00/36	2	254	1/	8625	003	36
09/02/1998	15/14 168	/00/38	2	254	1/	8625	003	7
09/02/1998	16/29 651659	/00/20	1	127	1/	8625	003	41
09/02/1998	16/30 651659	/02/02	1	127	1/	8625	003	10
09/02/1998	16/42 0337972364	/00/45	2	254	1/	8625	003	41
09/02/1998	16/44 0337972364	/00/36	2	254	1/	8625	003	13
10/02/1998	9/23 0337972364	/00/45	3	381	1/	8625	003	5
10/02/1998	10/25 168	/00/38	2	254	1/	8625	003	31
10/02/1998	19/52 168	/00/38	2	254	1/	8625	003	34
10/02/1998	19/53 168	/00/49	2	254	1/	8625	003	42
11/02/1998	12/45 168	/00/35	2	254	1/	8625	003	15
11/02/1998	12/46 168	/00/35	2	254	1/	8625	003	36
11/02/1998	12/46 168	/00/35	2	254	1/	8625	003	13
11/02/1998	14/13 922833	/08/57	8	1.016	1/	8625	003	13
11/02/1998	14/34 651256	/02/59	1	127	1/	8625	003	38
11/02/1998	14/43 168	/00/36	2	254	1/	8625	003	11
11/02/1998	17/39 6512	/00/32	1	127	1/	8625	003	8
11/02/1998	17/40 651256	/00/58	1	127	1/	8625	003	9
12/02/1998	7/01 168	/00/35	2	254	1/	8625	003	15
12/02/1998	9/32 0337972364	/01/18	7	889	1/	8625	003	7
12/02/1998	12/02 168	/00/43	2	254	1/	8625	003	37
12/02/1998	15/59 168	/00/29	2	254	1/	8625	003	18
12/02/1998	16/06 168	/00/36	2	254	1/	8625	003	36
12/02/1998	16/53 168	/00/37	2	254	1/	8625	003	36
12/02/1998	17/09 168	/00/35	2	254	1/	8625	003	31
12/02/1998	17/19 30862	/01/46	3	381	1/	8625	003	38
12/02/1998	18/21 168	/00/34	2	254	1/	8625	003	30
13/02/1998	4/28 651256	/01/43	1	127	1/	8625	003	26
13/02/1998	4/30 651256	/03/26	1	127	1/	8625	003	30
13/02/1998	5/30 651256	/01/14	1	127	1/	8625	003	41
13/02/1998	12/18 168	/00/55	2	254	1/	8625	003	22
13/02/1998	17/21 168	/00/44	2	254	1/	8625	003	42
13/02/1998	17/33 168	/00/46	2	254	1/	8625	003	42
13/02/1998	20/30 168	/00/50	2	254	1/	8625	003	37
13/02/1998	22/44 168	/00/45	2	254	1/	8625	003	17

ITALTEL TELEMATICA : XTIL.4

Elaborato da 601 - Stampa dettagliata delle telefonate

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Data e ora	Numero chiamato	Durata/Scatti	Importo	Chiamante	Acc. code	Account code	Author. code	Fascio/Trasli code
14/02/1998	702 168	/00/45	2	254	1/	8625		003 42
14/02/1998	9/26 168	/00/45	2	254	1/	8625		003 17
14/02/1998	10/02 168	/00/32	2	254	1/	8625		003 30
14/02/1998	10/24 168	/00/31	2	254	1/	8625		003 29
14/02/1998	11/07 163	/00/44	2	254	1/	8625		003 19
14/02/1998	12/13 168	/00/48	2	254	1/	8625		003 19
14/02/1998	13/51 656667	/00/43	1	127	1/	8625		003 15
14/02/1998	14/53 168	/00/37	2	254	1/	8625		003 19
14/02/1998	15/22 168	/00/35	2	254	1/	8625		003 17
14/02/1998	17/04 168	/00/40	2	254	1/	8625		003 22
14/02/1998	17/06 168	/00/39	2	254	1/	8625		003 30
14/02/1998	17/08 168	/00/36	2	254	1/	8625		003 31
14/02/1998	17/11 168	/00/43	2	254	1/	8625		003 26
14/02/1998	17/14 168	/00/35	2	254	1/	8625		003 24
14/02/1998	18/06 168	/00/33	2	254	1/	8625		003 40
14/02/1998	18/54 652552	/02/52	1	127	1/	8625		003 36
14/02/1998	19/04 656667	/01/06	1	127	1/	8625		003 13
14/02/1998	23/11 168	/00/33	2	254	1/	8625		003 32
14/02/1998	23/21 168	/00/34	2	254	1/	8625		003 17
15/02/1998	6/26 168	/00/38	2	254	1/	8625		003 4
15/02/1998	9/48 652552	/01/07	1	127	1/	8625		003 16
15/02/1998	11/35 0336380033	/02/13	4	508	1/	8625		003 29
15/02/1998	12/08 168	/00/47	2	254	1/	8625		003 12
15/02/1998	12/25 168	/00/40	2	254	1/	8625		003 8
15/02/1998	13/04 0049	/02/20	12	1.524	1/	8625		003 17
15/02/1998	13/29 00491712279961	/00/23	4	508	1/	8625		003 35
15/02/1998	13/40 00491712279961	/02/02	12	1.524	1/	8625		003 40
15/02/1998	19/15 0336380033	/00/46	2	254	1/	8625		003 7
15/02/1998	20/25 656667	/01/24	1	127	1/	8625		003 33
15/02/1998	20/38 168	/00/41	2	254	1/	8625		003 24
15/02/1998	20/40 168	/00/38	2	254	1/	8625		003 39
16/02/1998	4/34 168	/00/45	2	254	1/	8625		003 25
16/02/1998	4/53 168	/00/30	2	254	1/	8625		003 9
16/02/1998	8/05 168	/00/42	2	254	1/	8625		003 36
16/02/1998	10/43 083	/00/32	2	254	1/	8625		003 14
16/02/1998	10/44 033638	/00/56	4	508	1/	8625		003 22
16/02/1998	15/43 168	/00/44	2	254	1/	8625		002 14
16/02/1998	23/27 168	/00/42	2	254	1/	8625		003 31
17/02/1998	8/22 168	/00/38	2	254	1/	8625		003 36
17/02/1998	14/25 168	/00/41	2	254	1/	8625		003 35
17/02/1998	14/26 168	/00/33	2	254	1/	8625		003 36
17/02/1998	14/28 168	/00/33	2	254	1/	8625		003 38
17/02/1998	14/31 168	/00/34	2	254	1/	8625		003 30
17/02/1998	14/54 168	/00/38	2	254	1/	8625		003 27
17/02/1998	14/56 168	/00/44	2	254	1/	8625		003 6
17/02/1998	15/57 168	/00/40	2	254	1/	8625		003 30
17/02/1998	15/58 168	/00/51	2	254	1/	8625		003 22
17/02/1998	16/43 651659	/03/27	1	127	1/	8625		003 41
17/02/1998	18/13 168	/00/44	2	254	1/	8625		003 27
17/02/1998	18/29 168	/00/44	2	254	1/	8625		003 25
18/02/1998	6/27 168	/00/38	2	254	1/	8625		003 4
18/02/1998	6/29 168	/00/38	2	254	1/	8625		003 11
18/02/1998	6/56 168	/00/42	2	254	1/	8625		003 18
18/02/1998	7/56 168	/00/39	2	254	1/	8625		003 32

ITALTEL TELEMATICA : XTIL.4

Elaborato da 601 - Stampa dettagliata delle telefonate

US AIR FORCE IN EUROPE

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Data e ora	Numero chiamato	Durata/Scatti	Importo	Chiamante	Acc. code	Account code	Author. code	Fascio/Trasl
18/02/1998 14/46	00491712279961	/02/07 15	1.905	1/ 8625			003	33
18/02/1998 17/02	00491712279961	/02/03 13	1.651	1/ 8625			003	30
19/02/1998 7/11	168	/00/44 2	254	1/ 8625			003	11
19/02/1998 7/12	168	/00/44 2	254	1/ 8625			003	18
19/02/1998 7/14	168	/00/39 2	254	1/ 8625			003	30
19/02/1998 7/17	168	/00/51 2	254	1/ 8625			003	4
19/02/1998 7/18	168	/00/44 2	254	1/ 8625			003	28
19/02/1998 12/16	168	/00/39 2	254	1/ 8625			003	35
19/02/1998 16/52	168	/00/48 2	254	1/ 8625			003	6
20/02/1998 12/25	168	/00/57 2	254	1/ 8625			003	9
20/02/1998 17/30	168	/00/37 2	254	1/ 8625			003	17
20/02/1998 17/35	1	/00/44 2	254	1/ 8625			003	15
20/02/1998 17/36	168	/00/39 2	254	1/ 8625			003	17
20/02/1998 17/37	168	/00/55 2	254	1/ 8625			003	11
20/02/1998 17/38	168	/00/41 2	254	1/ 8625			003	35
20/02/1998 17/39	168	/00/26 2	254	1/ 8625			003	14
20/02/1998 17/41	168	/00/21 2	254	1/ 8625			003	28
20/02/1998 17/43	168	/00/21 2	254	1/ 8625			003	2
20/02/1998 17/44	168	/00/22 2	254	1/ 8625			003	9
20/02/1998 17/44	168	/00/29 2	254	1/ 8625			003	16
20/02/1998 17/46	168	/00/22 2	254	1/ 8625			003	32
20/02/1998 17/46	168	/00/20 2	254	1/ 8625			003	34
22/02/1998 11/42	0336380033	/04/25 7	889	1/ 8625			003	32
22/02/1998 13/29	168	/00/47 2	254	1/ 8625			003	21
22/02/1998 13/38	168	/00/41 2	254	1/ 8625			003	37
22/02/1998 14/25	0444280664	/00/59 2	254	1/ 8625			003	4
22/02/1998 14/44	168	/00/42 2	254	1/ 8625			003	4
23/02/1998 15/47	0335810	/04/22 14	1.778	1/ 8625			003	12
23/02/1998 16/35	0336	/03/08 10	1.270	1/ 8625			003	27
23/02/1998 18/10	03358104	/03/10 7	989	1/ 8625			003	23
24/02/1998 10/21	168	/00/47 2	254	1/ 8625			003	39
24/02/1998 16/36	0336380033	/02/43 9	1.143	1/ 8625			003	42
24/02/1998 16/55	168	/00/49 2	254	1/ 8625			003	34
24/02/1998 17/14	168	/00/32 2	254	1/ 8625			003	35
24/02/1998 20/38	168	/00/43 2	254	1/ 8625			003	30
26/02/1998 7/02	0032757	/02/20 13	1.651	1/ 8625			003	23
26/02/1998 9/45	003275763487	/03/57 24	3.048	1/ 8625			003	18
26/02/1998 13/12	003275763487	/03/08 13	1.651	1/ 8625			003	4
27/02/1998 11/14	0456304157	/00/40 3	381	1/ 8625			003	31
27/02/1998 11/40	0456304157	/12/55 35	4.445	1/ 8625			003	1
27/02/1998 16/29	168	/00/43 2	254	1/ 8625			003	34
27/02/1998 18/26	168	/00/36 2	254	1/ 8625			003	9
27/02/1998 18/30	168	/00/37 2	254	1/ 8625			003	26
27/02/1998 18/31	168	/00/40 2	254	1/ 8625			003	6
27/02/1998 18/44	168	/00/42 2	254	1/ 8625			003	33
27/02/1998 18/49	168	/00/37 2	254	1/ 8625			003	35
27/02/1998 18/51	168	/00/36 2	254	1/ 8625			003	38
27/02/1998 20/15	168	/00/36 2	254	1/ 8625			003	33
28/02/1998 5/49	168	/00/32 2	254	1/ 8625			003	39
28/02/1998 5/51	168	/00/39 2	254	1/ 8625			003	3
28/02/1998 5/52	168	/00/35 2	254	1/ 8625			003	12
28/02/1998 5/54	168	/00/40 2	254	1/ 8625			003	22
28/02/1998 5/57	168	/00/41 2	254	1/ 8625			003	6
28/02/1998 5/59	168	/00/36 2	254	1/ 8625			003	33

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P.14

Pages 480 through 490 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosure (2) to Exhibit (34): Referred to the Department of the Air Force

Statement

PLACE: AVIANO AFB, ITALY

DATE: 25APR98

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Lt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) make the following free and voluntary statement to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of corrections to a statement I made yesterday to Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) regarding the 03FEB98 Aviano Prowler mishap flight. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) For purposes of identification, I am NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) years old, born in NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) My SSN# is NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I presently am assigned to VMAQ. My rate is 0-2 in the United States Marine Corps. I have a top secret security clearance. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The correction to yesterday's statement is as follows. For clarification, aside from the mishap flight, I mentioned that there was only one other Prowler flight on that day, and that I was part of the aircrew. I stated that MAJ NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) piloted the flight. I was a backseat ECMO, I can't recall which seat. The correction is that "the flight" included two separate Prowlers flying together, and as I recall, the other Prowler was flown by CAPT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from VMAQ-2. Likewise, my crew was also from VMAQ-2, except for me. I do not know who was in the crew by name except for the Major. I am not aware of any RADALT problems or any sort of mechanical incidents from his plane to the best of my knowledge. Further, I do not recall my plane's tail number and am unsure if it was the same aircraft used later that day by CAPT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the mishap flight or if NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) plane was the one used. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have read the preceding page statement prepared for me at my request by Special Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from information that I provided. I have been allowed to make any necessary changes that I see fit. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Date: 25 Apr 98 Time: 11:34

Subscribed and sworn before me this 25th day of April, 1998 at Aviano AFB, Italy.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Agent, NCIS

AUTHORITY: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

Exhibit (55)

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

PLACE: NCISRA SIGONELLA

DATE: 25APR98

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SENIOR AIRMAN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) MAKE THE FOLLOWING FREE AND VOLUNTARY STATEMENT TO NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) WHOM I KNOW TO BE A SPECIAL AGENT OF THE NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE. I MAKE THIS STATEMENT OF MY OWN FREE WILL AND WITHOUT ANY THREATS MADE TO ME OR PROMISES EXTENDED. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT THIS STATEMENT IS GIVEN WITH REGARD TO THE CAVALESE MISHAP OF 03FEB98 WHICH INVOLVED AN EA-6B MARINE PROWLER HITTING A SKI GONDOLA CABLE AND KILLING ALL 20 PEOPLE ON BOARD NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES, I AM A NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) MALE; DOB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) POB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C); I AM CURRENTLY ASSIGNED AS AN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER AT THE RADAR APPROACH CONTROL (RAPCON) FACILITY, FLIGHT LINE AREA, AVIANO AIR BASE, ITALY. MY UNIT IS THE 31TH OPERATIONS SUPPORT SQUADRON (OSS). NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) MY WORK SCHEDULE VARIES. MY WORK TELEPHONE NUMBER IS NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I FIRST ARRIVED IN AVIANO, ITALY IN OCT96, AT WHICH TIME I WAS ASSIGNED AT THE RAPCON ABOARD AVIANO AIR BASE. MY AVERAGE WORK WEEK CONSISTS OF ABOUT 48 HOURS. AT ANY RATE, ON 03FEB98, I WAS WORKING EITHER THE DAY SHIFT (0700 HRS TO 1400 HRS) OR THE SWING SHIFT (1400 HRS TO 2200 HRS), I DON'T EXACTLY REMEMBER WHICH ONE; HOWEVER, I DO RECALL THAT I WAS ON DUTY. I WAS SITTING AT MY POSITION WHEN I OVERHEARD THE APPROACH CONTROLLER TELL THE WATCH SUPERVISOR THAT THERE WAS AN EMERGENCY INVOLVING AN INBOUND AIRCRAFT. I HAD NO IDEA, AT THE TIME, WHAT KIND OF AIRCRAFT IT WAS OR WHAT KIND OF AN EMERGENCY IT INVOLVED. SINCE MY PLACE OF WORK AT THE TIME WAS NOT WITH THE APPROACH CONTROLLER, I DID NOT HEAR ANYTHING SAID BY THE AIRCRAFT CREW TO THE HIM, NOR DO I EVEN KNOW WHO THE APPROACH CONTROLLER WAS AT THE TIME. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I NEVER TALKED TO ANY OF THE FLIGHT CREW OF THE TROUBLED AIRCRAFT, NOR DID I KNOW WHO THEY WERE. NOT EVEN AFTER THE TROUBLED AIRCRAFT LANDED DID I HEAR ANYONE IN RAPCON TALK ABOUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED WITH REGARD TO THE TROUBLED AIRCRAFT. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I FOUND OUT ABOUT THE AERIAL MISHAP LATER THAT DAY WHILE WATCHING CNN AT WORK. I REALLY DON'T HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO ADD REGARDING THE AERIAL MISHAP IN QUESTION. I NEVER EVEN SAW THE AIRCRAFT IN QUESTION AFTER THE LANDING. IN SHORT, I WAS NEVER IN THE LOOP ON ANYTHING CONCERNING THE INCIDENT IN QUESTION. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) THIS STATEMENT, CONSISTING OF 2 PAGES WAS PREPARED FOR ME, BY SPECIAL AGENT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) AS WE DISCUSSED THE DETAILS. I HAVE REVIEWED THIS STATEMENT AND HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO MAKE ANY CORRECTIONS, DELETIONS, CHANGES, OR ADDITIONS AS I SEE FIT FOR ANY REASON I SO DESIRE. I HAVE INITIALED SUCH CHANGES AND HAVE NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

000492 NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 Apr 98

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT 136
25 Apr 98

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SIGNED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE. THIS STATEMENT IS TRUE AND
CORRECT TO THE VERY BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND RECOLLECTION. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 APR 98 1607

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO ME THIS 25TH OF APRIL 1998, AT AVIANO AIR
BASE, ITALY. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 Apr 98 1607

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) AUTHORITY: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04 JAN 93

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 APR 98

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 Apr 98

STATEMENT

PLACE: *Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT*

DATE: *25APR98*

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), make the following free and voluntary statement to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of concerning my knowledge of the EA-6B mishap occurring on 03FEB98.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) For the purpose of identification, I am NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) inches tall, weighing approximately NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) pounds. I have NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hair and NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) eyes. My social security number is NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I was born on NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) On 25 APR 98, I was asked a series of questions regarding the EA-6B mishap occurring on 03FEB98, by Special Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). I have no information regarding these questions. The questions ranged from being aware of a "Cable Car Club", identifying persons entering the cockpit of the mishap aircraft after the mishap flight, information regarding the LtCol NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), information regarding the videotaping of the mishap flight, violation of altitude restrictions on low level missions, any existing videotapes, similar to the NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and any other information concerning low level flight NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) This statement, consisting of this page was typed for me by Special Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as we discussed its contents. I have read and understand the above statement. I have been given the opportunity to make any changes or corrections I desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes or corrections. This statement is true and correct. KUL

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

480425 *1637*
Date Time

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 25th day of April, 1998 at Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 APR 98 / 1637

Special Agent, U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
AUTH: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

EXHIBIT (37)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
e - followin

STATEMENT

PLACE: AVIANO AIR BASE, AVIANO, IT

DATE: 25APR98

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) _____, make the following free and voluntary statement to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of concerning my knowledge of information regarding the EA-6B mishap of 03FEB98. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the purpose of identification, I am NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) inches tall, weighing approximately NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) pounds. I have NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hair and NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) eyes. My social security number is NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I was born on NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 25APR98, I was asked a series of questions regarding the EA-6B mishap occurring on 03FEB98, by Special Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have no information regarding these questions. The questions ranged from being aware of a "Cable Car Club", identifying persons entering the cockpit of the mishap aircraft after the mishap flight, information regarding the LtCol NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) information regarding the videotaping of the mishap flight, violation of altitude restrictions on low level missions, any existing videotapes, similar to the NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) tape and any other information concerning low level flight. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) statement, consisting of this page was typed for me by Special Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as we discussed its contents. I have read and understand the above statement. I have been given the opportunity to make any changes or corrections I desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes or corrections. This statement is true and correct. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25Apr 98 1525
Date Time

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 25th day of April, 1998 at AVIANO AIR BASE, AVIANO, IT.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 25APR98/1525

Special Agent, U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
AUTH: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

EXHIBIT (38)

NCIS [redacted] and correct NCIS [redacted]

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

C.P. / CSMC

25 APR. 97
Date

1812
Time

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 25th day of April, 1998 at USAF Aviano, Italy.

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

AUTH: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

STATEMENT

PLACE: USAF Aviano, Italy

DATE: 25APR98

I, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), make the following free and voluntary statement to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of circumstances surrounding the VMAQ-2 EA6-B "Prowler" mishap the occurred on 03FEB98.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) For the purpose of identification, I am [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) tall, weighing approximately [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) pounds. I have [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hair and [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) eyes. My social security number is [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I was born on [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) background, I have been a airframe maintenance mechanic with VMAQ-4 since MAR96. This is my second deployment with VMAQ-4 to Aviano. My first deployment to Aviano was during the SEP96-MAR97 time frame. I recently arrived at Aviano with VMAQ-4 during the mid-FEB98 time frame [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) regards to the questions asked me by Special Agent [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I would like to state the following [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

- 1 [REDACTED] I have never heard of the "Cable Car Club" [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
- 2 [REDACTED] On the date of the VMAQ-2 mishap (03FEB98), I was still in Cherry Point, NC. As such, I do not know who had access to the VMAQ-2 mishap aircraft following the mishap [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
- 3 [REDACTED] I have never seen or heard of the video tape that was allegedly made by LTCOM [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) during a low level training mission [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
- 4 [REDACTED] I do not have any knowledge concerning any photographs or video tape(s) made by the VMAQ-2 mishap aircrew or any other aircrew [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
- 5 [REDACTED] I do not know of anyone who has intentionally violated altitude restrictions [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
- 6 [REDACTED] No one has told me not to cooperate, withhold information or evidence, or destroy evidence relative to this investigation. I know of no additional information relative to this investigation [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) This statement, consisting of this page and one (1) other was typed for me by Special Agent [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) discussed its contents. I have read and understand the above statement. I have been given the opportunity to make any changes or corrections I desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes or corrections. This statement is true and correct. *SW*

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 APR 98 1629
Date Time

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 25th day of April, 1998 at USAF Aviano, Italy.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Special Agent, U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
AUTH: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04 JAN93

Statement

PLACE: Aviano AFB, Italy
Safety Office

DATE: 25 April, 1998

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I, LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, make the following free and voluntary statement to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of events and/or circumstances involving the 03FEB98 incident near Cavalese, Italy, in which twenty civilian skiers died after their cabled gondola crashed to the ground [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

For purposes of identification, I am [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) years old, born in [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). I have [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hair and [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) eyes. My SSN# is [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I presently am assigned to the Maintenance Section, VMAQ-4 deployed in Aviano, Italy (DSN PHONE [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and my rate is E-3 in the United States Marine Corps. I believe I have a secret security clearance [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I was not in Aviano on 03FEB98 when this mishap flight occurred, as I came with the squadron on or about 14FEB98. I overlapped briefly with a few of my counterparts from VMAQ-2 before they returned to CONUS, but I had no contact with any of them. However I did have contact with some of their return advance party before I left CONUS. At that time I heard from some of them that one of their crews had hit a gondola cable wire which had caused the deaths of twenty people. No one spoke of any details nor did anyone tell me how this was caused. The rest of the little I know is from what I read about it in the papers [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I have never heard of anything called the Cable Car Club or the Cable Club, or anything along those lines. I am unaware of any sort of initiation procedures or rites of passage for the air crews, to include rumor and "shop talk" [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

As to the Hard Copy release of a video of a flight by LTCOIN [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have no knowledge of it. I did see a computer animated reenactment of a low level flight of the gondola incident on Hard Copy, but I can't recall when it aired. It was a live show here about 0630 one morning, and had not been videotaped. I have never known of any other crews, to include the crew of the mishap flight, to videotape such flights, and I have no knowledge, even from gossip, of any taping of the mishap flight at all. I am likewise unaware of any illegal flying going on in Prowlers, or any intentional low level flying below the restricted minimum altitudes at any time [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

EXHIBIT (41)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
I have read the preceding page statement prepared for me at my request
by Special Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from information that I provided. I have
been allowed to make any necessary changes that I see fit. This
statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Date: 4-25-98 Time: 1457

Subscribed and sworn before me this 25th day of April, 1998 at Aviano
AFB, Italy.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 Apr 98
Special Agent, NCIS

AUTHORITY: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

STATEMENT

PLACE: AVIANO AIR BASE
AVIANO, ITALY

DATE: 25APR98

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] CPL, USMC [redacted] make the following free and voluntary statement to
[redacted] whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative
Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises
extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of the EA-6B mishap
investigation.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] For purpose of identification, I am [redacted] tall, weighing approximately [redacted]
[redacted] My social security number [redacted] I was born [redacted]
[redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] Approximately two (2) weeks ago, I assisted in moving the EA-6B mishap aircraft from the hangar it
was originally stored into, to another hangar located behind the tower, either HAZ 39 or HAZ 29. During
the moving of the mishap aircraft, Gunnery Sergeant [redacted] was sitting in the pilot seat of the
aircraft for braking purposes and a Carabinieri person, who was in uniform, I do not know his name, was
sitting in the ECMO-1 seat. Again, this occurred approximately two (2) weeks ago at the Aviano Air Base,
Aviano, Italy.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] I had also heard that Lt [redacted] was relieved because he had told his officers to get rid of any
information or videotapes of low level flights occurring in Aviano, Italy. This was something I had heard. I
have no other information regarding any of the other questions SA [redacted] asked me.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] This statement, consisting of this page was typed for me by Special Agent [redacted] as we
discussed it's contents. I have read and understand the above statement. I have been given the opportunity
to make any changes or corrections I desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes or
corrections. This statement is true and correct.

[redacted signature box]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

date: 25 APRIL 98 time: 1351

Subscribed and sworn before me this 25th day of April, 1998 at Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT.

[redacted signature box]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 APR 98 / 1351

Special Agent, U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service
Auth: SECNAVINST 5520.3B of 04JAN93

EXHIBIT (42)

STATEMENT	e following
	PLACE: <u>Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT</u>
	DATE: <u>25APR98</u>

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

_____, make the free and voluntary statement to _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of concerning my knowledge of the EA-6B mishap occurring on 03FEB98. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the purpose of identification, I am _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) inches tall, weighing approximately _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) pounds. I have _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hair and _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) eyes. My social security number is _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I was born on _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 25APR98, I was asked a series of questions regarding the EA-6B mishap occurring on 03FEB98, by Special Agent _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) On 03FEB98, after the mishap aircraft had landed, I was sitting in the Flight Equipment Shop located at the Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT. While in the Shop, Captain _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) of whose flight gear I am responsible for, came into the Flight Equipment Shop after the flight and placed his gear in the Shop. Besides Captain _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I am not sure what other members of the mishap flight crew were in the Shop at that time. The pilots were talking at the time; however, I could not understand what they were saying. I only heard mumbling. We were subsequently called to formation, I am not sure by who, to the mishap aircraft, and we were informed that the aircraft was involved in a mishap. I do not recall many details about the formation. I did not speak with any of the mishap flight crew subsequent to the mishap flight. In addition, I did not go into the cockpit of the mishap aircraft and I cannot identify anyone who may have. My responsibility concerning my pilot, Captain _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was to obtain his flight gear, which as I mentioned, he took care of himself, by bringing it into the Flight Equipment Shop himself. I also subsequently gathered Captain _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) flight equipment and provided same to Major _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, who was on the Mishap Board here in Aviano, IT. I have no further information regarding the questions asked by Special Agent _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The questions ranged from being aware of a "Cable Car Club", identifying persons entering the cockpit of the mishap aircraft after the mishap flight, information regarding the LtCol _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) information regarding the videotaping of the mishap flight, violation of altitude restrictions on low level _____, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

missions, any existing videotapes, similar to the [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and any other information concerning low level
flight [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

and one of the [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is statement, consisting of this page[✓] was typed for me
by Special Agent [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as we discussed its contents.
I have read and understand the above statement. I have been
given the opportunity to make any changes or corrections I
desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes
or corrections. This statement is true and correct [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 APR 98 1919
Date Time

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 25th day of April, 1998 at Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT.

[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 APR 98 / 1919

Special Agent, U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
AUTH: SECNAVINST 5520.38 OF 04JAN93

Statement

PLACE: Aviano AFB, Italy
Safety Office
DATE: 25 April, 1998

I, LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, make the following free and voluntary statement to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of events and/or circumstances involving the 03FEB98 incident near Cavalese, Italy, in which twenty civilian skiers died after their cabled gondola crashed to the ground [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for purposes of identification. I am [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) years old, born in [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hair and [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) eyes. My SSN# is [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I presently am assigned to the Maintenance Section, VMAQ-4 deployed in Aviano, Italy (DSN PHONEN[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and my rate is E-3 in the United States Marine Corps. I believe I have a secret security clearance [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I was not in Aviano on 03FEB98 when this mishap flight occurred, as I came with the squadron on or about 14FEB98. I did not overlap with my counterparts from VMAQ-2 before they returned to CONUS, so I had no contact with any of them. Also, I did not have any contact with their return advance party before I left CONUS [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have no knowledge of anything called the Cable Car Club, Cable Club, or anything like that. This includes by rumor or innuendo [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I had heard of the mishap flight while in NC before we deployed, but I don't recall from what source, it was word of mouth at Cherry Point. The word in the maintenance community as to the cause of the accident was that it was probably a mechanical problem, although talk of pilot error was also mentioned as a possibility. In my own opinion it seems like it either had to be pilot error or a mechanical malfunction, I simply do not know. I also heard something about an altitude malfunction due to something sticking at the cold temperatures, but again, this was only someone's speculation [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have no idea who was in the cockpit after the landing. I also have no personal knowledge of LTCOL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) tape although I had heard about it after the mishap. I have never seen a low level flight from a Prowler except in training at Whidbey Island. It included real video as well as computer generated images. The real video was done in a desert environment or on ships. I have no knowledge at all regarding any video of the mishap flight, to include rumors and such [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Further, I have never known anyone in the USMC aviation community to brag about their flying styles or horsing around in the cock pits. I have no reason to lie or withhold any information that would be helpful with this investigation, and therefore am telling the whole truth in this statement regarding what little knowledge of I have about the questions asked by Agent [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

CONTINUED ON SECOND AND LAST PAGE [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT (4/1)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

have read the preceding two page statement prepared for me at my request by Special Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from information that I provided. I have been allowed to make any necessary changes that I see fit. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. TLG

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

LEP/USMAC

Date: April 25, 1998 Time: 1550

Subscribed and sworn before me this 25th day of April, 1998 at Aviano AFB, Italy.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 Apr 98
Agent, NCIS

AUTHORITY: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

Statement

PLACE: Aviano AFB, Italy

DATE: 25 April, 1998

I, CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, make the following free and voluntary statement to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of events and/or circumstances involving the 03FEB98 incident near Cavalese, Italy, in which twenty civilian skiers died after their cabled gondola crashed to the ground [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) purposes of identification, I am [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) female, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) years old, born in [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). I have [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hair and [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) eyes. My SSN# is [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I presently am assigned to the Maintenance Section, VMAQ-4 deployed in Aviano, Italy (DSN PHONE [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and my rate is E-4 in the United States Marine Corps. I believe I have a secret security clearance [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I was not in Aviano on 03FEB98 when this mishap flight occurred, as I came with the squadron on or about 14FEB98. I did not overlap with my counterparts from VMAQ-2 before they returned to CONUS, so I had no contact with any of them. Also, I did not have any contact with their return advance party before I left CONUS regarding this incident [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have no knowledge of anything called the Cable Car Club, Cable Club, or anything like that. This includes by rumor or hearsay. I had heard of the mishap flight while in NC before we deployed, by the news only. I have no knowledge of any fooling around in the cockpit or any intentional illegal flying or anything like that. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I had heard about [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) tape on Hard Copy from some members of his squadron, and this was before I deployed from NC, but I cannot say when exactly this was. It was however after the squadron (his) found out about it officially because at that time they told me their CO had been fired. I am pretty sure that this was after the Aviano mishap. I also heard from a friend in the squadron (CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (Q-3) that was told by an officer in Q-3 that LTCOL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had allegedly stated in an AOM that anyone with evidence along this line should get rid of it. I was also told that [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) comments were made in a joking manner. I am unaware of anyone ever videotaping anything from any Prowler cockpits, including the mishap flight. Further, I have no personal knowledge of any tapes or film from that flight being hidden or destroyed or even existing [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

CONTINUED ON SECOND/LAST PAGE [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT (45)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have read the preceding two page statement prepared for me at my request by Special Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from information that I provided. I have been allowed to make any necessary changes that I see fit. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Date: 980425 Time: 16:48

Subscribed and sworn before me this 25th day of April, 1998 at Aviano AFB, Italy.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 Apr 98
Agent, NCIS

AUTHORITY: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

Statement

PLACE: Aviano AFB, Italy
Safety Office

DATE: 25 April, 1998

LCPL [REDACTED] USMC, make the following free and voluntary statement to [REDACTED] whom I know to be a Special Agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of events and/or circumstances involving the 03FEB98 incident near Cavalese, Italy, in which twenty civilian skiers died after their cabled gondola crashed to the ground [REDACTED]

For purposes of identification, I am [REDACTED] years old, born in [REDACTED]. I have [REDACTED] hair and [REDACTED] eyes. My SSN# is [REDACTED] and I presently am assigned to the Maintenance Section, VMAQ-4 deployed in Aviano, Italy (DSN PHONE [REDACTED]) and my rate is E-3 in the United States Marine Corps. I have a secret security clearance [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was not in Aviano on 03FEB98 when this mishap flight occurred, as I came with the squadron on or about 14FEB98. I overlapped briefly with a few of my counterparts from VMAQ-2 before they returned to CONUS. I cannot recall them by names. I never had any conversations with anyone from VMAQ-2 about the mishap, although I did see the crew from the mishap flight. However, before leaving Cherry Point, I spoke with CPL [REDACTED] who was part of VMAQ-2's return advance party, which is when I met him. [REDACTED] told me he thought the crew was "hot dogging" which is what caused the accident. I did not ask him why he thought that, and he told us he that he knew the crew members. He did not indicate he suspected them because of their reputations, nor did he comment about their reputation. I never heard the term "hot dogging" used before, nor any other word with that definite [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] have no knowledge of any sort of behavior like this used at any time. I have never heard of the Cable club or anything like that until this interview. I am unaware of any sort of initiation or rites of passage, nor have I ever even heard of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is the only name I know of for anyone that had anything to do with the plane or related equipment after the landing. He's from VMAQ-4 and was an advance member, present in Aviano on 03FEB98. He told me that after the landing he had to round up all the crew's gear, but I don't know the details [REDACTED]

EXHIBIT (47)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I am unaware of the videotape made by LTCOL NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and that aired on Hard Copy, as Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is the first person to have ever mentioned it to me. I have no knowledge of any other such tapes of low level flights, nor am I aware of any rumors or suspicions that other tapes exist. I have never heard of any crews speak of intentionally violating altitude restrictions for any purpose NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have read the preceding two page statement prepared for me at my request by Special Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from information that I provided. I have been allowed to make any necessary changes that I see fit. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Date: April 25, 1998 Time: 1422

Subscribed and sworn before me this 25th day of April, 1998 at Aviano AFB, Italy.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 Apr 98
al Agent, NCIS

AUTHORITY: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

Statement

PLACE: Aviano AFB, Italy
Safety Office
DATE: 25 April, 1998

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

CPL [redacted] USMC, make the following free and voluntary statement to [redacted] whom I know to be a Special Agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of events and/or circumstances involving the 03FEB98 incident near Cavalese, Italy, in which twenty civilian skiers died after their cabled gondola crashed to the ground [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

For purposes of identification, I am [redacted] years old, born in [redacted] I have [redacted] hair and [redacted] eyes. My SSN# is [redacted] and I presently am assigned to the Maintenance Section, VMAQ-4 deployed in Aviano, Italy (DSN PHONE [redacted]) and my rate is E-4 in the United States Marine Corps. I have a secret security clearance [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] was in Aviano on 03FEB98 when this mishap flight occurred, as I came with the advanced party. My squadron replaced VMAQ-2 in Aviano, and it was VMAQ-2 squadron's crew that was involved in the mishap flight. I have never seen the cockpit of this particular plane that was involved in the mishap [redacted]

On the day it happened, I was working on base at the Navy maintenance complex. I saw the damaged plane land, but did not see the damage to the aircraft because of the side of the plane I was on. As it caught a trap I knew something had to be wrong. I returned to the M-loop and saw that many from the shop had gone out to the runway. Later that afternoon, perhaps around 40 minutes after landing, when the plane was towed to [redacted] I saw it up close for the first time and saw the obvious damage. I did not enter the cockpit. Unknown or identified VMAQ-2 personnel, many of which were maintenance personnel, were all around the aircraft and in the cockpit, securing it and closing the canopies and things like that, also addressing safety issues. I do recall that Gunny [redacted] (Q-2 Powerline) was out there, as was their SSGT from Maintenance Control from that particular shift. I do not recall either of their names. I did not see anyone remove anything from the cockpit or bring anything into it at all. I also recall there was only one Maintenance Marine (a [redacted] male, a SGT from powerline as I recall) in the cockpit, who was pinning the seats and the canopy, standard operations after a landing. LT [redacted] from Q-2 was another person I recall being at the aircraft at the time, but he did go into the plane [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Regarding the video tape of LTCOL [redacted] flight last year that aired in 1998 on Hard Copy, I have never seen it. Likewise, I am unfamiliar with what it showed except for what I read about it in the paper or heard about it on the radio. I also have never heard of any other [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT (48)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

apes of such flights, to include this mishap flight. I am sure pilots have taped such missions but I have never known one who did it or has it ever been brought to my attention. I also recall from our first deployment that the pilots spoke of the low level flights and of being low over ski resorts and watching the skiers and having the skiers looking up at them and wiping out as they looked. No mention of any particular ski resort was ever made, and there are many different resorts in this area. CAPT [redacted] is the only one from a crew I can identify as having talked about seeing the skiers. [redacted] is an ECMO and is still with VMAQ-4 in Aviano. I had never heard of the Cermis resort until this mishap, and I had no knowledge of the mishap flight route as any sort of a preferred route. [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Also, I have never heard of a Cable Club or anything along those lines, even in joking. I have never known of any crews to be under the altitude restrictions at all. However, crews do not usually discuss things like that with us in Maintenance nor have I ever heard anything like that from rumors or shop talk. [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] was my OIC at Powerline, and I had spoken with him near the Ready Room about 20 minutes before the flight, and it was then that I learned he was flying this mission. I have never discussed the Mishap flight with him, but after it he did stop by the Powerline area and let us know he was okay, but he said he could not discuss the Mishap because of the investigation, and no one asked him any questions. I do recall someone asked him if he thought he'd make it back and he said no because of the loss of hydraulics. This is the only thing I have ever heard any of the crew say about the flight. Aside from me, the only other Maintenance member with the advance party was SGT Flynt, who is still here. [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I have read the preceding 2 page statement prepared for me at my request by Special Agent [redacted] from information that I provided. I have been allowed to make any necessary changes that I see fit. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Date: 25 Apr 98 Time: 1349

Subscribed and sworn before me this 25th day of April, 1998 at Aviano AFB, Italy.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 Apr 98
Agent, NCIS

AUTHORITY: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

STATEMENT	NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
	PLACE: Aviano, Italy
	DATE: 25APR98

I, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), make the NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) following free and voluntary statement to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ~~this statement concerns assignment to VMAQ-4 and any knowledge I may have of the 3FEB98 mishap wherein a prowler aircraft struck a cable car cable, which resulted in the death of 20 individuals.~~ NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the purpose of identification, I am NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) inches tall, weighing approximately NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) pounds. I have NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hair and NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) eyes. My social security number is NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I was born on NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) have been in the Marine Corps for about 15 months and I am currently assigned to VMAQ-4, which is now located in Aviano, Italy. I have been assigned to Q-4 since NOV97 and arrived in Aviano in FEB98. I do not know any members of the mishap aircraft crew except Captain NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) who was assigned to Q-4; however, I only know him by sight and have never had any conversations except for short courtesy comments. Sometime after the accident, Captain NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) addressed the Q-4 squadron and stated something to the effect that when the accident initially happened they thought they had hit a bird but found out sometime after returning that they had hit a cable. He also said that he and the crew were extremely sorry for the victims and their family members.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) has asked me about my knowledge of a "Cable Car Club". The first time I heard this term was when asked by SA NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have never heard any crew members or anyone else use this term or any similar term.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) have not seen the mishap aircraft since arriving in Aviano and do not have any knowledge of any one else having been in this aircraft.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) not have any information regarding the NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I was not even aware of this tape until I was asked by SA NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Additionally, I do not have any information about anyone regarding videotaping the mishap flight route or have any knowledge of anyone videotaping a

flight.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) not have any knowledge of any low level flights where altitude restrictions were not adhered to.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ^{two} statement, consisting of this page and one other was typed for me by Special Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as we discussed its contents. I have read and understand the above statement. I have been given the opportunity to make any changes or corrections I desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes or corrections. This statement is true and correct.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

980425 1530
Date Time

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 25th day of April, 1998 at Aviano, Italy.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

Special Agent, U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL

AUTH: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

Statement

PLACE: Aviano AFB, Italy
DATE: 25 April, 1998

I, SGT [REDACTED] USMC, make the following free and voluntary statement to [REDACTED], whom I know to be a Special Agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of events and/or circumstances involving the 03FEB98 incident near Cavalese, Italy, in which twenty civilians died after their cabled gondola crashed to the ground [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] For purposes of identification, I am [REDACTED] years old, born in [REDACTED]. I have [REDACTED] hair and [REDACTED] eyes. My SSN# is [REDACTED] and I presently am assigned to the Maintenance Section, VMAQ-4 deployed in Aviano, Italy (DSN PHONE [REDACTED]) and my rate is E-5 in the United States Marine Corps. I have a secret security clearance [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I was in Aviano on 03FEB98 when this mishap flight occurred, as I came with the squadron's advance party on or about 28JAN98. I did overlap with my counterparts from VMAQ-2 before they returned to CONUS. When it happened, I was en route home on the bus and saw an aircraft (Prowler) being towed off the airstrip and I saw the wing, pod and football damage and returned to tent city, where I tried to find out what was going. Shortly after I got to tent city, one of the Marines told me that the Prowler had struck a cable car and I later found out that deaths had occurred because of it. I mostly heard this from Q-2 Marines but can't recall their names now although I could have identified them after it happened. I am surprised I have not been interviewed until now [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On the day of the incident, I did not see the flight crew. I did later learn the names of the Q-2 crew members, but also knew that my boss, CAPT [REDACTED] had been in that crew that day. I have never spoken with any of the crew about the mishap, except briefly with [REDACTED] but only casually and several weeks after it happened. I have a lot of respect for the Captain and think he's a great guy. He's a very motivated OIC who looks out for his people. He had the respect of all his people. When I did speak with him, he told me nothing about the details and said the aircrew was not doing anything wrong. He also told me not to believe what was being said in the papers. We did not discuss the mishap beyond that extent [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I have no knowledge of anything called the Cable Car Club, Cable Club, or anything like that. This includes by rumor or hearsay. I have no knowledge of any fooling around in the cockpit or any intentional illegal flying or anything like that, regarding the mishap flight or any other Prowler flights [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] After the incident and landing, I know CPL [REDACTED] from my unit assisted in handling the aircraft, and I think [REDACTED] from Q-1 Powerline was there, as also I think LCP [REDACTED] (Q-2), their GSE [REDACTED] EXHIBIT (50)

representative, was there. These are the only ones I know to have handled the aircraft after the landing, although I am pretty sure others were there too. I am unaware of anyone placing into or removing anything at all from the cockpit of the damaged aircraft. I have heard there were questions about the integrity of the altimeter, I mean, whether or not it was working properly. I have no knowledge as to whether or not it was

I had heard about [redacted] tape from the media, and some aftermath talk about it from some members of my squadron, and this was all after I arrived in Aviano and after the mishap flight. I have heard of videotaping from the Prowler cockpits, but I cannot name anyone in particular. I am pretty sure most ECMO's have filmed from the cockpit before. I also recall that on our last deployment the squadron had a videotape of a flight that was not a low level. The terrain as I recall was not visible, as it was above the clouds. I am unaware of anyone in particular ever videotaping anything from any Prowler cockpits, including the mishap flight. Further, I have no personal knowledge of any tapes or film from that flight being hidden or destroyed or even existing

[redacted] am unaware of any illegal low level flights, but I am unaware of what the altitude restrictions are. I have heard about pretty scenery from flight crews, but never any mention of being real close to ground or ever of any ski resorts

[redacted] side from CPIN [redacted] there were about thirty other avionics division maintenance people from our squadron that arrived in Aviano with the advance party. They can all be identified from records. I am unaware of any of them handling the aircraft after it landed. I do recall the avionics chief, [redacted] was asked to see if the plane was safe to apply electrical power to it, which he did and determined it was unsafe to do so. Also, CPL [redacted] an electrician, went to the plane with [redacted] These individuals, along with [redacted] (the QA chief), went to the plane, but I understand it was about a week or so after the mishap flight. I do not know who asked them to look at the aircraft, but I'd guess it was the investigation team

I have read the preceding two page statement prepared for me at my request by Special Agent [redacted] from information that I provided. I have been allowed to make any necessary changes that I see fit. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

[redacted]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Date: 4-25-98 Time: 1759

Subscribed and sworn before me this 25th day of April, 1998 at Aviano AFB, Italy.

[redacted]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 Apr 98
Special Agent, NCIS

AUTHORITY: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

	NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
STATEMENT	PLACE: <u>Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT</u>
	DATE: <u>25APR98</u>

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), make the following free and voluntary statement to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of concerning my knowledge of the EA-6B mishap occurring on 03FEB98.

For the purpose of identification, I am NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) inches tall, weighing approximately NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) pounds. I have NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hair and NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) eyes. My social security number is NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I was born on NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).

On 25APR98, I was asked a series of questions regarding the EA-6B mishap occurring on 03FEB98, by Special Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). I have no information regarding these questions. The questions ranged from being aware of a "Cable Car Club", identifying persons entering the cockpit of the mishap aircraft after the mishap flight, information regarding the LtCol NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) information regarding the videotaping of the mishap flight, violation of altitude restrictions on low level missions, any existing videotapes, similar to the NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and any other information concerning low level flights.

This statement, consisting of this page was typed for me by Special Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as we discussed its contents. I have read and understand the above statement. I have been given the opportunity to make any changes or corrections I desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes or corrections. This statement is true and correct.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Date: 25APR98 Time: 1748

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 25th day of April, 1998 at Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 25APR98/1748

Special Agent, U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
AUTH: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

EXHIBIT (51)

STATEMENT

DATE: 25 APRIL 1998

PLACE: AVIANO AIR BASE, ITALY

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, make the following free and voluntary statement to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will, without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand this statement is given concerning my knowledge of the events of 03Feb98 involving an aircraft mishap NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for identification purposes, I am a NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male, born on NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) My social security number is NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have a Secret security clearance. I am assigned to 31st OSS, Aviano Air Base, Aviano, Italy. I am an air traffic controller for the Air Force. I have approximately eight years experience as an air traffic controller. I work at the RAPCON - Radar Approach Control NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) RAPCON is in a separate facility from the flight control tower. Unlike the flight control tower, our radar radius extends to a 15-20 mile radius. We will monitor the aircraft through the radar until it leaves our area of responsibility. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I was working at RAPCON on 03Feb98. I started work at approximately 1400. I recall when the mishap aircraft was cleared for landing. SSgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) spoke to the pilot of the aircraft during takeoff. I monitored this conversation. It was a routine takeoff conversation between the pilot and the air traffic controller. The pilot did not mention where his destination was, nor did he describe his route. Neither did he mention any altitudes he was anticipating on flying. I know the flight plan that the pilot had filed was an authorized one. The pilot of the aircraft did not seem unduly stressed at this point, judging from his voice. The aircraft departed the airfield without incident. The aircraft did not fly in a radical manner, nor did he fly at excessively high or low altitudes. I would describe it as a normal departure. I remember the aircraft's call sign NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had dealt with NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) during departure and arrivals in the past without incidents. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) cannot recall the weather conditions at the base at that time. I do recall that air traffic was light that day. Sometime after the aircraft's departure, I do not recall how much later, I received a report from our Italian Liaison Officer NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) that an aircraft had sent a distress signal. The aircraft popped up on our radar screens about 18 miles to the West of the base. I was told that "Easy 01" was coming in on an emergency. When the aircraft came into our area of responsibility, either the pilot or the co-pilot started talking to SSgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) who was the approach controller. I also monitored this conversation. The conversation continued on and off throughout the entire approach and landing sequence, until the aircraft was handed over to the air traffic control tower. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) At this point, it is our job to find out the pilot's intentions. We need to know the amount of fuel left, their altitude, etc. I do not recall how much fuel the aircraft had, nor his NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Page 1 of 2, Statement NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT (52)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] at the time. I do know that the aircraft never flew below the 8,000 foot MVA – Minimum Vectoring Altitude- for the area he was in. I recall the pilot (or co-pilot) sounded nervous. He mentioned that he sustained structural damage, and vertical stabilizer damage. The pilot did not state where he had sustained the damage, nor did he describe his route, or altitudes. The pilot wanted to proceed to Aviano, and make an emergency landing, and engage a cable. SSG [redacted] put him in a holding pattern. Later on, he stated that he had a hydraulic failure, and needed to land immediately. The aircraft was vectored in to runway 23, where the landing was made. I believe the aircraft landed sometime around 1530. I did not personally witness the landing. During their approach, the aircraft never went through any zones which blocked radar reception. I never personally spoke to the pilot. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] about half an hour or 45 minutes after the aircraft had landed, our Italian Liaison Officer received a call from Trevino, that there had been some “casino” (fooling around) in NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) involving an aircraft. He did not specify which aircraft, or whether or not it was military. There was no mention of injuries or damage at this time. llw

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] am not aware of any altitude restrictions for military or civilian aircraft flying locally. As far as low-level complaints, I’ve heard of one complaint concerning a group of f-16’s approaching our base. Someone complained that the aircraft were making too much noise because they were flying too low. This complaint came through Italian authorities sometime last summer (summer, 1997). NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] working at RAPCON that day were NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Italian Air Force; SSG [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] SSG [redacted] and one or two additional Italian personnel, whom I do not know. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I have read and understand this statement, consisting of this and one additional page, typed for me by NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] from information we discussed. I have made an initialed any corrections. This statement is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

[redacted]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 APR 98 1720L

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of April, 1998 at Aviano Air Base, Aviano, Italy.

[redacted]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

25 APR 98 1720

Authority: SECNAVINST 5520.3B of 04Jan93

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP
JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE

On 25 April, 1998, reporting agent met with [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] USMC regarding captioned investigation, specifically to collect evidence documented in a sworn statement made by [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] on 24APR98. During this meeting, RA seized from [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] one EA-6B Elint Record Tape, marked for identification as "SECRET" and "VMAQ-2 9700079." This item has serial number 15446. The item was subsequently entered into the NCISFO evidence custody system.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] is the unit's Intel officer. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] advised that this particular recording was originally placed in his office's custody after it was seized "about a week or two" after the mishap flight by CWO2 [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] advised the tape has been properly secured (as a classified item) in his safe since that time, without event. Further [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] advised this tape had been previously in the custody of the JAGMAN investigators and was that which was used for analysis purposes by that body.

Reporting Agent: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]
Office: NCISFO Naples, Italy

EXHIBIT (53)

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: *RESULTS OF INTERVIEW (LOP) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 25APR98, Lcpl [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, was interviewed at the USAF Base, Aviano, Italy, concerning his knowledge of circumstances surrounding the VMAQ-2 EA6-B "Prowler" mishap that occurred on 03FEB98. As background, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) has been assigned to VMAQ-4 since AUG97. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) arrived at USAF Aviano with the main VMAQ-4 contingent during the mid-FEB98 time frame. This is [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) first deployment to Aviano.

1. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he has never heard of the "Cable Car Club".
2. On the date of the VMAQ-2 mishap (03FEB98) [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had not yet arrived in Aviano. As such, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he did not know who had access to the VMAQ-2 mishap aircraft following the mishap. In addition, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he has not had contact with any VMAQ-2 squadron personnel, to include the VMAQ-2 mishap aircrew. According to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the only information he knows of relative to the VMAQ-2 mishap flight is what he has read in the newspaper or seen on television.
3. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he has never heard about or seen the low level video taped flight that was allegedly made by LTCOL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
4. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he has no knowledge of any instance(s) in which altitude restrictions were intentionally violated.
5. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he had no knowledge of any photographs or video tape involving the VMAQ-2 mishap.
6. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that nobody instructed him not to cooperate, withhold information or evidence, or destroy any evidence relative to this investigation. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added that he had no additional information relative to this investigation.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: Assigned to VMAQ-4 ground crew maintenance

SSAN [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: NCIS Naples, Italy

DATE TYPED: 26APR98

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

SSN: [REDACTED]

DOB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

Command: 31ST OSS, Aviano Air Base

Security clearance: Secret

Reporting Agent: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Office: NCISFO Naples, Italy

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO AVIANO
MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 25Apr98, TSgt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), USAF, was interviewed by reporting agent aboard the Aviano Air Base, Aviano, Italy. Reporting agent identified himself verbally and by displaying his credentials. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed concerning his knowledge of the events surrounding the aircraft mishap with a cable car in near Aviano, Italy on 03Feb98. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is an aircraft controller for the Aviano Air Base, and has been in this position since approximately August 1996. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) has approximately 17 years experience working as an air traffic controller for the U.S. Air Force. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is currently a Watch Crew Supervisor.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was working in the RAPCON – Radar Approach Control – building on 03Feb98. Radar Approach Control is responsible for monitoring and guiding aircraft as while they are in the air within a 15-20 mile radius around the base. He was working as a “fall back” that day – meaning an alternate air traffic controller in the event the ones on primary duty were not available.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he was involved in very little of the events concerning the mishap. While on fallback status in the RAPCON building, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) primarily studied and prepared for an upcoming promotion examination. He had no personal knowledge of takeoff clearing procedures for the mishap aircraft. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) additionally was not present in the radar room when the aircraft in question squawked his distress signal.

Sometime during the afternoon as he was studying in a room separate from the radar room, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated someone had reported to him that an aircraft was in distress. By the time he entered the radar room, the aircraft was on its final approach to runway 23 on the base. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) “plugged in” and monitored the transmission between RAPCON and the mishap aircraft. He listened for “a short period of time” [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not recall anything from the conversation, other than to comment that the transmission consisted of routine procedural landing descriptions. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) never spoke to the crew of the aircraft in question.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) does not personally know any of the Prowler aircraft crews, nor is he aware of any flight altitude restrictions that pilots follow. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not learn of the aircraft’s mishap with the gondola until he heard it while watching the Italian news on television during the evening of 03Feb98.

Page 1 of 2

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

SSN [REDACTED]

DOB NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB [REDACTED]

Command: 31st OSS, Aviano Air Base

Security clearance: Secret

Reporting Agent: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Office: NCISFO Naples, Italy

Page 2 of 2

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: 'RESULTS OF INTERVIEW (LONIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C))

On 25APR98, LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, was interviewed at USAF Aviano, Italy, concerning his knowledge of circumstances surrounding the VMAQ-2 EA6-B "Prowler" mishap that occurred on 03FEB98. As background, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was assigned to VMAQ-4 during the MAR96 time frame. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) arrived at USAF Aviano with the VMAQ-4 advance party on or about 19/20JAN98. This is [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) second deployment to USAF Aviano.

On the day of the mishap (03FEB98) [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was working in the Hardened Aircraft Shelter (HAS) on the USAF Aviano flight line where the EA6-B Prowlers are maintained. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he waved to the mishap aircrew as they were walking towards the aircraft prior to their departure.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) first became aware that the mishap aircraft was experiencing problems as he was leaving the HAS and returning to USMC area aboard USAF Aviano. While driving along the flight line, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) saw the mishap aircraft making it's landing approach. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also saw the mishap aircraft on the runway after the aircrew had exited the aircraft. Later that evening, while watching CCN news, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) learned that a "U.S. War Plane" had struck a ski cable resulting in the deaths of several people.

Approximately one (1) to two (2) weeks following the mishap, CAPT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) addressed a group of VMAQ-4 members and expressed his appreciation to the maintenance personnel for maintaining EA6-B aircraft in a condition which allowed for his safe return. Although [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and the other mishap crew members in the dining facility following the mishap, he never had the opportunity to speak with them as they were always with their defense attorneys.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he has never heard of the "Cable Car Club". [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not know who had access to the VMAQ-2 mishap aircraft following the mishap. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not know if the mishap aircrew were in possession of any camera equipment during the mishap flight.

Although [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had heard rumors about the low level video taped flight that was allegedly made by LTCOL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) he has never actually seen it. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that although he has heard rumors concerning the existence of other low level video taped flights, he has never actually seen any of these tapes and does not know anyone who might be in possession of any such tapes.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had no knowledge of any intentional altitude restriction

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE
AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: VMAQ-4, U.S. Marine Corps

SSAN

DOB: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

RESIDENCE: VMAQ-4, Aviano, Italy

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: EUNA

DATE TYPED: 25APR98

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

violations. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that no one has instructed him not to cooperate in this investigation, to destroy evidence, or withhold any information or evidence relative to this investigation. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added that he had no additional information to provide and was not in possession of any potential evidence relative to this investigation.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: VMAQ-4 Electronic Countermeasures Maintenance

SSA: [REDACTED]

DOB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
OFFICE: NCIS Naples, Italy
DATE TYPED: 28APR98

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE
AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, was interviewed by SA [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
on 25APR98, at Aviano Air Force Base, Aviano, Italy.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised that he arrived in Aviano about 2 months ago and
is assigned to VMAQ-4. He indicated that he has been with Q-4 for
about 2 years. Prior to arriving in Aviano he was stationed with
Q-4 in Cherry Point, N.C. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised that he is not aware of
the "Cable Car Club" and that the first time he heard this term was
during the interview. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised that he has no knowledge of
anyone having access to the cockpit of the EA-6B mishap aircraft
and has not even seen the damaged aircraft since arriving in
Aviano. Additionally, he denied having any knowledge of anyone
videotaping the mishap flight or having any knowledge of any low
level flights where altitude restrictions were not adhered to.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) commented that either just before arriving or just after
arriving in Aviano he heard about the [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
could not remember who told him about the tape and advised that he
has never seen the tape.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised that he has seen videotapes of flights but not of any
low level flights. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalls these videotapes were of sunsets
or other aircraft in the distance.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he has heard aircraft crew members talking about
flying low level flights but these were during scheduled low level
flying routes.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised that he knows Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) one of the members
of the mishap flight, and described Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as an
excellent officer. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was his OIC
for about four or five months, just prior to him [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) arriving
in Aviano.

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: VMAQ-4, U.S. Marine Corps

SSAN

DOB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB:

RESIDENCE: VMAQ-4, Aviano, Italy

REPORTED BY: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: EUNA

DATE TYPED: 25APR98

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP
JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: Additional information from NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 25 April, 1998, reporting agent interviewed SGT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), USMC, regarding captioned investigation, and a sworn statement was obtained regarding his knowledge thereof. On 02MAY98, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided additional information relative to comments he recollected hearing from CAPT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) after the mishap flight. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled that one day after VMAQ-4 was all aboard Aviano, the squadron held a formation near the HAS (Hardened Aircraft Shelter). Following that formation, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) "sort of formally" addressed all the Maintenance personnel, which NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) estimated at near a hundred or so. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) assuring the group that the aircrew during the mishap flight was doing nothing that they were not supposed to be doing. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised that this was the gist of NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) message and nothing more specific was stated regarding the incident.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had no recollection of any smaller informal meeting with NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in which he NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) participated. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) further advised he was not present or involved in the launch of the mishap flight.

In his prior statement, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recounted a brief one on one conversation with NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) about the incident. In this interview, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) further recalled that during that conversation, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised him in uncertain words (and NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was unable to recall quotes) that he was unhappy with the way this whole ordeal was being handled by the top brass, but no specifics were added. Also, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated that "they" (NFI) were looking to pin the blame on the whole crew. Again, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he was uncertain of NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) exact words but recalled that this was his memory of the content of NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) message.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:

NAME: [REDACTED]
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
DUSTA
WORK [REDACTED]

Reporting Agent: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Office: NCISFO Naples, Italy

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STATEMENT	PLACE: <u>Aviano, Italy</u>
	DATE: <u>26APR98</u>

I, [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), make the following free and voluntary statement to [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of the events following the 3FEB98, mishap in which a prowler aircraft struck and cable car lift cable, resulting in the death of 20 individuals..

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for the purpose of identification, I am [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male, [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) tall, weighing approximately [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) pounds. I have [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hair and [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) eyes. My social security number is [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I was born on [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) currently assigned to VMAQ-4, Aviano, Italy. I have been assigned to VMAQ-4 since APR95. Prior to arriving in Aviano I was with the squadron in Cherry Point, N.C.

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) or about 14APR98, I was with a number of Marine and Air Force personnel who helped move the damaged prowler. It only took about 10 or 15 minutes to actually move the aircraft from one location to another. I noticed that the Italian Carbs were guarding the aircraft. I did see GySgt [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in the cockpit while we were moving the aircraft. In the cockpit with him was a Carb member also.

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Special Agent [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) has asked me if I am aware of the "Cable Car Club". I am not aware of such a club and this is the first time I have heard this term.

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) am aware of the [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I heard about this tape following its showing on Hard Copy t.v. show. I have never seen this tape. Also, I am not aware of any similar type video tapes.

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) last time I was in Aviano there was a video tape Cruise book made. It contained shots of our squadron - ground operations, flight ops etc... I have no knowledge regarding the videotaping of the mishap flight.

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) not have any knowledge of any low level flights where altitude restrictions were not adhered to.

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) know Captain [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for he was in our squadron. About 2 or 3 weeks after the incident I was in Tent City with

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) several other squadron members. I do not recall at this time who the other members were. Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was answering some questions. I do not now recall his exact comments; However, I do recall him expressing his sorrow and the fact that he would gladly give his life to bring the victims back.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) sometime after this meeting there was a general meeting with all the squadron members. I do recall at this meeting that Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) mentioned that all they felt was a "thump" and again he made similar comments about being sorry for what had happened.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) statement, consisting of two pages was typed for me by Special Agent [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have read and understand the above statement. I have been given the opportunity to make any changes or corrections I desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes or corrections. This statement is true and correct.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

98 04 26 *1415*
Date Time

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 26th day of April, 1998 at Aviano, Italy.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Special Agent, U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
AUTH: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS/I

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 26APR98, LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), USMC, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) VMAQ-4, Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT was interviewed at the Safety Bldg., regarding a series of questions posed by reporting agent. LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had no information regarding these questions. The questions asked of LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) by reporting agent were if he knew of, or heard of a "Cable Car Club" among the VMAQ-2 or VMAQ-4 community. If he could identify persons who had access to the cockpit of the EA-6B mishap aircraft immediately after it's landing. Did he have any information regarding the LtCol [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) or know of anyone who may have information regarding same. Did he have any information regarding the videotaping of the mishap flight. Did he have any knowledge of any low level flights where altitude restrictions were not adhered to. Did he know if there were any existing videotapes, similar to the LtCol [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Did he have any information regarding low level flights that was not covered. Again, LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had no information regarding these questions.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Employment: USMC, VMAQ-2, Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT

SSN: [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

Reporting Agent: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Reporting Office: NCISFO Europe, Naples, IT

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000534

EXHIBIT 60

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW (CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C))

On 26APR98, CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), USMC, was interviewed at USAF Aviano, Italy, concerning his knowledge of circumstances surrounding the VMAQ-2 EA6-B "Prowler" mishap that occurred on 03FEB98. As background, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) has been assigned to VMAQ-4 since NOV95. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was previously deployed to Aviano with VMAQ-4 during the SEP96-FEB97 time frame. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) arrived in Aviano with the VMAQ-4 advance party on or about 27JAN98.

In response to questions asked by reporting agent, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided the following responses:

1. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he has never heard of the "Cable Car Club".
2. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he did not know who had access to the VMAQ-2 mishap aircraft following the mishap.
3. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that although he has heard of the low level video taped flight that was allegedly made by LCO [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) he has never actually seen it.
4. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) knew of no instance(s) in which altitude restrictions were intentionally violated.
5. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not know if the VMAQ-2 mishap crew had any camera equipment in the cockpit at the time of the mishap.
6. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that no one has instructed him not to cooperate in this investigation, to destroy evidence, or withhold information relative to this investigation.
7. According to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) addressed a group of VMAQ-4 members approximately one (1) week after the mishap. Although [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not indicate if he saw anything at the time of the mishap, he stated that the mishap flight was within their limits and that the mishap was unintentional.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: VMAQ-4 Aviation Electrician

SSAN [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
OFFICE: NCIS Naples, Italy
DATE TYPED: 27APR98

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE
AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW (CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C))

On 26APR98, CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, was interviewed at the USAF Base, Aviano, Italy, concerning his knowledge of circumstances surrounding the VMAQ-2 EA-6B "Prowler" mishap that occurred on 03FEB98. As background, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) has been assigned to VMAQ-4 since MAY96. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) arrived at Aviano Air Force Base with the advance VMAQ-4 contingent during the early-FEB98 time frame. This is [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) second deployment to Aviano.

1. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he has never heard of the "Cable Car Club".
2. On the date of the VMAQ-2 mishap (03FEB98), [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had just recently arrived at the Aviano AFB. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he believes the Recovery Crew had access to the aircraft immediately after it landed as he believes the Recovery Crew is present at all aircraft recoveries. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is a squadron technical publications librarian and as such, does not have any personal experience with the Recovery Crews or knowledge of exactly how they operate. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) further stated that he does not know what specific individuals might have been part of the Recovery Crew for the mishap aircraft. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also stated that the information he has heard about the incident comes from a statement CAPT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) made to the squadron in the week following the incident, from newspapers, and from CNN coverage.
3. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he has heard rumors about the low level video taped flight that was allegedly made by LTCOL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) but that he has not seen the tape nor does he know of anyone who has seen the video tape.
4. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he has no knowledge of any instance(s) in which altitude restrictions were intentionally violated.
5. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he had no knowledge of any photographs

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE
AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

or video tape involving the VMAQ-2 mishap nor any knowledge of VMAQ aircrew using cameras or videorecorders in their cockpits during flight operations.

6. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added that he had no additional information relative to this investigation.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: VMAQ-4 Maintenance Administration enlisted personnel

SSAN [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: NCIS Naples, Italy

DATE TYPED: 26APR98

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SERVICE.

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

PLACE: AVIANO AIR BASE, ITALY

DATE: 27APR98

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] USN, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] MAKE THE FOLLOWING FREE AND VOLUNTARY STATEMENT TO NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] WHOM I KNOW TO BE A SPECIAL AGENT OF THE NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE. I MAKE THIS STATEMENT OF MY OWN FREE WILL AND WITHOUT ANY THREATS MADE TO ME OR PROMISES EXTENDED. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT THIS STATEMENT IS GIVEN WITH REGARD TO MY RELATIONSHIP WITH CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] USMC, PILOT, EA-6B PROWLER, VMAQ-2, BETWEEN OCT97 AND MAR98, WHILE HE WAS DEPLOYED AT AVIANO AIR BASE, ITALY. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES, I AM NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] FEMALE; DOB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] POB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] HT: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] WT: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] HAIR: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] EYES: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]; I AM CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AS THE DIRECTOR, YOUTH ACTIVITIES (BLDG 240, AREA 2) AVIANO AIR BASE, ITALY. MY WORK SCHEDULE IS MONDAY THROUGH FRIDAY 1000 TO 1900. I CAN BE CONTACTED THROUGH MY WORK TELEPHONE NUMBER AT DSN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] AFTER HIS NAME WAS MADE PUBLIC NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] SOON AFTER THE MISHAP CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] DID SAY HE CALLED NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] TO LET HER KNOW HE WAS OK AND THAT THE PRESS MAY BE HOUNDING HER. HE'S VERY CLOSE TO NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] DID NOT KNOW WHAT ELSE HE MAY HAVE SAID TO HIS NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] THE OTHER PERSON HE'S VERY CLOSE TO IS HIS NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] AS A MATTER OF FACT HE'S TOO VERY CLOSE TO HER IN MY OPINION; HOWEVER, I DON'T THINK HE WOULD HAVE TOLD HER ANYTHING NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] CLOSEST FRIENDS, WHILE ASSIGNED TO AVIANO AIR BASE, WERE CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] (VMAQ-2) AND THE NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] (THE VMAQ-2 NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]). I CAN'T RECALL HIS NAME RIGHT NOW NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] E-MAIL ADDRESS, DURING THE TIME HE WAS AT AVIANO AIR BASE, WAS NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] AT PRESENT, IT'S NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] I KNOW, THROUGH CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] THAT HE AND VMAQ-2 MEMBERS HAVE IN THE PAST (BEFORE THE MISHAP) GONE TO ARABBA (PROVINCE OF BELLUNO), CORTINA D'APPEZZO (PROVINCE OF BELLUNO) AND KARNICHE (AUSTRIAN AND ITALIAN BORDER) TO SEE NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] THIS PAST WEEKEND I RECALLED THAT THE ^ WEEKEND BEFORE CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] DEPARTED ITALY, WHILE DRINKING WITH VMAQ-4 OFFICERS AT THE TENT CITY VMAQ OFFICERS' CLUB KNOWN AS "THE HARE," I HEARD CAPTAIN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] SAYING TO ANOTHER OFFICER THAT HE SAW SOMETHING IN THE FLIGHT PATH AND THAT HIS IMMEDIATE REACTION WAS TO PUSH DOWN BECAUSE IT WAS HIS IMMEDIATE REACTION AT THE TIME. I DID HEAR HIM SAY THAT HE SAW A WIRE IN THE FLIGHT PATH AND PUSHED DOWN TO AVOID IT. I DON'T RECALL WHO HE WAS TALKING TO, EXCEPT THAT HE WAS TALKING TO ONE PERSON. OTHER OFFICERS WOULD WHO WERE IN "THE NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]

EXHIBIT (3)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 000538

4/27/98

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

27 Apr 98

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] "HARE" AT THE TIME WOULD SPORADICALLY PARTICIPATE IN THE CONVERSATION. THE CONVERSATION WAS PROMPTED BY ARTICLES, ABOUT THE MISHAP, WHICH I HAD BROUGHT IN TO HIM TO READ. THE ARTICLES WERE IN "NEWSWEEK," "STARS AND STRIPES," THE LOCAL "HERALD NEWSPAPER," AS WELL AS OTHER NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS ABOUT THE MISHAP WHICH FRIENDS OF MINE HAD CUT OUT OF THEIR LOCAL NEWSPAPERS AND SENT TO ME [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] ABOUT 2 TO 4 WEEKS AFTER THE MISHAP, WHILE IN "THE HARE," I DO RECALL OVERHEARING SOMEONE MAKING THE STATEMENT THAT ONE CAN FLY AT 500 FEET OVER LAKE GARDA, COME OFF THE WATER, GO INTO THE MOUNTAINS, AND THAT WOULD BE WHERE THE ALTITUDE CHANGE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE TO ADJUST TO THE MOUNTAINS, OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] I ALSO RECALL CAPTAIN [REDACTED] TALKING TO A RESERVE CHAPLIN, WHILE IN "THE HARE." THIS OCCURRED SOME WEEKS BEFORE CAPTAIN [REDACTED] DEPARTED ITALY. AT ANY RATE, I REMEMBER CAPTAIN [REDACTED] TELLING THE CHAPLIN HE HAD NEVER FLOWN THAT PARTICULAR LOW-LEVEL ROUTE, AND THAT THE SQUADRON DIDN'T GET ENOUGH TRAINING ON LOW LEVEL FLYING. I DON'T REMEMBER THE NAME OF THE CHAPLIN, BUT I DO REMEMBER HIM SAYING HE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE VATICAN FOR A LONG TIME - I BELIEVE FIFTEEN YEARS OR SO [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] THIS STATEMENT, CONSISTING OF 2 PAGES WAS PREPARED FOR ME, BY SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED] AS WE DISCUSSED THE DETAILS. I HAVE REVIEWED THIS STATEMENT AND HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO MAKE ANY CORRECTIONS, DELETIONS, CHANGES, OR ADDITIONS AS I SEE FIT FOR ANY REASON I SO DESIRE. I HAVE INITIALED SUCH CHANGES AND HAVE SIGNED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE. THIS STATEMENT IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE VERY BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND RECOLLECTION [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]

4/27/98 1820 hrs

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO ME THIS 27TH DAY OF APRIL 1998, AT AVIANO AIR BASE, ITALY [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]

27 Apr 98 / 1820

SPECIAL AGENT, NCIS [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] AUTHORITY: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04 JAN 93 [REDACTED]

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

STATEMENT

DATE: 27 April, 1998

PLACE: AFOSI AVIANO, ITALY

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), SSgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, make the following free and voluntary statement to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will, without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand this statement is given concerning my knowledge of the events of the day of the mishap between an aircraft and a gondola NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) For identification purposes, I am a NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male, born on NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) My social security number is NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have a Secret security clearance. I am currently assigned to the 31st OSS, Aviano Air Base, Italy. I am an air traffic controller with RAPCON – Radar Approach Control. I have been assigned to the base since March of 1997. I have approximately 16 years experience as an air traffic controller NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I work in building 1361, in what we call the RAPCON, or IFR (Instrument Flying Rules) room. The RAPCON room is where all flights taking off and coming in for a landing are monitored. The room contains four ASR- Airport Surveillance Radar scopes, and two RFC – Radar Final Control scopes. When an aircraft departs, we monitor that plane on average for approximately 15-20 miles. Our radar scopes are adjusted for an approximate 40 mile coverage. Our area of responsibility depends on the direction of the flight. We monitor the aircraft's route after departure within our area of responsibility. I am not certain in which direction the aircraft in question departed. During this time, the aircraft's altitude, which is shown on the radar, is monitored and verified. After the aircraft leaves our area of responsibility, Center has control of the aircraft. Center is The Italian air traffic control center in Padova or Treviso. The Center's radar coverage depends on aircraft's route and altitude NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) As MVA – Minimum Vectoring Altitude- the lowest Mean Sea Level (MSL) altitude at which an IFR aircraft will be vectored by a radar controller, varies depending on obstacle clearance. If an aircraft flies lower than the MVA in my area of jurisdiction, our low-altitude alert alarm will go off. There are also "black out" areas – areas where the low altitude alert alarm is turned off, because it would not be practical to have the alarm active in these areas. An example of this would be the final approach course. If the alarm were turned on in these areas, it would be constantly sounding as the aircraft descended for landing. We may lose radar contact and/or communications if an aircraft flies VFR between the mountains, depending on our radar coverage. Before flying, a pilot must file a flight plan. We write down the aircraft's estimated time of return from information received from Base Operations. As the flight comes in, we vector and/or sequence him in for an approach NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I was working on the day the aircraft had the mishap with the cable car. I don't exactly remember the date. I also don't remember what time I reported for work that day. As of NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) can recall, also working that day were: TSgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SSgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SSgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and two Italian personnel. I do not remember who they were. The main function of the Italians is to coordinate with other air traffic control facilities. SSgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was working the approach control position. SSgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was either working as the coordinator, or the Watch Supervisor. I 'm not sure if I was on duty when the mishap aircraft departed. I do not know who in RAPCON handled the mishap aircraft's departure from the base. I myself was assigned the RFC position that day – an aircraft on final approach to the runway. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) On the day in question, air traffic was light, and I didn't have much activity. I do not remember how or what time I was informed of the in-flight emergency. I believe SSgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) handled the aircraft's approach, and actually communicated with the aircrew. I did not communicate at any time with the aircrew of that flight. I was told that the aircraft had sustained structural damage. I did not monitor the aircraft on the radar. Radar readings are not recorded by RAPCON, and I do not remember the aircraft's altitude as it came into Aviano's area of responsibility. I don't remember whether or not our low altitude alert alarm went off. I had nothing to do with the vectoring of the flight for landing. I remember the mishap aircraft landed VFR – Visual Flight Rules. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I monitored a portion of the conversation between SSgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and the aircraft pilot. I heard the pilot request cable status and request an approach-end engagement. Aviano's normal configuration for cables is departure-end. The aircraft was holding over the field VFR. The aircraft landed on runway 23 – which means approaching in the opposite direction of the assigned runway. This was easier for the pilot who needed to make an approach-end cable engagement. I have no idea how long the landing procedure for this aircraft took. I am not familiar with any of the low-level flight routes flown by aircraft. All transmissions and phone communications in the RAPCON are recorded on tape. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have read and understand this statement, consisting of this and one additional page typed for me by NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from information we discussed. I have made and initialed any corrections. This statement is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge and belief. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

16042

28 APR 98

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of April, 1998 at the Aviano Air Base, Aviano, Italy

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

28 APR 98

1604

AUTHORITY:
SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04Jan93

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS/I

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 27APR98, CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), USMC, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), VMAQ-4, Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT was interviewed at the Safety Bldg., regarding a series of questions posed by reporting agent. CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had no information regarding these questions. The questions asked of CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reporting agent were if he knew of, or heard of a "Cable Car Club" among the VMAQ-2 or VMAQ-4 community. If he could identify persons who had access to the cockpit of the EA-6B mishap aircraft immediately after it's landing. Did he have any information regarding the LtCol [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) or know of anyone who may have information regarding same. Did he have any information regarding the videotaping of the mishap flight. Did he have any knowledge of any low level flights where altitude restrictions were not adhered to. Did he know if there were any existing videotapes, similar to the LtCol [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Did he have any information regarding low level flights that was not covered. Again, CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had no information regarding the questions.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: USMC, VMAQ-4, Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT

SSAN [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: NCISFO Europe, Naples, IT

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SERVICE

000542

EXHIBIT (65)

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO AVIANO
MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: CONTACT WITH ITALIAN AIRFORCE
HEADQUARTERS, ROME, ITALY REGRADING EXISTENCE OF ATC
PADOVA FIGHT RADIO COMMUNICATIONS FOR 03FEB98.

ON 27APR98, REPORTING AGENT MET WITH MR [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
[REDACTED] LOGISTICS OFFICER, OFFICE OF DEFENSE
COOPERATION (ODC), AMEMBASSY ROME, ITALY. THE
PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING WAS TO REQUEST THAT MR [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
MAKE INQUIRIES WITH THE ITALIAN AIRFORCE HEADQUARTERS
IN ROME, ITALY TO ASCERTAIN THE EXISTENCE OF RADIO
COMMUNICATIONS THAT MAY HAVE BEEN RECORDED BY THE AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTER (ATC) AT PADOVA, ITALY ON
03FEB98, BETWEEN THE U.S.M.C EA-6B AIRCRAFT AND THE
PADOVA ATC.

MR [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SUBSEQUENTLY CONTACTED COL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
[REDACTED] ITALIAN AIRFORCE HEADQUARTERS, LIAISON
OFFICE, ROME, ITALY REGARDING THIS MATTER. MR [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
ADVISED THAT COL. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ADVISED THAT HE DID NOT
HAVE ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH TAPES.
COL. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ADDED THAT IF THE TAPES DO EXIST THE
ITALIAN MAGISTRATE INVESTIGATING THE AIRCRAFT MISHAP
WOULD HAVE SEIZED THEM AND PLACED THEM INTO CUSTODY.

REPORTING AGENT: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SENIOR RESIDENT
AGENT
OFFICE: NCISRU ROME, ITALY
DATE: 27APR98, ROME, ITALY

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C))

On 27APR98, LT (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) USN, was interviewed at the USAF Base, Aviano, Italy, by Special Agent (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) and reporting agent concerning his knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the VMAQ-2 EA-6B "Prowler" mishap that occurred on 03FEB98. As background (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) the flight surgeon for VMAQ-4 and arrived at Aviano Air Force Base on 07FEB98 as part of the mishap investigation team. (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) was asked to participate in the investigation as a special medical advisor to the mishap board.

(NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) participated in Class "B" and Class "C" mishap investigations.

(NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) stated that he was brought into the mishap deliberation process as a special medical advisor to the mishap board because the mishap board felt that LT (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)), the VMAQ-2 flight surgeon and the initial medical responder for the aircrew, was "contaminated" and no longer unbiased because of his prior association with the mishap aircrew.

(NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) stated that after arriving in Aviano he and (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) conducted a one week turnover in which (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) on the various general flight surgeon pass down items and given a brief recount of the mishap. However (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) further stated (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) was very concerned about disclosing potentially privileged information and shared only the basic information about the incident (what had happened) and what treatment he had provided the mishap aircrew and the squadron personnel. (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) stated that (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) did not share all of the information about the incident or the mishap board issues at his disposal (such as the post-mishap flight physicals and the aircrew's 72-hour history) and that (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) felt this made things between himself and (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) somewhat awkward.

(NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) further stated that he was informed early on that this mishap board would be unique in that he would not have access to a lot of information considered "privileged" or "private" in nature, unlike a regular mishap board. (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) stated that he was not a full member of the mishap board, but rather a "special advisor" for medical concerns.

(NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) stated that he reviewed the medical records of the mishap aircrew the first day he was in Aviano. (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) further stated that he did not find any discrepancies or anything unusual in the mishap aircrew's medical records and that (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) gave him no indications that there were any controversial or other potentially negative medical issues regarding the mishap aircrew.

In response to questioning about whether (NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) might have

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EWBIT (67)

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

taken with him any medical information about the mishap aircrew to North Carolina. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he is not aware of NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) taking back any medical information about the mishap aircrew with him to North Carolina. However, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) speculated that NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) could have taken back with him the post-mishap flight physicals and the aircrew's 72 hour histories - two common medical reports that are made immediately after every mishap. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he never formally received either of these medical reports from NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) probably felt these reports were privileged.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) suggested that NCIS speak with NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) but also stated that he did not think NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) would be very willing to speak against the squadron or any of its aircrew.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also suggested that NCIS speak with the USAF 81st Fighter Squadron Flight Surgeon, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was the duty Aviano flight surgeon the day of the mishap and was an initial responder when the mishap aircraft recovered. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he never spoke with NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) about the mishap but NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) feels that NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) might have heard something when the aircrew initially landed and egressed from their damaged aircraft.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) does not know of any other potential witnesses. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he had never heard of the "Cable Car Club" in any squadron-related capacity. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did state that he had heard of the club from a VMAQ-4 maintenance person who mentioned that NCIS was asking people about the existence of something known as the "Cable Car Club".

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he had seen only the "Hard Copy" version of the LCOL, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and not the original. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) further stated that he has never seen any homemade EA-6B flight-related videotapes nor has he ever seen any EA-6B aircrew carry a video camera into the EA-6B cockpit. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also stated that he has never seen any videos or photographs of any low-level flights.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he is not aware of there having been any cameras in the mishap aircraft, but NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) further stated that he carries a camera whenever he flies.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he is not aware of any instances of "flat hatting" or any other incidents of illegal maneuvers by members of any VMAQ squadron. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also stated that he has never heard any VMAQ aircrew ever brag of conducting any illegal flight maneuvers. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he has not heard anything about the incident directly from the aircrew. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) further stated that the aircrew of both VMAQ-2 and VMAQ-4 desperately want to believe that the mishap

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UNIT COMMANDING OFFICER

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

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aircrew were not flat hatting NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) so added that no one has
asked (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) withhold information from NCIS or deny anything from
NCIS.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: VMAQ-4 FLIGHT SURGEON, USN LIEUTENANT

SSAN [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

RESI [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: NCIS NAPLES, ITALY

DATE TYPED: 27APR98

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS/I

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 27APR98, CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), VMAQ-4, Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT was interviewed at the Safety Building, regarding a series of questions posed by reporting agent. CP [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had no information regarding these questions. The questions asked of CP [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) by reporting agent were if he knew of, or heard of a "Cable Car Club" among the VMAQ-2 or VMAQ-4 community. If he could identify persons who had access to the cockpit of the EA-6B mishap aircraft immediately after it's landing. Did he have any information regarding the LtCo [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) or know of anyone who may have information regarding same. Did he have any information regarding the videotaping of the mishap flight. Did he have any knowledge of any low level flights where altitude restrictions were not adhered to. Did he know if there were any existing videotapes, similar to the LtCol [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Did he have any information regarding low level flights that was not covered. Again, CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had no information regarding these questions.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: USMC, VMAQ-4, Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT

SSAN [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: NCISFO Europe, Naples, IT

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP
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CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: Additional information from NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 27 April, 1998, reporting agent interviewed COL NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) regarding captioned investigation, and a sworn statement was obtained on 28 April, 1998, regarding his knowledge thereof. In that statement, page two, top paragraph, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he would attempt to provide a copy of the clock setting procedures for the E3A aircraft. Later on the morning of 28APR98, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided RA with enclosures (1) and (2). NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) clarified that the "automatic time setting procedure" option referred to in enclosure (2) is not applicable on the E3A aircraft in Europe, only those in the USA. Further, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised that the "comprehensive mission log" for the mission in question, which at this time is not releasable from NATO, will reflect the actual hand written entry for the starting time, as made by the display technician. That log is maintained at NATO. However, that same time will also be reflected on the computer generated printouts (also not yet releasable from NATO) maintained in Mr. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) office, also on board the NATO base at Geilenkirchen, Germany.

Additionally, during this meeting, RA obtained a copy of the NATO AWACS public information brochure, enclosure (3) pertains. This brochure describes in layman's term the capabilities and mission of the AWACS.

ENCLOSURES

- (1) COPY OF AWACS' "MANUAL TIME SETTING" PROCEDURES/UNDATED
- (2) COPY OF AWACS' "ALTERNATE PROCEDURES"/UNDATED
- (3) COPY OF AWACS PUBLIC INFORMATION BROCHURE/UNDATED

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:

NAME:

SSN:

DPOB:

DUSTA

WORK

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Reporting Agent: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Office: NCISFO Naples, Italy

EXHIBIT (69)

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MANUAL TIME SETTING

1. Master CLEAR Pushbutton - Depressed
2. OPERATE CLOCK STOP Pushbutton - Depressed
3. OPERATE CLOCK RESET Pushbutton - Depressed
4. PUSH TO SET TIME Pushbuttons - Set

Set time display by incrementing digits until desired time setting is achieved.

NOTE

If an error is made, or desired time is exceeded while setting time, depress OPERATE CLOCK RESET pushbutton and start over. Failure to comply can result in unpredictable clock operation.

5. DISPLAY TIME Switch - A (B)
6. TIME START Switch - MANUAL
7. OPERATE CLOCK START Pushbutton - Depressed/Released

Verify that display indicates appropriate progression.

NOTE

Clock starts when START pushbutton is released.

8. DISPLAY TIME Switch - A and B

Verify time is correct in both A and B.

Enclosure (1)

ALTERNATE PROCEDURES**CPS Time Correction**

The following procedure provides the capability to change the CPS time while the AOCB is cycling. This procedure can be used when units in the TADIL A net are not within 10 seconds of CUT or when the time is not set correctly prior to IPL.

NOTE

Refer to DT Positional Handbook, Program Load Procedure Limitations (CPS Time) prior to performing this procedure.

- OCC -

1. Perform the BMU IPL procedures to stop cyclic operation.

- CPS -

2. Time Corrected

Correct time by performing automatic or manual time setting procedure in subsection II-C.

- OCC -

3. Continue BMU IPL procedure to regain cyclic operation.

POWER Fluctuation Isolation Procedure

1. Notify TD that computer is experiencing RSET or POWR reasons for restart.
2. Coordinate with the flight engineer to isolate generator three and MAAC 3 from cyclic bus.

NOTE

Generator three, through MAAC 3, supplies power to data processor, ESTSG, IFF, and part of data display system.

3. If no additional RSET or POWR restarts occur, operation with generator three isolated may continue for remainder of flight.
4. If additional RSET or POWR restarts occur, suspect generator 3 as problem and coordinate with flight engineer to return MAAC 3 to Sync Bus and to isolate generator three from the power distribution system.

5. If RSET or POWR restarts continue to occur, coordinate with flight engineer for continued troubleshooting. Suspect power distribution system component that is common to entire system.
6. Notify TD of results. If power malfunctions continue to occur, shutdown DPS, DDS, and ESTSG equipment using data processing system power removal procedures when directed by TD.

Faulty Power Supply Isolation

Whenever the MASTER ERROR ACK indicator illuminates without an E indicator illuminating, a unit power supply is suspected faulty. The following procedure should be followed to find the faulty power supply.

1. MASTER ERROR ACK Pushbutton - Depressed

--- If MASTER ERROR ACK Indicator Remains Illuminated, Proceed to Step 3. If Indicator Goes Out Perform Step 2 Only ---

2. OCC E Indicators - Observed/Monitored

Monitor the OCC E indicators for an intermittent power supply problem. Turn the overhead light to low to help isolate problem. If an E light flashes, write it up in Form 781 with MASTER ERROR ACK lamp problem, then discontinue this procedure.

3. OCC Units ON/OFF Switch - OFF

Starting with MMUs, power off one unit at a time and then perform step 4. Continue procedure until faulty unit is found.

4. MASTER ERROR ACK Pushbutton - Depressed

--- If MASTER ERROR ACK Indicator Still Illuminated, Repeat Steps 3 and 4 For a Different Unit ---

5. MASTER ERROR ACK Indicator - Out
6. Unit Power Supply - Faulty

Power supply of the last unit powered off is faulty.

Enclosure (2)

NATO WAC

1993



000551

Demonstrat

Deterre

D:



NATO's Airborne Early Warning Force

In the early 1970s, studies showed the ability to "look down" with radar and see low-flying aircraft was essential to air defense. In September 1978, the Alliance decided to buy and operate an airborne early warning system, forming NATO's largest commonly-funded acquisition programme. Thirteen of NATO's 16 nations are partners in the venture. France, Iceland and Spain are not. The United Kingdom contributes financially to the program, but elected to create its own unit consisting of seven E-3D aircraft. The two units, British and multi-national, will comprise the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force.

While the Force's principal role is early warning and air surveillance, it also provides command and communications support, counter-air, close air support, rescue, reconnaissance and airlift operations. The Force Command Headquarters is located with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium.



000552



NATO's E-3A Component


Civilians and military work together creating NATO's first integrated multi-national operational unit. Their mission is to provide early warning to the three major NATO commanders; supporting air defense of Alliance nations, as well as NATO naval operations.

The crews of the four flying squadrons are made up of military from 12 nations. The military and civilians of the Component's support organizations throughout Europe come from all of 13 participating nations. To communicate, this multi-national unit uses English, the language of aviation. These men and women have flown more than 70,000 accident-free flying hours.

The Component became operational in 1984 with 18 E-3A aircraft and 2,500 people organized in a headquarters staff and five functional areas: an Operations Wing, Training Centre, Logistics Wing, Software Support Centre and Base Support Wing. E-3A crew members train in NATO's Training Centre, which has a highly realistic computer-driven simulator.

Besides the main operating base at Geilenkirchen, West Germany, the Component operates detachments in Turkey, Greece, Italy and Norway. But the Component is not limited to flying from these locations, as crews fly regularly from almost every Alliance nation during exercises and other operations. With the E-3A's watching NATO airspace, to be "forwarned" is to be truly "forearmed".

NATO Standard Configuration



U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO AVIANO
MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: ACQUISITION OF DOCUMENTS FROM
MAJOR [REDACTED] USAF

On 27Apr98, Major [REDACTED] USAF, [REDACTED] provided several documents pertinent to the Local Area Orientation (LAO) briefing which he gave to VMAQ-2 on 25Aug97. [REDACTED] provided a photocopy of the appointment calendar where his secretary, [REDACTED] Civ, GS-4, entered the appointment for the squadron LAO brief. Enclosure (1) pertains to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] additionally provided a photocopy of Chapter 8 (Aviano Supplement) of Air Force Instruction MCI 11-F16 (local area procedures), dated 10Apr96 (Local Area Flying Procedures) which was passed out to the VMAQ-2 audience during the brief in question. He also provided an updated version of Chapter 8, dated 15Oct97 (updated after the briefing). The black lines appearing on the side of the newer Chapter 8 version indicate where the document was updated. See enclosures (2) and (3).

[REDACTED] additionally provided a copy of Flight Crew Information File (FCIF) 97-16, dated 29Aug97. This document calls for a 2000 foot altitude restriction for pilots flying over the Trentino Alto Adige region. Enclosure (4) pertains to [REDACTED] crew for reporting agent a corridor on a navigational map of the Aviano/Trentino Alto Adige region, where the FCIF 2000-foot altitude restriction is in effect. This corridor (35 nautical miles either side of a line between Trento and Bolzano) is described in FCIF 97-16. Also outlined on the map is a flight route from Point Sierra (on the Adriatic Coast near Caorle, to Point Fermo, which lies approximately 20 miles south of Aviano. A noise complaint was received by the 31st Fighter Wing concerning this flight sometime in the Summer of 1997, according to [REDACTED]. See enclosure (5).

Enclosures

- (1) Copy of appointment calendar
- (2) Copy of Aviano Supplement to MCI 11-F16 dated 10 April 1996
- (3) Copy of Aviano Supplement dated 15 Oct 1997
- (4) Copy of FCIF 97-16
- (5) Navigational map

Reporting Agent [REDACTED]
Office: NCISFO Naples, Italy

Pages 554 through 556 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosure (1) to Exhibit (70): NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), Withheld

Chapter 8 LOCAL OPERATING PROCEDURES

Section A - INTRODUCTION

8-1. Introduction.

8.1.1. This chapter supplements operational directives and establishes local procedures for all pilots assigned and attached to the 4190th Provisional Wing. Non F-16 pilots can disregard F-16 specific directives, annotated by (F-16). Information contained in other directives will not be repeated in this regulation. Close study of this regulation, the 4190 (P) Wing Pilot Aid, and current FCIFs is necessary to effectively and safely employ in the Southern Region.

8-2. Responsibility.

8.2.1. All pilots assigned attached to the 4190 (P) Wing are responsible for compliance with this directive.

8-3. Deviations.

8.3.1. The 4190 OG CC has waiver authority for this directive. 4190 OG ST will publish long term waivers (greater than 30 days) as FCIFs.

8-4. Changes.

8.4.1. Recommend changes to this supplement by submitting an AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication, or calling 4190 OG ST at DSN 632-8611.

Section B - GENERAL POLICY

8-5. Go / No Go Items

8.5.1. The following items are Go/No Go items for the 4190th (P) Wing.

- All Aircrews
FCIF (Flight Crew Information File)
- Aircrews which enter the AOR
DE ROE monthly.
- All 31 FW Pilots
FCIF
DE ROE monthly.
CAPS prior to first flight of the week.
SRF - Squadron Read File
Current SEPT (30 days)
SIF - Safety Information File
Publication Sign Off

8-6. (F-16) Situational Emergency Procedures Training (SEPT).

8.6.1. Accomplish SEPTs once every thirty days. Schedule SEPTs and print on the daily flying schedule. SEPTs will be a minimum of 30 minutes. Operations Group Stan/Eval will distribute a "SEPT Scenario of the Month" to provide a starting point for the SEPT. 4190 (P) Wing/SE will consolidate F-16 accident information for SEPT training.

8-7. (F-16) Publications.

8.7.1. Each pilot will maintain a current basic flight manual, aircraft and weapon employment checklists, MCI 11-F-16 Vol 3 with Aviano Supplement, air refueling checklist and the 4190 (P) Wing Pilot Aid.

8-8. (F-16) Single Ship Missions.

8.8.1. The following scheduled single-ship missions are authorized:

- Incentive orientation flights. Pilots will monitor squadron VHF frequency. The ejection mode select handle will be set in AFT. No simulated emergency procedures will be flown.
- MR pilots may proceed on single-ship medium altitude sorties. Only flight lead qualified pilots may fly single ship low level missions. Additionally, the minimum altitude is 1500 feet AGL or the MSA whichever is higher.
- Functional Check Flights.
- Operational Check Flights
- Instrument proficiency or check sorties.
- The initial night TI sortie (D-model)
- The Horn Awareness and Recovery Training Series (HARTS) (AFM 11-F-16 Vol 5, MCM 3-3) will be flown only under the supervision of an instructor pilot or squadron supervisor.

8.8.2. "Top Three" may authorize single-ship missions as a result of fallout.

8-9. Alternate Missions

8.9.1. Brief alternate missions. Intercepts or instruments are the standard alternate missions. Alternate missions will be consistent in configuration and tasking with the primary mission, i.e., BFM as an alternate to ACT.


8.9.2. Three-ship fallout. A four-ship flight lead or IP may take any two qualified wingmen on any tactical sortie.

8-10. Airfield Data.

- Location: 4602.0N 1236.1E
- Elevation: Field elevation 413' MSL
- RWY: Single. 05/23, 8596' x 148.' It has an upslope of approximately 1.1 % from SW to NE.
- Load bearing overruns: NE end - 815', SW end - 907'.
- Taxiways. There are north and south parallel taxiways. The south parallel is available as an emergency landing surface with 4190 (P) OG/CC approval and may take up to one hour to activate. The MAAS barrier at midfield requires 15 minutes minimum prior notice if not rigged.
- ILS PAR glide slope: 2.5°. Touchdown point is 790' past the threshold of RWY 05. There is no ILS PAR capability to RWY 23. PAPI glide slope is aligned with the ILS PAR glide slope and PAPIs are available for RWY 23.
- Runway 05 is the only runway with instrument approaches due to the location of restricted area (R-9) 5NM east of the field and the terrain to the north.
- Both high and low altitude TACAN ILS approach procedures are available to RWY 05. Aviano also has a PAR ASR available for RWY 05. Circling is only authorized to the south due to mountainous terrain to the north.
- Aircraft Arresting Systems Standard Configuration:
 - Runway 05:
 - MA-1A. (Barrier =6)
 - BAK-9. (Barrier =5)
 - BAK-13. (Barrier =4)
 - Runway 23:
 - MA-1A. (Barrier =1)
 - BAK-9. (Barrier =2)
 - BAK-13. (Barrier =3)
- Connecting approach end cables require 15 minutes prior notice. If needed ask for. "Approach end engagement."
- Transition altitude in the Aviano Approach Control airspace is 7000' MSL. (In Italy, each airdrome identifies its own transition altitude and they vary from 5500' MSL to 8500' MSL.)
- Do not overfly the Weapons Storage Area (WSA) located between Nickel and Tower loops on the southside of the field.

8-11. Weather:

Aviano has both USAF and Italian Air Force weather observers. On the Automated Weather



Data System (AWDS) the identifier LIYW is Aviano's USAF weather, and LIPA is Aviano's ITAF weather. The status of the airfield (VFR or IFR) is dependent on the ITAF observation. ITAF ceiling and visibility criteria for VFR are ICAO standard, but use worst quadrant visibility only for determining visibility. Weather patterns at Aviano are such that the visibility to the north is frequently much lower than visibility on final. Pilots and supervisors should use PIREPS, RVR readings, and USAF observations when making approach-or-divert type decisions. Use LIYW weather to determine if ITAF weather requires an IFR pattern and the corresponding fuel requirements.

8.11.2 Aviano's airfield elevation is about 100' above almost all airfields in a 200 NM radius. During periods of fog, it is not unusual to have unrestricted visibility at Aviano, while all the neighboring airfields have visibilities of less than 400 meters. A slight change in temperature or wind can cause drastic changes in Aviano's weather with little or no warning.

8-12. (F-16) Anti-Exposure Suit Wear:

8.12.1. The wearing of anti-exposure suits is mandatory on any preplanned overwater flight when the water temperature is 60°F or less unless the local air temperature is 70°F (20°C) or greater.

8.12.2. The wearing of anti-exposure suits is waived for sorties when the overwater portion occurs during departure and RTB only and the aircraft is within gliding distance of land. The wearing of anti-exposure suits is also waived for Decisive Edge sorties.

8-13. Filing Flight Plans:

8.13.1. 31 OSS current operations must file two types of flight plans for local, non Decisive Edge, sorties. One is civilian (ICAO - DD Form 1801); and one is military, SMA-7 (Stato Maggiore Aereo Directive number 7). Each squadron must have the next days local training flying schedule to 31 OSS OSC by 1130L the workday prior. Italian holidays, Saturdays, and Sundays are not considered workdays. The 31 OSS current ops section deconflicts airspace and sends the message through the base communication center to the 1st ROC Air Traffic Control Center by 1300Z. Base Operations will use their copy of the daily flight schedule to file the ICAO (DD Form 1801) flight plan.

8.13.2. There are procedures to file flight plans the same day of the flight. Notify base operations with the requirement for an "immediate" flight plan. This is not a routine request. File immediate flight plans at least 1 1/2 hours before takeoff.

8.13.3. Aircraft taking off up to ten minutes late may join the flight on the original mission number and flight plan.

8-14. Suspected Flying Violations

8.14.1. Pilots who are involved in a flying violation will inform their supervisor, give the mission tapes to the squadron commander, and submit a written report to the 4190 OG CC.

Section C - GROUND OPERATIONS

8-15. (F-16) Start and Taxi Procedures.

8.15.1. Preflight. Pilots or crew chiefs will not change the gun configuration. Weapons personnel will safe or arm the gun.

8.15.2. All pilots will check ATIS for current airfield and weather information and monitor ground control frequency during start.

8.15.3. If an F-16 ice FOD alert is in effect, the SOF or squadron will direct the first aircraft to start to conduct an ice FOD check in accordance with the 4190 (P) Wing F-16 Pilot Aid procedures. If inlet icing is observed flying operations will terminate (except airborne flights). The SOF will direct all ground F-16s to shut down.

8.15.4. Engine start. Radios will be set on squadron Victor and Uniform ground for start. Flight lead will request engine start clearance with ground control.

8.15.5. After start. Perform after start checks to include SEC check and EPU check in the HAS, or outside the HAS after confirming jetblast direction is safe. Complete the SEC check prior to pulling the EPU pin.

8.15.6. The minimum lights for night flying are: all interior instrument lights, position lights (one wingtip light per side, both inlet, tail), anti-collision strobe, landing, and taxi lights, all formation (upper, lower, both tail) The AAR lights must be operational if air refueling is planned.

8.15.7. Minimum taxi interval will be 300' on the centerline or 150' staggered. Pilots will taxi staggered only during daytime and on the north or south parallel taxiways.

8.15.8. Pilots who change UHF from ground control (except for HQ Secure Voice Checks) will notify ground control. Pilots will monitor guard frequency.

8-16. Ground Radio Drill

8.16.1. Make an Engine Start call on Ground Control, Channel 2. This will put your clearance on request. Request taxi "Aviano Ground, callsign, taxi, number of aircraft, location, ATIS letter, IFR/VFR". Pilots will read back assigned runway. Maintain Ground Control until directed to "Contact Clearance Delivery," UHF Channel 1. This normally occurs ten minutes prior to departure time. Refrain from contacting clearance delivery earlier as it will hinder, not expedite, the process. Pilots will inform Ground Control if their actual departure time will differ by more than 5 minutes from the proposed flight plan time. All pilots will acknowledge clearance. Switch to Tower when ready for departure.

8-17. Arming/Dearming

8.17.1. Normally arming/dearming will take place on the north/south parallel. The 4190 OG CC is the approval

authority for arming of aircraft in the parking loops (in the chocks), this approval will only be granted for mass launches. The Nickel loop will arm inside the west gate when the field is IFR (1500 ft 5 km) or at night. Aircraft returning to the Nickel loop will dearm just inside the east gate. Aircraft waiting to be dearmed in the Nickel loop will hold short of the ILS critical area when the field is IFR or at night.

8-18. ILS Critical Area

8.18.1. In order to ensure the integrity of the ILS signal, all vehicles, aircraft and equipment will remain outside of the ILS critical area during Night or IFR conditions when an aircraft is on the ILS. During IFR conditions tower will direct aircraft to "hold short of runway 5 ILS critical area" if an aircraft is on or approaching ILS final. The ILS critical area is defined by the Instrument Hold Short Lines at the approach end of runway 05.

8-19. Wet-Dry Runway.

8.19.1. After landing, pass runway braking action to tower if braking action is other than expected or reported. Report conditions in terms of the following standard terminology: good, fair, poor, or nil.

8.19.2. Base operations determines runway condition (wet or dry). If the runway is declared "wet", the SOF determines "standing water" for formation takeoffs.

Section D - FLYING OPERATIONS

8-20. Takeoffs.


8.20.1. Advise tower if planning a non-standard (greater than 20 seconds spacing) departure or if excessive time on the runway will be required. Maintain at or below 1500' MSL until departure end. Discontinue afterburner use at 300 KIAS for noise abatement unless safety of flight dictates otherwise.

8.20.2. All unrestricted climbs must be approved by the 4190 OG CC. This rule applies at Aviano and all other airfields. Functional check flights are exempt from this requirement.

8-21. VFR Departures:

8.21.1. RWY 05. The status of the Maniago range (R-9) is on ATIS. If "R-9 Maniago is Hot," after takeoff, fly straight ahead until past the Conventional Armament (CAS) area, then right to point Anna (AVI 140 7), then turn to the south so as to fly just to the east of the

town of San Foca but still avoiding R-9. The intent of this delay is to attain a higher altitude prior to the turn south in the interest of noise abatement. If unable to climb due to low ceilings avoid overflight of all towns as much as possible. Wingmen will also comply with the above procedures and will not attempt to use either power or cutoff until above 3000' MSL. During all phases of flight, pilots will place noise abatement consideration second in priority to safety. Climb to 3500' MSL or higher until point Anna. R-9 is approximately 5 NM from end of the runway (the dry river bed). (C-130s do not need to follow noise abatement ground track.)



8.21.2. If "R-9 Maniago is Cold," fly heading 055° to 4 DME (at or above 3000') then right turn to intercept the 7 DME arc until heading 180°. Cross AVI 090°R at or above 4500', then as cleared.

8.21.3. RWY 23. After takeoff, turn left to point Fermo (AVI 200 13). Expedite climb to 3500' MSL or above. Avoid the towns of Vigonovo and Sacile.

8.21.3. VFR Entry Exit Reference Points: Point Anna is a set of railroad and highway bridges 1 NM SE of the town


of Pordenone. (N4556.700 E1232.000 120'). Point Fermo is a bridge over a river. (N4549.837 E1227.882 62').

8-22. IFR Departures

8.22.1. If departing IFR in VMC, fly the noise abatement procedure described above until southbound then continue as cleared.

8.22.2. File SIDs for all IFR departures. Aviano has four DOD-approved SIDs. The Chioggia 7, Vicenza 6, and the Adriatic 1 are published in DOD Flip. The Cavallo 1 is a local SID, it is published in the Pilot Aid and is available at Base Ops.


8.22.3. The Cavallo 1 is designed to get flights into Zita airspace. When Aviano is IFR, flights with VFR flight plans may request the Cavallo 1 to get VFR on top if they have a reasonable chance of accomplishing the mission as filed. If the field is IFR due to a local low ceiling or fog bank, request the Cavallo 1 departure at engine start or as soon as the field goes IFR. Coordination for this local SID takes about 10 minutes.



8-23. VFR arrivals

8.23.1. VFR arrivals will contact Aviano Approach with intentions when approaching Aviano airspace. On initial contact with Aviano state receipt of current ATIS information or state "Negative ATIS".

8.23.2 RWY 05: The entry point is Point Fermo (AVI 203/13). When cleared by tower, depart point Fermo heading 330° at 2500' MSL until intercepting the 050° course inbound to Aviano (Avoid overflight of Sacile to the North, offset by as much as safety allows). At 5 DME, begin descent to 2000' MSL. Initial altitude is 2000' MSL with a north break for a left base to RWY 05. The normal reentry to initial will be via the noise abatement ground track to point Anna at 3500' then to point Fermo descending to 2500' MSL. VFR straight-ins to RWY 05 must be cleared by the tower before departing point Fermo. Maintain 2500' MSL until intercepting extended final, clear for GCA traffic at or above 2000' MSL.



8.23.3. RWY 23. Entry point is point Anna (AVI 140/7). When cleared by tower, depart point Anna heading 015° descending to 2000' MSL. Turn to a heading of 340° short of the Dry River Bed and then to initial, heading 230 degrees. The turn to initial is around a large red striped

tower at the edge of the town of San Foca. Initial altitude is 2000' MSL with a north break for a right base to RWY 23. The normal reentry to initial will be a left between Macile and Vigonova climbing to 3500', then point Anna entering as above. avoid overflight of towns.

8.23.4. Do not fly practice VFR straight-in patterns to RWY 23. If an emergency straight-in is required, fly a 3.5 mile final to avoid R-9. The ground track is the same as the overhead pattern, after departing point Anna, descend to 1500' MSL. Configure for landing on base leg.

8.23.5. Only A-10s are authorized to fly tactical initial. Element leads will position themselves over the runway with wingman 3000-6000' line abreast, opposite the break. Wingman must not overfly the WSA.

8.23.6. Low approach go-around. Climb and maintain between 700' and 1500' MSL until 1.2 NM past departure end. Request closed, SFO, or reentry via point Anna/Fermo. Closed pattern is a climbing turn to the north to 2000' MSL.

8.23.7. Tower may approve a "high downwind reentry" if pattern spacing does not allow a closed pattern. The "high downwind reentry" is a turn to the north, climbing to 2500' and then a turn to intercept a 3 DME initial descending back to 2000'.

8.23.8. (F-16) Simulated Flameout (SFO) Procedures: "High Key" is overhead the runway at 7500' (coordinate other altitudes with tower). Holding at high key will be a circular orbit in the direction of the SFO pattern. "Straight-in High Key" is on a 5 NM final at 5500' MSL.

- Overhead SFO: The SFO pattern is a 360° turn to the south. Report "High Key", "Low Key", and "Base". Minimum weather required is an 8000' ceiling and 8000 meters (5NM) visibility. If weather does not allow a high key entry, initiate the SFO at low key using the same ground track. Pilots may request a closed pattern to high key. When 1.2 NM past the departure end at 700' to 1500' MSL initiate a climbing turn to the north.

- Straight-in SFO: The straight-in SFO will follow the normal ground track for a visual straight-in and may only be flown to RWY 05. Report "5 Mile Straight-in High Key" at 5 NM on final. Coordinate altitude with approach and tower. Minimum weather is 6000' ceiling and 8000 meters visibility. There will be no "random entry" straight-in SFOs, fly only the normal ground track from Fermo.

8-24. IFR Arrivals

8.24.1. IFR inbound traffic expect two minutes between approaches. On initial contact with Aviano state receipt of current ATIS information or state "Negative ATIS".

8.24.2. All IFR approaches are to RWY 05. Make circling approaches to RWY 23 to the south due to mountainous terrain north of the field. Radar monitoring is not available on TACAN final.

8.24.3. If separate approaches are desired for wingmen notify the controlling agency prior to assuming "non-standard" formation.

8.24.4. Radar assisted trail recoveries (RATR) are permitted with the following restrictions:

- Do not hold in radar trail without an altitude stack.
- Four ships are the maximum number in radar trail. Four ships must be on a depicted approach. Radar vectors will not be accepted. Should vectors be required, flight leads will obtain separate clearances for each flight member.
- Two ships will make every effort to fly a depicted approach. Radar vectors will only be accepted in extraordinary circumstances. If vectors are required, the flight lead will attempt to get separate clearances.

8.24.5. Standard lost communications procedures. If no transmissions are received for 30 seconds in the pattern or 5/15 seconds on final, attempt contact with Aviano Tower and proceed VFR. If unable to maintain VFR, maintain 3000' until established on final and proceed with the ILS/TACAN approach RWY 05. CAUTION: Do not proceed north of the AVI 233 degrees radial unless established on a segment of the approach, due to rapidly rising terrain. If landing RWY 23 circle southeast of the runway for a left downwind /base to RWY 23.

8.24.6. PAR/ASR/ILS consecutive approach procedures. Applicable to RWY 05 only. GCA will issue the following instructions or advise "execute local climbout." After low approach, touch and go, or missed approach, climb straight ahead beyond the departure end to 1500 feet, then following noise abatement procedures when VMC, turn right to a heading of 210 degrees, climb and maintain 3000' MSL.

8-25. Noise Abatement

8.25.1. Noise complaints are a serious problem in the Aviano area. The following rules must be followed.

- Departure noise abatement procedures must be followed.
- Training sorties are not allowed between 2300L and 0700L. Training and non training sorties arriving after 2200L and prior to 0730L fly a single approach (VFR or IFR) to a fullstop.
- Airspeed above .90 mach is prohibited over the Italian National Territory and National Waters (12 NM from the coast). Include a 12 NM buffer when directed towards the coast.
- Observe minimum altitudes and maximum airspeeds on low levels, in the range pattern, and near populated areas. Flights must avoid public beaches by 2 NM or 2000' AGL. Flights that cross the coastline will be on a heading perpendicular to the coastline at least 1 kilometer prior and past the coastline. Flights in mountainous terrain must maintain at least 1000' AGL between 1 Nov and 30 Apr or anytime there is snow present.
- Afterburner is prohibited below 2000' AGL except for takeoffs and emergencies.
- Low level flights are not authorized on Saturday, Sunday, or during Italian holidays.
- Do not overfly Pordenone Cordenons below 3000' or Sacile below 2500' MSL unless on final.

8-26. Local Flying Area

8.26.1. The Aviano local flying area is northeast Italy east of 9° East and north of 42° North

8.26.2. Use of airspace in Italy is subject to restrictions imposed by controlled airspace, danger, restricted, and prohibited areas. VFR flight must be carefully planned IAW FLIP, GP, AP 2, AP2A and the Italian AIP. Reference the low level operational air traffic (BOAT) manual for low level rules.

8.26.3. There are numerous firing areas in Italy. Firing areas (FRAs) are NOTAMed active in the daily notams.

8.26.3. The 4190 (P) Wing's working areas are listed in Area Planning (AP 2) and Decisive Edge Flight SPINS for SPEEDY. The working areas are not formally defined airspace, but just sectors of airspace NOTAMed to have high density military traffic. Civilian aircraft crossing a

section of the airspace will normally cause an altitude restriction.

Airspace	Altitudes	Max Airspeed	GCI or radar.	Chart/Flare authorized.
Speedy	Normally 6000 MSL to FL300 or FL500	None	Maroon, Pedro, or Padova	Yes
Zita	As assigned. 5000' MSL (1000' AGL min) to FL350	.9 Mach	Padova, Pedro, or Aviano	No
Sara	As assigned. 5000' MSL to FL350	.9 Mach	Pioppo or Padova	No
Lola	As assigned. 5000' MSL (1000' AGL min) to FL350	.9 Mach	Pioppo or Padova	No
Ada	As assigned. FL 135 to FL 285	.9 Mach	Padova or Pedro	No
Feltre-Belluno	As assigned. 5000' MSL (1000' AGL min) to FL350	.9 Mach	Padova, Pedro, or Aviano	No

Speedy Notes:

VFR entry is not permitted

RTB Five minutes before departing SPEEDY, request a clearance to Aviano. Expect clearance to Rotar, Penny, Aviano.

Warning calls by GCI. Aircraft approaching within 3 NM of the boundaries of SPEEDY will be given position advisories and an appropriate heading. The Croatian FIR will be considered as a flying boundary, and aircraft seen approaching this boundary will be given a position on VHF/UHF guard.

Zita Notes:

VFR Entry/Exit On departure, climb above 5000' Aviano Departure will hand you off to PEDRO's working frequency. Recovery can be to initial VFR entry point or IAF. Contact Aviano Approach before departing ZITA.

IFR Entry/Exit Fly the Cavallo 1 SID from Aviano, cancel when VFR. Exit by TACAN penetration.

The proximity of the Buffer Zone, the Austrian border, civilian airways, and R-9 requires extra attention to position at all times.

Northern Zita has mountains up to 11,000' MSL.

Lola Notes:

VFR entry is not permitted. If an unable to obtain an IFR clearance for RTB, maintain VMC, select an appropriate hemispherical altitude, and advise Padova returning to Aviano.

IFR Entry/Exit All flights will use the Vicenza 6 SID to Villafranca. After passing Vicenza, request clearance into the area. Request IFR clearance from Pioppo five minutes before desired exit time.

Sara Notes:

Entry/Exit Coordinate with Padova. Notify controlling agency 5 minutes prior to RTB with intentions.

8-27. IFF Procedures / Self Protection Procedures

8.27.1. When over the Italian landmass, all members in the flight should squawk Mode III and C when concerned. Do not squawk Mode 1 or 2 unless specifically tasked to do so.

8.27.2. Inhibit decoy dispensers and electronic counter measure systems over Italy.

8-28. Divert vs Alternate, and Understanding the ATIS Status

8.28.1. The absolute weather minimums for all fighter type aircraft operating from Aviano is 300 ft and 1.6 km. The SOF can get mission essential aircraft permission to launch from either the DEOC or the 4190 OG/CC.

8.28.2. A divert airfield is required for all local flights. If both Aviano and the divert Airfield are VFR, then the SOF will declare a divert airfield. If either, Aviano or the divert airfield is IFR, then the SOF will declare an alternate. Divert airfield weather must be reported and forecasted to be above the USAFE minimums for a compatible approach and pilot weather minimums. The divert does not have to meet dual/single alternate rules if Aviano is VFR.

8.3. ATIS will read: "Aviano Air Base Information "B". Time 0001Z. -Weather-, -Expected Approach and Runway-, NOTAMS. 4190 STATUS VFR, IFR Recoveries Only, Alternate Villafranca Advise on initial contact you have information "B."

- The key word is Alternate. If one hears the word Alternate in the ATIS, either the Aviano weather requires an alternate or the alternate field requires an instrument approach, or both. Fuels must be calculated accordingly using the Divert/Alternate annotation on the ATIS information. The first item of the "4190 Status" allows a quick determination of the current USAF weather and the fuel required for approaches and/or missed approaches at Aviano.
- VFR -Fuel for a VFR recovery is required. Weather is greater than 1500' and 5 km.
- IFR -Fuel for an IFR recovery and missed approach is required. Weather is less than 1500' and 5 km.
- The second item contains notes that would modify one's fuel required. IFR Recoveries Only (Fuel for an IFR approach). Overhead Closed (No change, VFR

recovery to a straight-in is still possible). The last item establishes the fuel (type of recovery) required at the Divert/Alternate.

The three most common examples of ATIS options are: 1) Aviano VFR, Divert Rivolto (Plan fuel for VFR arrival at Aviano and a VFR divert/arrival to Rivotto). 2) Aviano VFR, Alternate Istrana (Plan fuel for VFR arrival at Aviano, expect and plan fuel for an IFR arrival at Istrana). 3) Aviano IFR, Alternate Villafranca (Plan for IFR arrival at Aviano, IFR divert and arrival at Villafranca)


8-29. Alternate/Emergency Airfields

PRIMARY ALTERNATES			
Destination ICAO/TCN (#) APPR/TWR FREQ	RWY/LENGTH Afld Coords. Elevation	Barriers Type Approaches	IFR Profile Snap Vector
RIVOLTO LIP/RIV (37) 261.27 / 257.8	06/24 8200' N 4559.700 E 1305.317 182'	BAK-13 Equiv. PAR / TAC	Penny direct IAF HI TAC RWY 06 098/019
ISTRANA LIPS/ISA (54) 337.95 / 338.5	08/26 9819' N 4540.900 E 1205.200 139'	BAK-12 SAFE BAR PAR / TAC	STD Divert 225/30
VILLAFRANCA LIPX/VIL (105) 292.7 / 257.8	05/23 8717' N 4523.700 E 1053.200 238'	BAK-12 SAFE BAR PAR / TAC	Vicenza 6. VIC. IAF TACAN RWY 05 243/81
GHEDI LIPL/GHE (46) 292.7 / 386.5	14/32 9810' N 4526.000 E 1016.300 334'	BAK-9 (RW 14) PAR / TAC	Vicenza 6. VIC. VIL. IAF HI TAC RWY 32 250/104
CERVIA LIPC/CEV (83) 379.75 / 258.95	12/30 9823' N 4413.500 E 1218.500 19'	BAK-12 BEFAB* TAC -	Chioggia 7. CHI. IAF TACAN RWY 12 186/109
CAMERI LIMN/CAM (97) 126.75 / 300.25	17/35 9285' N 4531.900 E 0840.200 588'	BAK-9 SAFE BAR TAC	Vicenza 6. VIC. UB4. SRN. CAM. IAF HI TAC RWY35 260/167
GROSSETO LIRS/GRO (28) 362.3 / 257.8	03/21 9817' N 4245.500 E 1104.600 15'	BAK-9 TAC	STD Divert 200/207
GIOIA DEL COLLE LIBV/GIO (125) 362.3 / 257.8	14/32 9843' N 4045.9 E 1656.1 1186'	BAK-12 PAR / TAC	Chioggia 7. CHI. FAL. VIE. GIO. IAF HI TAC 5 RWY 2/14 147 / 368
BRINDISI / CASALE LIBR/BRD (79) 376.8 / 257.8	14/32 8622' N 4039.6 E 1756.48'	BAK 12 ILS / TAC	Chioggia 7. CHI. FAL. VIE. BRD. IAF HI VORTAC RWY 32 141 / 398

- Istrana. VFR divert airfield. Too close for single weather alternate but can be used under dual alternate

procedures. Do not confuse with Treviso-St Angelo which is a nearby parallel runway 5 NM southeast. Most common VFR divert, normally 24 hour operations.

- Rivolto.** VFR divert airfield. Operational: Sunrise - 30 minutes to sunset + 30 minutes. Rivolto is too close to meet single weather alternate requirements but can be used as half of dual alternates. PAR minima is not yet published in US FLIP, available in IAF FLIP and in the Pilot Aid. Rivolto often closes early, field status should be confirmed by SOF.
- Villafranca.** Italian controlled PAR. ILS is not an approved DOD instrument approach procedure.
- Ghedi.** Do not confuse with Montichiari airfield which is a closed nearly parallel runway two NM east. The Ghedi TACAN is right next to the active runway. Operational: sunrise - 30 minutes to sunset - 30 minutes.
- Pisa.** USAF aircraft may only use during daylight hours. No cables.
- Cameri.** Operational: Sunrise - 30 minutes to sunset + 30 minutes.
- Grosseto.** Italian controlled PAR. TACAN approach in FLIP. Grosseto is often the primary IFR alternate during Po valley fog months. Note: If diverting to Grosseto with live ordnance, you should fly the divert procedure in the Pilot Aid. From Aviano, ask for the Adriatica DS. From the AOR, as for East DS from Lisko.
- Cervia.** Operational: Sunrise - 30 minutes to sunset - 30 minutes. Monday - Friday. No DOD approved GCA.
- Falconara.** Operational: 0600-2200Z. No GCA or BAK type barrier capabilities.
- Rimini.** Civil airfield only. No DoD approved approaches due to the recent departure of Italian AF from the airfield, not to be used as a weather alternate. Can be used as an emergency airfield, coordinate through Romagna approach.
- Venezia/Tessera.** No GCA TACAN capabilities and no cables. Not to be used as a weather alternate. Can be used as an emergency airfield, coordinate through Treviso Approach.



EMERGENCY ALTERNATES NOT TO BE USED AS PRIMARY DIVERT			
Destination ICAO/TCN (=) APPR/TWR FREQ	RWY/LENGTH Afd Coords. Elevation	Barriers Type Appr.	IFR Profile Snap Vector
VENEZIA LIPZ:None 254.6 / 257.8	04 / 22 10827 N 4530.400 E 1221.100 7'	NONE ILS	Penny Direct to Field 198/33
RONCHI DEI LEGONARI LIPQ: 89 (DME) 119.15 / 257.8	09 / 27 9843 N 4549.600 E 1328.00 39'	NONE ILS	Penny Direct to Field 107/39
RIMINI LIPR: NONE 379.75 / 257.8	13 / 31 9813 N 4401.400 E 1236.700 42'	NONE NONE	Chioggia 7. CHI. Direct to Field 179/121
FALCONARA LIPY: FAL (35) 338.65 / 257.8	04 / 22 9816 N 4337.000 E 1321.800 50'	NONE ILS / TAC	Chioggia 7. CHI. FAL. IAF HI TAC RWY 22 166/149
PISA LIRP: PIN(20) 344.6 / 257.8	04 / 22 9816 N 4341.000 E 1023.600 7'	NONE ILS / TAC	Chioggia 7. CHI. FER. FRZ. PIN. IAF HI TAC RWY 04 214/169
GENOVA LIMJ / 57 (DME) 131.325 / 118.7	05 / 23 12795 N 4424.700 E 0850.600 13'	NONE ILS	Vicenza 6. VIC. VIL. PIA. Direct to Field 239/186

8-30. Low-Level Navigation:

8.30.1. Procedures and limitations for low level flight are published in Area Planning (AP²) and in the "Low Level Operational Air Traffic Flight Manual" Procedures and restrictions are as follows:

- Depart Aviano's VFR exit points at or above 3500' MSL and maintain at or above 3500 MSL (weather permitting) until after departing the first turn point on the low level.
- The low-level structure extends from 500' AGL to 2000' AGL.
- The Italian military authorities have established a low level directional flow control system to minimize the possibility of in-flight collisions. A depiction of the flow boundaries and directions is in the 31 FW Pilot Aid and AP². Flights conforming to low altitude flow directions may operate 500-2000' AGL. Flights not conforming to the low altitude flow directions must be above 2000' AGL. The preplanned low-levels are not affected by the directional flow if flown as filed.
- Avoid restricted airspace published in the Italian NOTAMs.
- Avoid population centers depicted on the 1:500,000 TPC's by 1 NM when below 1500' AGL.
- Pop up attacks are authorized, but limited to one pass unless more are coordinated with the controlling agency. Coordinate altitudes if going above 2000 feet AGL.
- Some of the local routes have high altitude segments. Weather may also require a climb to higher altitudes. The standard ICAO procedure for crossing airways is at right angles, VMC, and at VFR hemispheric altitudes.
- Italian laws and flight regulations require aircraft to be in contact with a controlling agency at all times. Controlled VFR procedures are in effect in all Italian airspace. Entering any control zones without having prior contact with the controlling agency will make the aircraft commander liable to violation. Once outside the control zones, contact Padova or Roma Military Control. Flights at low altitude will be unable to maintain constant line of site with Padova and Roma Military in the mountains. Flights will know which agencies to call. 4190 (P) Wing local area

maps depict the different control areas.

- Low-level flights are not authorized below 1000' AGL in the mountains during the winter months (1 Nov - 30 Apr) or anytime snow is present.
- Low-level routes will offset coastlines by a minimum of 2 NM.
- Maintain \pm 5 miles of the "black line" during low level flight.

8-31. (F-16) Targeting Pod Restrictions

8.31.1. Do not use the targeting pod for LGB guidance below 5000' AGL, or as the sensor of interest below 1000' AGL.

8-32 Night GLIB II Maneuvers.

8.32.1. Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) evasive maneuvers, as described in Multi Command Manual (MCM) 3-1, are authorized at night with the following restrictions:

- Single-ship only.
- Complete all portions of the maneuver above 5,000' AGL in VMC.
- Airspeed: Min 300 KIAS. (Note, max airspeed overland is .9M, must schedule overwater for effective training.)
- SAM last ditch maneuvers at night are prohibited.

8-33. (F-16) Formation Landings

8.33.1. F-16 Formation Landings are prohibited.

SECTION E - WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT

8.34. (F-16) Weapons Employment

8.34.1 Do not perform simulated low altitude attacks on historical buildings, places of worship, or tourist areas. Avoid planning low altitude attacks on populated areas to the maximum extent possible.

8.34.2 Pachino range, near NAS Sigonella, is an overwater range with prevailing reduced visibility due to haze. Turning Safe Escape Maneuvers (TSEMs) are not permitted at Pachino.

8.34.3. Italian airfield attacks. Pilots will not conduct an airfield attack nor will they accept airfield attack tasking on a civilian use only airfield. Coordinate attacks against Italian military bases with 1st ROC and the base command not being attacked. Ensure positive radio contact with the base control tower is maintained. Minimum altitude is 500 feet AGL. Contact 31 OSS/OSC for approval and assistance in coordinating airfield attacks. Lead time for coordination is a minimum of seven days.

SECTION F - ABNORMAL PROCEDURES

8-35. Controlled Ejection/Jettison


8.35.1. Primary/Bailout Area - Position the aircraft outbound on the 170° radial of the Aviano TACAN. Eject at 30 DME with optimum airspeed and altitude. Secondary Bailout Area - If an over-water ejection is undesirable, position the outbound on the 040 radial of the Aviano TACAN (Ch 111). Eject at optimum airspeed above 7000' MSL at 8 DME.

8.35.2. Primary Jettison Area - Jettison at least 10 NM from the coastline over the Adriatic sea clear of all sea vessels. The TACAN reference is AVI 170 40 (Ch 111) or RIV 193.31 (Ch 37). The secondary jettison area is the 320° jettison circle south of the target on Maniago Range (N 4606.0 E 1243.0 750'). Aviano tower can coordinate entry into Maniago Airspace for jettison only when the weather is VMC. Maniago is an Italian range and one must obtain clearance to drop. Release will be at 2000' AGL, heading 170°.

8-36. Emergencies.

8.36.1. (F-16) Ground engine flameout procedures. In the event of an uncommanded ground flameout, do not reset any cockpit switches except to safe the EPU. Do not attempt to isolate the malfunction by recycling switch positions.

8.36.2. Inflight emergencies. Ensure all Dash 1 procedures are complied with and contact the SOF as time permits. UHF 252.52 (local channel 9) is a dedicated IFE Single Frequency Approach (SFA) frequency. The tower always monitors the SFA frequency just like Guard.



8.36.3. Malfunctioning landing gear.

- Have gear visually checked by another aircraft.
- If no other aircraft is available, emergency aircraft with malfunctioning landing gear shall execute a 300' AGL low approach between the runway and the south parallel taxiway to permit visual gear check by the SOF or tower.
- Fuel and weather permitting, hold to allow other aircraft to land ahead of you.
- Crash recovery personnel will meet the aircraft with landing gear pins. Stop straight ahead after landing and follow crash recovery crew instructions. Do not turn or taxi an aircraft with a known or suspected gear malfunction until the landing gear is pinned.

8.36.4. Fuel Burndown:

- (F-16) Engine related emergencies - Orbit highkey.
- Other emergencies - Pilots will use discretion on where to burndown fuel. If proximity to the base is not a factor, coordinate with Padova for overwater orbit if planning to use afterburner.

8-37. Barrier Engagements

8.37.1. Pilots will advise an Aviano controlling agency as soon as anticipating a barrier engagement. If the situation permits, the pilot will coordinate landing sequence, engagement, and missed engagement procedures with the SOF. Short notice changes to barrier configuration are time consuming. Fire Department personnel are responsible for removing aircraft from the barriers and resetting the barriers. The barriers are connected and disconnected by barrier maintenance personnel who can connect any of the barriers in about 15 minutes. The BAK-13 (Cable #3 or #4) is the desired approach end arrestment cable.

8-38. Istrana AB Local Divert Procedure

8.38.1. There is a GCA to GCA Istrana divert procedure in the pilot aid. Istrana AB is a nearby military airfield with barriers and a DOD approved instrument approach.

8-39. Aircraft Recall

8.39.1. Aircraft flying from Aviano will be recalled via GUARD in the clear. Upon notification, aircrews will contact the SOF with fuel remaining in minutes. The SOF will give aircrews instructions and inform ATC of the plan.

8-40. Hot Brakes

8.40.1. The hot brake areas are taxiways Alpha South and Delta South. Do not taxi into the loops if hot brakes are suspected or confirmed.

8.40.2. Following a high speed abort or any time the brakes are glowing hot, smoke exists, or the tires deflate, declare an emergency and contact the SOF. (F-16) F-16s will follow Dash 1 procedures including shutting off the EPU, then the engine, then having the nose gear chalked.

8-41. Hung Ordnance (Gravity and Forward Firing).

8.41.1. Fly a straight-in approach with chase if possible. Make every attempt to avoid populated areas. If you require cables to be reconfigured, notify Approach/Tower ASAP. After landing clear the runway to the south, onto taxiway A south (Rwy 05 landing) or taxiway D south (Rwy 23 landing). Await EOR/EOD personnel to safe the aircraft. With hung forward firing ordnance after clearing the runway point the nose of the aircraft down the grass between the runway and the south parallel (180° off the landing direction). The rest of the flight will land and taxi back normally.

8-42. Inadvertent Release

8.42.1. Mark the point if possible and notify the SOF. Pilots will have the EOR ground crew hookup on the headset and explain the particulars of the occurrence. Pilots are reminded that once the aircraft is safed and is back in parking, it will be impounded IAW the 4190 (P) Wing Pilot Aid.

PHILIP J. FRAZEE, Colonel, USAF
Commander

Chapter 8 LOCAL OPERATING PROCEDURES

Section A - INTRODUCTION

8-1. Introduction.

8.1.1. This chapter supplements operational directives and establishes local procedures for all pilots assigned and attached to the 31st Fighter Wing (FW). Non F-16 pilots can disregard F-16 specific directives, annotated by (F-16). Information contained in other directives will not be repeated in this regulation. Close study of this regulation, the 31 FW Pilot Aid, and current FCIFs is necessary to effectively and safely employ in the Southern Region.

8-2. Responsibility.

8.2.1. All pilots assigned/attached to the 31st Expeditionary Wing (EWG) are responsible for compliance with this directive.

8-3. Deviations.

8.3.1. The 31st Operations Group Commander (OG/CC) has waiver authority for this directive. 31 OG Standardization and Evaluation (OGV) will publish long term waivers (greater than 30 days) as FCIFs.

8-4. Changes.

8.4.1. Recommend changes to this supplement by submitting an AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*, or calling 31 OGV at DSN 632-8611. New/changed information to this supplement is highlighted with a bold black line in the margin.

Section B - GENERAL POLICY

8-5. Go / No Go Items.

8.5.1. The following items are Go/No Go items for the 31 FW.

- All Aircrews
FCIF (Flight Crew Information File)
- Aircrews which enter the AOR
DG ROE/CAPS, monthly
- All 31 FW Pilots
CAPS prior to first flight of the week.
Current SEPT (30 days)
SIF - Safety Information File
Publication Sign Off

8-6. (F-16) Situational Emergency Procedures Training (SEPT).

8.6.1. Accomplish SEPTs once every 30 days. Failure to accomplish a SEPT will result in grounding until that month's SEPT is accomplished. SEPTs should be accomplished in the Cockpit Familiarization Trainer (CFT) or simulator. SEPTs will normally be accomplished one-on-one, however, when absolutely necessary, SEPTs may be done with up to four pilots. SEPTs will be a minimum of 30 minutes, however an hour block should be scheduled for 2 pilots, 1+15 for 3 pilots, and 1+30 for 4 pilots. OGV will distribute a "SEPT Scenario of the Month" to provide a starting point for the SEPT. 31 FW Safety (SE) will consolidate F-16 accident information for SEPT training.

8-7. (F-16) Publications.

8.7.1. Each pilot will maintain a current basic flight manual, aircraft and weapon employment checklists, MCI 11-F-16 Vol 3 with Aviano Supplement, air refueling checklist and the 31 FW Pilot Aid.

8-8. (F-16) Single Ship Missions.

8.8.1. The following scheduled single-ship missions are authorized:

- Incentive/orientation flights. Pilots will monitor squadron VHF. The ejection mode select handle will be set in AFT. No simulated emergency procedures will be flown.
- MR pilots may proceed on single-ship medium altitude sorties. Only flight lead qualified pilots may fly single ship low level missions. Additionally, the minimum altitude is 1500 feet AGL or the MSA whichever is higher.
- Functional Check Flights.
- Operational Check Flights
- Instrument proficiency or check sorties.
- The initial/night Theater Indoctrination (TI) sortie (D-model)
- The Horn Awareness and Recovery Training Series (HARTS) (AFM 11-F-16 Vol 5, MCM 3-3) will be flown only under the supervision of an instructor pilot or squadron supervisor.

8.8.2. "Top Three" may authorize single-ship missions as a result of fallout.

PILOT OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

This supplement establishes local procedures for all pilots assigned and attached to the 31 Expeditionary Wing (EWG).

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8-9. (F-16) Alternate Missions.


8.9.1. Brief alternate missions. Intercepts or instruments are the standard alternate missions. Alternate missions will be consistent in configuration and tasking with the primary mission, i.e., BFM as an alternate to ACT.

8.9.2. Three-ship fallout. A four-ship flight lead or instructor pilot (IP) may take any two qualified wingmen on a tactical sortie.

8-10. Airfield Data. (Figure 1)

- Location: 4602.0N 1236.1E
- Elevation: Field elevation 413' MSL
- Runway (RWY): Single, 05/23, 8596' x 148.' It has an upslope of approximately 1.1 % from SW to NE.
- Load bearing overruns: NE end- 815', SW end- 907'
- Taxiways. There are north and south parallel taxiways. The south parallel is available as an emergency landing surface with 31 OG/CC approval and may take up to 1 hour to activate. The MAAS barrier at midfield requires one hour to rig.
- ILS/PAR glide slope: 2.5°. Touchdown point is 790' past the threshold of RWY 05. There is no ILS/PAR capability to RWY 23. PAPI glide slope is aligned with the ILS/PAR glide slope and PAPIs are available for RWY 23.
- RWY 05 is the only runway with instrument approaches due to the location of restricted area (R-9) 5 nautical miles (NM) east of the field and high terrain to the north.
- Both high and low altitude TACAN/ILS approach procedures are available to RWY 05. Aviano also has a PAR/ASR available for RW 05. Circling is only authorized to the south due to mountainous terrain to the north.
- Aircraft Arresting Systems
RWY 05:
E-5, (Barrier #6)
BAK-9, (Barrier #5)
BAK-13, (Barrier #4)
RWY 23:
E-5, (Barrier #1)
BAK-9, (Barrier #2)
BAK-13, (Barrier #3)
- Connecting approach end cables require 15 minutes prior notice. If needed, ask for "Approach end engagement."
- Transition altitude in the Aviano Approach Control airspace is 7000' MSL. (In Italy, each airdrome identifies its own transition altitude and they vary from 5500' MSL to 8500' MSL.)

- Do not overfly the Weapons Storage Area (WSA) located between the Nickel and Tower loops.



8-11. Weather.

8.11.1. Aviano has both USAF and Italian Air Force (ITAF) weather observers. Pilots and supervisors must use USAF observations when making approach or divert decisions. On the Automated Weather Data System (AWDS), the identifier LIYW is Aviano's USAF weather (contact Pilot to Metro), and LIPA is Aviano's ITAF weather (broadcast on ATIS). The "official" condition of the airfield (VFR or IFR) is dependent on the ITAF observation. ITAF ceiling and visibility criteria for VFR are ICAO standard, but use worst quadrant visibility only for determining visibility. Weather patterns at Aviano are such that the visibility to the north is frequently much lower than visibility on final.

8.11.2 Aviano's airfield elevation is about 100' above almost all airfields in a 200 NM radius. During periods of fog, it is not unusual to have unrestricted visibility at Aviano, while all the neighboring airfields have visibilities of less than 400 meters. A slight change in

temperature or wind can cause drastic changes in Aviano's weather with little or no warning.

8-12. (F-16) Anti-Exposure Suit Wear.

8.12.1. The wearing of anti-exposure suits is mandatory on any preplanned overwater flight when the water temperature is 60°F or less unless the local air temperature is 70°F (20°C) or greater and the water temperature is 51°F or greater.

8.12.2. The wearing of anti-exposure suits is waived for sorties when the overwater portion occurs during departure and RTB only and the aircraft is within gliding distance of land. The wearing of anti-exposure suits is also waived for contingency operations (ops) sorties.

8-13. Filing Flight Plans.

8.13.1. 31 Operations Support Squadron (OSS) current ops must file two types of flight plans for local training sorties. One is civilian (ICAO - DD Form 1801); and one is military, SMA-7 (Stato Maggiore Aereo Directive #7). Each squadron must have the next days' local training flying schedule to 31 OSS/OSC by 1130L the workday prior. Italian holidays, Saturdays, and Sundays are not considered workdays. The 31 OSS current ops section deconflicts airspace and sends the message through the base communication center to the 1st ROC Air Traffic Control Center by 1300Z. Base Operations will use their copy of the daily flight schedule to file the ICAO (DD Form 1801) flight plan.

8.13.2. There are procedures to file flight plans the same day of the flight. Notify base operations with the requirement for an "immediate" flight plan. This is not a routine request. File immediate flight plans at least 1 1/2 hours before takeoff.

8.13.3. Aircraft taking off up to ten minutes late may join the flight on the original mission number and flight plan.

8-14. Suspected Flying Violations.

8.14.1. Pilots who are involved in a flying violation will inform their supervisor, give the mission tapes to the squadron commander, and submit a written report to the 31 OG/CC.

Section C - GROUND OPERATIONS

8-15. (F-16) Start and Taxi Procedures.

8.15.1. Preflight. Pilots or crew chiefs will not change the gun configuration. Weapons personnel will safe or arm the gun.

8.15.2. All pilots will check ATIS for current weather information and monitor ground control frequency during start.

8.15.3. Engine start. Daily launch procedures require a fully functioning communications (comm) cord/headset. If comm cords/headsets are inoperative, comm out launches will use visual signals outlined in AFI 11-218 (AFR 60-11).

8.15.4. After start. Perform after start checks to include SEC check and EPU check in the hardened aircraft shelter (HAS), or outside the HAS after confirming jet blast direction is safe. Complete the SEC check prior to pulling the EPU pin. Additionally, flight control checks between pilots and crew chiefs require a positive challenge and response dialogue to ensure the flight controls are moving in the proper direction.

8.15.5. The minimum lights for night flying are: all interior instrument lights, position lights (one wingtip light per side, both inlet, tail), anti-collision strobe, landing, and taxi lights, all formation (upper, lower, both tail). The AAR lights must be operational if air refueling is planned. All external lights are required to be operational for NVG sorties. Pilots will remain "bright-flash, strobe on" anytime stopped on the north/south parallel taxiways.

8.15.6. Minimum taxi interval will be 300' on the centerline or 150' staggered. Pilots will taxi staggered only during daytime and on the north or south parallel taxiways. Maximum taxi speed is 25 knots.

8.15.7. Pilots who change UHF from ground control (except for Have Quick (HQ)/Secure Voice Checks) will notify ground. Pilots will monitor guard frequency.

8.15.8. Due to tight parking limitations at Aviano, pilots should taxi with extreme caution. Do not taxi aircraft within 25 feet of obstructions without wing walkers. Never taxi aircraft within 10 feet of any obstruction. Also, no vehicle will pass within 10 feet of an aircraft unless absolutely required.

8-16. Ground Radio Procedures.

8.16.1 Radios will be set on squadron Victor and Uniform Ground for start. Flight lead will request engine start clearance from ground control.

8.16.2. Request taxi. "Aviano Ground, callsign, taxi number of aircraft, location, ATIS letter, IFR/VFR." Pilots will read back assigned runway. Maintain Ground Control until directed to "Contact Clearance Delivery." This normally occurs ten minutes prior to departure time. Refrain from contacting clearance delivery earlier as it will hinder, not expedite, the process. Pilots will inform Ground Control if their actual departure time will differ by more than 5 minutes from the proposed flight plan time. All pilots will acknowledge clearance. Switch to Tower when ready for departure.

8-17. Arming/De-arming.

8.17.1. Normal arming/de-arming will take place in a unit designated area. The 31 OG/CC is the approval authority for arming aircraft in the parking loops (in the chocks). This approval will only be granted for mass launches. The Nickel loop will arm inside the west gate when the field is IFR or at night. Aircraft returning to the Nickel loop will de-arm just inside the east gate. Aircraft waiting to be de-armed in the Nickel loop will hold short of the ILS critical area when the field is IFR or at night.

8-18. ILS Critical Area.

8.18.1. In order to ensure the integrity of the ILS signal, all vehicles, aircraft, and equipment will remain outside of the ILS critical area during Night or IFR conditions. During IFR conditions tower will direct aircraft to "hold short of runway 5 ILS critical area" if an aircraft is on or approaching ILS final. The ILS critical area is defined by the Instrument Hold Short Lines at the approach end of runway 05 (Figure 1).

8-19. Wet-Dry Runway.

8.19.1. After landing, pass runway braking action to tower if braking action is other than expected or reported. Report conditions in terms of the following standard terminology; good, fair, poor, or nil.

8.19.2. Base operations determines runway condition (wet or dry). If the runway is declared "wet", the SOF determines "standing water" for formation takeoffs.

Section D - FLYING OPERATIONS

8-20. Takeoffs.

8.20.1. Advise tower if planning a non-standard departure or if excessive time on the runway will be required. Flights will use 30 second interval during Moderate/Severe Bird conditions. Cross departure end between 700' and 1500' MSL. Discontinue afterburner at 350 KIAS unless safety of flight dictates otherwise.

8.20.2. Unrestricted climbs are approved only for FCF flights, Incentive flights, and, with ATC coordination, flights into Zita airspace. All other flights must be approved by the 31 OG/CC. This rule applies at Aviano and all other airfields. Minimum airspeed prior to pulling vertical is 400 knots (A/A config.) and 450 knots (A/G config.). Maximum climb angle is 90 degrees (A/A) and 70 degrees (A/G). Minimum recovery airspeeds are 200 KIAS (A/A) and 250 KIAS (A/G).

8-21. VFR Departures.

8.21.1. RWY 05 (Figure 2). Fly runway heading until 1/2 nm past departure end, then turn right to heading 070. Cross 4 DME at or above 3000' MSL. Turn right to fly East of the San Foca tower and proceed as cleared. Complete turn within 5 DME to remain clear of R-9. If unable to climb due to low ceilings, avoid overflight of towns as much as possible. Wingmen will comply with the above procedures and will not use cutoff until southbound past San Foca. During all phases of flight, pilots will place noise abatement consideration second in priority to safety. R-9 is approximately 5 NM from end of the runway (the dry river bed). (C-130s do not need to follow noise abatement ground track.)

8.21.2. RWY 23 (Figure 3). Maintain between 700' and 1500' MSL until past departure end, then climb to 3500' MSL or higher and turn left to FERMO. Expedite climb to 3500' MSL or above. Avoid the towns of Vigonovo and Sacile.

8.21.3. VFR Entry/Exit Points (Figures 3/4): Point Anna (AVI 140/7) is a set of railroad and highway bridges 1 NM SE of the town of Pordenone. (N4556.7 E1242.0 120') Point Fermo (AVI 200/13) is a bridge over a river. (N4549.837 E1227.882 62')

8-22. IFR Departures.

8.22.1. If departing IFR in VMC, fly the noise abatement procedure described above until southbound past San Foca then continue as cleared.




8.22.2. File SIDs for all IFR departures. Aviano has four DOD-approved SIDs. The Chioggia 7, Vicenza 6, and the Adriatic 1 are published in DOD Flip. The Cavallo 1 and the Adriatic 1S are local SIDs and published in the Pilot Aid.

8.22.3. The Cavallo 1 is designed to get flights into Zita airspace. When Aviano is IFR, flights with VFR flight plans may request the Cavallo 1 to get VFR on top if they have a reasonable chance of accomplishing the mission as filed. If the field is IFR, request the Cavallo 1 departure at engine start or as soon as the field goes IFR. Coordination for this local SID takes about 10 minutes.

8.22.4. When departing IFR in a non-standard formation, the last aircraft will squawk xx00, where xx are the first two digits in the flight leads squawk. For example, if the flight leads squawk is 6134, the last aircraft will squawk 6100 until rejoined to a standard formation. Contingency ops aircraft will squawk as fraged.

contact with Aviano state receipt of current ATIS information or state "Negative ATIS".

8.23.2 RWY 05: The entry point is Point Fermo. When



8-23. VFR Arrivals.

8.23.1. VFR arrivals will contact Aviano Approach with intentions when approaching Aviano airspace. On initial

cleared by tower, depart point Fermo heading 320 at 3500' MSL until intercepting the 050 course inbound to Aviano. Avoid overflight of Sacile to the north, offset by as much as safety allows. At 7 DME, begin descent to 2000' MSL. Initial altitude is 2000' MSL with a north break for a left base to RWY 05. The reentry to initial will be via the noise abatement ground track to point Anna at 3500', then to point Fermo. VFR straight-ins to RWY 05 will not descend to 2000' until turning to extended final. Clear for Radar traffic at or above 2000' MSL. NOTE: VFR aircraft may depart Fermo as low as 2500' MSL when the ceiling is greater than 3000' MSL but less than 4000' MSL.

8.23.3. RWY 23 (Figure 3). Entry point is point Anna. When cleared by tower, depart point Anna heading 015° at 3500' MSL. Turn to parallel then the dry river bed. Turn to initial around the second red striped tower at the edge of San Foca, then descend to 2000'. Initial altitude is 2000' MSL with a north break for a right base to RWY 23. The reentry to initial will be maintain between 700' and 1500' until departure end, climb to 3500', and turn left direct to Fermo. Proceed to Anna at 3500'. Avoid the towns of Sacile and Vigonova.

8.23.4. Do not fly practice VFR straight-in patterns to RWY 23. If an emergency straight-in is required, the ground track is the same as the overhead pattern. Depart Anna at 1500' MSL.

8.23.5. Tactical Initials are authorized for training flights only. Element leads will position themselves over the runway with wingman 6000' line abreast, opposite the break. Element leads will initiate the break to ensure wingmen will not overfly the WSA. Maximum airspeed is 400 knots. Normal initial airspeed is 300 knots.

8.23.6. Low approaches. Cross departure end between 700' and 1500' MSL. Request closed, SFO, or reentry via point Anna/Fermo. Closed pattern/SFO is a climbing turn to the north at departure end.

8.23.7. Tower may approve a "high downwind reentry" if pattern spacing does not allow a closed pattern. The "high downwind reentry" is a turn to the north, climbing to 2500' MSL and then a turn to intercept a 3 DME initial descending back to 2000' MSL.

8.23.8. Simulated Flameout (SFO) Procedures: "High Key" is overhead the runway at desired altitude coordinated with ATC. Max of 7500' MSL with an 8000' ceiling. Holding at high key will be a right hand circular orbit. Pilots will remain 500' below the weather at all times.

- Overhead SFO: The SFO pattern is a 360° turn to the south. Report "High Key", "Low Key", and "Base Key". Minimum weather required for a high key entry is a 8000' ceiling and 8000 meters visibility. If weather does not allow a high key entry, request the SFO at low key using the same ground track. Minimum weather required for a low key entry is a 5000' ceiling and 8000 meters visibility. Pilots may request a closed pattern to high key. When at the departure end, initiate a climbing turn to the north. "Random entry" overhead SFOs are approved with prior coordination, otherwise proceed to high key via Fermo/Anna and the normal initial ground track.
- Straight-in SFO: The straight-in SFO may only be flown to RWY 05. Coordinate altitudes with approach and/or tower. Depart Fermo at coordinated altitude following normal initial ground track. Report "5 Mile Straight-in SFO" at 5 NM on final. Minimum weather required is a 5000' ceiling and 8000 meters visibility. There will be no "random entry" straight-in SFOs. "High Straight-In SFO Reentry" is a turn to the north, climb to the coordinated altitude, proceed to 10 NM, turn back towards the airfield, and report "5 mile Straight-in SFO."

8-24. IFR Arrivals.

8.24.1. IFR inbound traffic expect two minutes between approaches. On initial contact with Aviano state receipt of current ATIS information or state "Negative ATIS."

8.24.2. All IFR approaches are to RWY 05. Make circling approaches to RWY 23 to the south due to mountainous terrain north of the field. Radar monitoring is not available on TACAN final.

8.24.3. If separate approaches are desired for wingmen, notify the controlling agency.

8.24.4. Radar assisted trail recoveries are permitted with the following restrictions:

- Four Ship maximum.
- Do not hold in radar trail without an altitude stack.
- After splitting into a non-standard formation, the wingman will squawk xx00, where xx are the first two digits in the flight leads squawk. For example, if the flight leads squawk is 6134, the wingman will squawk 6100. Contingency ops aircraft will squawk as fraged.

- Four ships will fly the depicted approach. Radar vectors will only be accepted by two ships.
- When conducting radar trail recoveries and required to break out of the pattern or are instructed to go around, breakout instructions are for the lead aircraft only, unless otherwise specified by the controller. If your wingman is going to stay with you then you must advise the controller.

8.24.5. Standard lost communications procedures. If no transmissions are received for 30 seconds in the pattern, 15 seconds on ASR final, or 5 seconds on PAR final, attempt contact with Aviano Tower and proceed VFR. If unable to maintain VFR, maintain 3000' until established on final and proceed with the ILS/TACAN approach RWY 05. Do not proceed north of the AVI 233 radial unless established on a segment of the approach, due to rapidly rising terrain. If landing RWY 23, circle southeast of the runway for a left base to RWY 23.

8.24.6. PAR/ASR/ILS consecutive approach procedures. Applicable to RWY 05 only. GCA will issue the following instructions or advise "Execute Standard Climbout." After low approach, touch and go, or missed approach, cross departure end between 700' and 1500' MSL, fly runway heading until departure end, climb and maintain 3000' MSL, and turn right heading 180. Complete turn within 5 DME for restricted airspace. If able to maintain VMC on any departure (IFR or VFR), comply with noise abatement until southbound past San Foca and then as cleared.

8-25. Noise Abatement.

8.25.1. Noise complaints are a serious problem in the Aviano area. The following rules must be followed:

- Departure noise abatement procedures must be followed. Do not compromise safety for noise abatement.
- Training sorties are not allowed between 2300L and 0700L. Training and non-training sorties arriving after 2200L and prior to 0730L, require OG/CC approval and will fly a single approach (VFR or IFR) to a fullstop.
- Airspeed above .90 mach is prohibited over the Italian National Territory and National Waters (12 NM from the coast).
- Observe minimum altitudes and maximum airspeeds on low levels and near populated areas. Flights must

avoid public beaches by 2 NM or 2000' AGL. Flights that cross the coastline will be on a heading perpendicular to the coastline. Flights in mountainous terrain must maintain at least 1000' AGL between 1 Nov and 30 Apr or anytime there is snow present.

- Afterburner is prohibited below 2000' AGL except for takeoffs, emergencies, or safety of flight.
- Low level flights are not authorized on Saturday, Sunday, or during Italian holidays.
- Do not overfly Pordenone/Cordenons below 3000' MSL or Sacile below 2500' MSL unless on final.

8-26. Local Flying Area.

8.26.1. The Aviano local flying area is northeast Italy east of 9° East and north of 42° North.

8.26.2. Use of airspace in Italy is subject to restrictions imposed by controlled airspace, danger, restricted, and prohibited areas. VFR flight must be carefully planned IAW FLIP, GP, AP/2, AP2A, and the Italian AIP. Reference the low level operational air traffic (BOAT) manual for low level rules.

8.26.3. There are numerous firing areas in Italy. Firing areas (FRAs) are NOTAMed active in the daily notams.

8.26.3. The 31 FW's working areas are listed in Area Planning (AP/2) and Deliberate Guard SPINS for SPEEDY. The working areas are not formally defined airspace, but just sectors of airspace NOTAMed to have high density military traffic. Civilian aircraft crossing a section of the airspace will normally cause an altitude restriction.

LOCAL AIRSPACE SUMMARY

Airspace	Altitudes	Max Airspeed	GCI or radar.	Chaff/Flare authorized.
Speedy Low	6000 MSL to FL 250	None	Maroon, Pedro, Padova	Yes
Speedy No/So	6000 MSL to FL290	None	Maroon, Pedro, Padova	Yes
Zita	As assigned, 5000-FL350 MSL (1000' AGL min)	.9 Mach	Padova, Pedro, Aviano	No
Sara	As assigned, 5000' MSL to FL350	.9 Mach	Pioppo, Padova	No
Lola	As assigned, 5000-FL350 (1000' AGL min) MSL	.9 Mach	Pioppo, Padova	No

Crater	As assigned, FL 115-285 (5000' AGL min)	.9 Mach	Roma, Quercia, Bracco	No
Feltre- Belluno	As assigned, 5000'-FL150 (1000' AGL)	.9 Mach	Padova, Pedro, Aviano	No

Speedy Notes:

AA3 is the exit/holding point.

Aircraft entering Speedy will give Maroon their expected RTB request. Use the following terminology and altitudes:

"Low recovery" is at FL 100

"High recovery" is at FL 200

Five minutes before departing Speedy, request clearance to exit. Expect clearance to Rotar then Penny. Do not exit Speedy until in contact with Padova. Aircraft approaching within 3 NM of the boundaries of Speedy will be given position advisories and an appropriate heading. The Croatian FIR will be considered as a flying boundary.

Zita Notes:

VFR Entry/Exit. On departure, climb above 5000' MSL. Aviano Departure will hand you off to working frequency. Recovery can be to initial, VFR entry point or IAF.

Contact Aviano Approach before departing ZITA.

IFR Entry/Exit. Fly the Cavallo 1 SID, cancel when VFR. Exit by TACAN penetration. The proximity of the Buffer Zone, the Austrian border, civilian airways, and R-9 requires extra attention to position at all times. Northern Zita has mountains up to 11,000' MSL.

Lola Notes:

VFR entry is not permitted. If unable to obtain an IFR clearance for RTB, maintain VMC, select an appropriate hemispherical altitude, and advise Padova.

IFR Entry/Exit. All flights will use the Vicenza 6 SID to Villafranca. After passing Vicenza, request clearance into the area. Request IFR clearance five minutes before desired exit time.

Sara Notes:

Entry/Exit. Coordinate with Padova. Notify controlling agency 5 minutes prior to RTB with intentions.

8-27. IFF Procedures / Self Protection Procedures.

8.27.1. When over the Italian landmass, the flight lead will squawk Mode III and C unless separated, then all will squawk. Wingmen will squawk Modes I, II, and IV.

8.27.2. Inhibit decoy dispensers and electronic counter measure systems over the Italian landmass.

8-28. Divert vs Alternate, and Understanding the ATIS Status.

8.28.1. The weather minimums for all USAF fighter type aircraft operating from Aviano is 300' and 1.6 km. If the weather is below this, the SOF can get mission essential aircraft permission to launch from either the DGOC or the 31 OG/CC.

8.28.2. A divert airfield is required for all local flights. If Aviano(± 1 hour of arrival) is VFR (>3000'/5km or 3.2km above), then the SOF will declare a divert airfield. If Aviano(± 1 hour of arrival) is VFR (> 1500'/5km but < 3000'/5km/3.2km) or IFR (< 1500'/5km), the SOF will declare an alternate. Divert airfield weather must be reported and forecasted to be above the USAFE minimums for a compatible approach and pilot weather minimums. The divert does not have to meet dual/single alternate rules if Aviano is VFR (>3000'/5km/3.2km).

8.28.3. ITAF weather is reported on ATIS with USAF altimeter. ATIS will read, 'Aviano Air Base Information "B", Time 0001Z, -Weather-, -Expected Approach and Runway-, NOTAMS, 31 FW STATUS VFR, IFR Recoveries Only, Alternate Villafranca Advise on initial contact you have information "B."


- The key word is Alternate. If one hears the word Alternate in the ATIS, the Aviano weather requires an alternate. Fuels must be calculated accordingly using the Divert/Alternate annotation on the ATIS information.
- The first item of the "31 FW Status" allows a quick determination of the current USAF weather and the fuel required for approaches and/or missed approaches at Aviano.
 - VFR: Fuel for a VFR recovery is required. Weather is greater than 1500' and 5 km.
 - IFR: Fuel for an IFR recovery and missed approach is required. Weather is less than 1500' and 5 km.
- The second item contains notes that would modify one's fuel required. IFR Recoveries Only (Fuel for an IFR approach). Overhead Closed (No change, VFR recovery to a straight-in is still possible). The last item establishes the fuel required at the Divert/Alternate.
- If the TACAN is out of service (radar required and the Wx ± 1 hour is > 3000'/5 km/3.2 km), then AFI 11-206 applies. The SOF will declare an alternate,

and this alternate only applies to USAF fighters on IFR flight plans. If the current weather (± 1 hour of arrival) is VFR, then local VFR flights can use the alternate airfield as a divert.

8-29. Alternate/Emergency Airfields.

PRIMARY ALTERNATES			
Destination ICAO/TCN (#) APPR/TWR	RWY/LENGTH Afd Coords. Elevation	Barriers DOD Aprchs	IFR Profile Snap Vector
RIVOLTO LIP/RIV (37) 261.27 / 257.8	06/24 8200' N 4559.700 E 1305.317 182'	BAK-13 Equiv. TAC	Direct Field 098/019
ISTRANA LIPS/ISA (54) 337.95 / 338.5	08/26 9819' N 4540.900 E 1205.200 139'	BAK-12 SAFE BAR PAR / TAC	STD Divert 225/30
VILLAFRANCA LIPX/VIL (105) 292.7 / 257.8	05/23 8717' N 4523.700 E 1053.200 238'	BAK-12 SAFE BAR PAR / TAC	VIC 6, VIC, IAF TAC RWY 05 243/81
GHEDI LIPL/GHE (46) 292.7 / 386.5	14/32 9810' N 4526.000 E 1016.300 334'	BAK-12 PAR / TAC	VIC 6, VIC, VIL, IAF TAC RY 31 250/104
CERVIA LIPC/CEV (83) 379.75 / 258.95	12/30 9823' N 4413.500 E 1218.500 19'	BAK-12 TAC	CHI 7, CHI, IAF TCN RWY 12 186/109
CAMERI LIMN/CAM (97) 126.75 / 300.25	17/35 9285' N 4531.900 E 0840.200 589'	BAK-9 SAFE BAR TAC	VIC 6, VIC, CAM, IAF TAC RWY 35 260/167
GROSSETO LIRS/GRO (28) 362.3 / 257.8	03/21 9817' N 4245.500 E 1104.600 15'	BAK-9 TAC	STD Divert 200/207
GIOIA DEL COLLE LIBV/GIO (125) 362.3 / 257.8	14/32 9843' N 4045.9 E 1656.1 1186'	BAK-12 PAR / TAC	CHI 7, CHI, FAL, GIO, IAF HI TAC 5 RWY 32/14 147 / 368
BRINDISI / CASALE LIBR/BRD (79) 376.8 / 257.8	14/32 8622' N 4039.6 E 1756.0 48'	BAK 12 ILS / TAC	CHI 7, CHI, FAL, IAF HI VOR RWY 32 141 / 398

- Pisa. DOD ILS and TACAN. No cables.
- Cameri. DOD TACAN.
- Grosseto. DOD TACAN. Grosseto is often the primary IFR alternate during Po valley fog months. Note: If diverting to Grosseto with live ordnance, you should fly the divert procedure in the Pilot Aid. From Aviano, ask for the Adriatica DS. From the AOR, ask for the EAST DS from Lisko.
- Cervia. DOD TACAN.
- Falconara. DOD ILS and TACAN. No cables.
- Rimini. Civil airfield. No DoD approved approaches. No cables.
- Venezia/Tessera. Civil airfield. DOD ILS. No cables.



- Istrana. VFR divert airfield. Too close for single weather alternate but can be used under dual alternate procedures. Do not confuse with Treviso-St Angelo which is a nearby parallel runway 5 NM southeast. DOD TACAN and PAR. Normally 24 hour operations.
- Rivilto. VFR divert airfield. Normally open 0800-1600L (M-Th), 0800-1300L (Fri). Rivilto is too close to meet single weather alternate requirements but can be used as half of dual alternates if the weather at Rivilto is VMC. DOD TACAN. PAR not in FLIP, but available in IAF FLIP and Pilot Aid.
- Villafranca. DOD TACAN and PAR.
- Ghedi. Do not confuse with Montichiari airfield which is a closed nearly parallel runway two NM east. DOD PAR and TACAN.

EMERGENCY ALTERNATES NOT TO BE USED AS PRIMARY DIVERT			
Destination ICAO/TCN (#) APPR/TWR FREQ	RWY/LENGTH Afd Coords. Elevation	Barriers Type Appr.	IFR Profile Snap Vector
VENEZIA LIPZ/None 254.6 / 257.8	04 / 22 10827 N 4530.400 E 1221.100 7'	NONE ILS	Penny Direct to Field 198/33
RONCHI DEI LEGONARI LIPQ / 89 (DME) 119.15 / 257.8	09 / 27 9843 N 4549.600 E 1328.00 39'	NONE ILS	Penny Direct to Field 107/39
RIMINI LIPR / NONE 379.75 / 257.8	13 / 31 9813 N 4401.400 E 1236.700 42'	NONE NONE	CHI 7, CHI, Direct to Field 179/121
FALCONARA LIPY / FAL (35) 338.65 / 257.8	04 / 22 9816 N 4337.000 E 1321.800 50'	NONE ILS/TAC	CHI 7, CHI, IAF HI TAC RWY 22 166/149

PISA LIRP / PIN(20) 344.6 / 338.35	04 / 22 9816 N 4341.000 E1023.600 7'	NONE ILS/TAC	CHI 7, CHI, FER, FRZ, PIN, IAF HI TAC RWY 04 214/169
GENOVA LIMI / 75 (DME) 362.3 / 257.8	11 / 29 9925 N 4424.700 E 0850.600 13'	NONE ILS	VIC 6, VIC, VIL, PIA, Direct to Field 239/186

8-30. Low-Level Navigation.

8.30.1. Procedures and limitations for low level flight are published in Area Planning (AP/2) and in the "Low Level Operational Air Traffic Flight Manual." Procedures and restrictions are as follows:

- Depart Aviano's VFR exit points at or above 4500' MSL and maintain at or above 4500' MSL (weather permitting) until departing the first turn point on the low level.
- The low-level structure extends from 500' AGL to 2000' AGL.
- The Italian military authorities have established a low level directional flow control system to minimize the possibility of in-flight collisions. A depiction of the flow boundaries and directions is in the 31 FW Pilot Aid and AP/2. Flights conforming to low altitude flow directions may operate 500-2000' AGL. Flights not conforming to the low altitude flow directions must be above 2000' AGL.
- Avoid restricted airspace published in the Italian NOTAMS. Avoid Cortina by 5nm when below 2000' AGL. Avoid the Military Propellant Factory Fontana Liri (N4136.5 E1333) by 1nm when below 3000' AGL.
- Avoid population centers depicted on the 1:500,000 TPC's by 1 NM when below 1500' AGL.
- Pop up attacks are authorized, but limited to one pass unless more are coordinated with the controlling agency. Coordinate altitudes if going above 2,000 feet AGL.
- Some of the local routes have high altitude segments. Weather may also require a climb to higher altitudes. The standard ICAO procedure for crossing airways is at right angles, VMC, and at VFR hemispheric altitudes.
- Italian laws and flight regulations require aircraft to be in contact with a controlling agency at all times.

Controlled VFR procedures are in effect in all Italian airspace. Entering any control zones without having prior contact with the controlling agency will make the aircraft commander liable to violation. Once outside the control zones, contact Padova or Roma Military Control. Flights at low altitude will be unable to maintain constant line of site with Padova and Roma Military in the mountains. Flights will know which agencies to call.

- Low-level flight is not authorized below 1000' AGL in the mountains during the winter months (1 Nov - 30 Apr) or anytime snow is present.
- Low-level routes will offset coastlines by a minimum of 2 NM.
- Maintain ± 5 miles of the "black line" during low level flight.
- Airspeeds: Overland - 450 knots/.68M, IP-TGT - 510 knots (540 loft)/.85M, Overwater - 600 knots, >12 nm from coast - Supersonic (with authorization).

8-31. (F-16) Targeting Pod Restrictions.

8.31.1. TGP restrictions are LAW MCI 11-F16 Vol 1, dated 1 Jul 1997, paragraph 6.6.

8-32. Night GLIB II Maneuvers.

8.32.1. Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) evasive maneuvers, as described in Multi Command Manual (MCM) 3-1, are authorized at night with the following restrictions:

- Single-ship only.
- Non-NVG flights must complete all portions of the maneuver above 5,000' AGL in VMC. NVG flights may continue to 1000' AGL during Hi-Illumination (2.2 millilux or greater) or MSA during Lo-Illumination.
- Airspeed: Min 300 KIAS, Max overland .9M.
- SAM last ditch maneuvers at night are prohibited.

8-33. (F-16) Formation Landings.

8.33.1. F-16 Formation Landings are not approved at Aviano AB.

SECTION E - WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT

8.34. (F-16) Weapons Employment.

8.34.1 Do not perform low altitude attacks on historical buildings, places of worship, or tourist areas. Avoid planning low altitude attacks on populated areas to the maximum extent possible. Do not simulate attacks on any targets within city boundaries.

8.34.2 Pachino range, near NAS Sigonella, is an overwater range with prevailing reduced visibility due to haze. Turning Safe Escape Maneuvers (TSEMs) are not permitted at Pachino.

8.34.3. Italian airfield attacks. Pilots will not conduct an airfield attack nor will they accept airfield attack tasking on a civilian use only airfield. Coordinate attacks against Italian military bases with 1st ROC and the base command post being attacked. Ensure positive radio contact with the base control tower is maintained. Minimum altitude is 500 feet AGL. Contact 31 OSS/OSC for approval and assistance in coordinating airfield attacks. Lead time for coordination is a minimum of seven days. Do not conduct pop-up attacks on Aviano AB.

SECTION F - ABNORMAL PROCEDURES

8-35. Controlled Ejection/Jettison.

8.35.1. Primary/Bailout Area - Position the aircraft outbound on the AVI 170 radial. Eject at 30 DME with optimum airspeed and altitude. Secondary/Bailout Area - If an over-water ejection is undesirable, position the aircraft outbound on the AVI 040. Eject at optimum airspeed above 7000' MSL at 8 DME.

8.35.2. Primary Jettison Area - Jettison at least 10 NM from the coastline over the Adriatic clear of all sea vessels. The TACAN reference is AVI 170/40 or RIV 193/31 (Ch 37). The secondary jettison area is the 820' jettison circle south of the target on Maniago Range (N 4606.0 E 1243.0 750'). Aviano tower can coordinate entry into Maniago Airspace for jettison only when the weather is VMC. Maniago is an Italian range and one must obtain clearance to drop. Release will be at 2000' AGL, heading 170°.


8-36. Emergencies.

8.36.1. (F-16) Ground engine flameout procedures. In the event of an uncommanded ground flameout, do not reset any cockpit switches except to safe the EPU. Do not attempt to isolate the malfunction by recycling switch positions.

8.36.2. Inflight emergencies. Ensure all Dash 1 procedures are complied with and contact the SOF as time permits. UHF 252.52 (local channel 9) is a dedicated IFE Single Frequency Approach (SFA) frequency. Tower monitors the SFA frequency just like Guard. **Tower APPROACH**

8.36.3. Malfunctioning landing gear.

- Have gear visually checked by another aircraft.



- If no other aircraft is available, emergency aircraft with malfunctioning landing gear shall execute a 300' AGL low approach between the runway and the south parallel taxiway to permit visual gear check by the SOF or tower.

- Fuel and weather permitting, hold to allow other aircraft to land ahead of you.
- Crash recovery personnel will meet the aircraft with landing gear pins. Stop straight ahead after landing and follow crash recovery crew instructions. Do not turn or taxi an aircraft with a known or suspected gear malfunction until the landing gear is pinned.

8.36.4. Fuel Burndown:

- (F-16) Engine related emergencies - Orbit high key.
- Other emergencies - Pilots will use discretion on where to burndown fuel. If proximity to the base is not a factor, coordinate with Padova for overwater orbit if planning to use afterburner.

8-37. Barrier Engagements.

8.37.1. Pilots will advise an Aviano controlling agency as soon as possible if anticipating a barrier engagement. If the situation permits, the pilot will coordinate landing sequence, engagement, and missed engagement procedures with the SOF. Short notice changes to barrier configuration are time consuming. Fire Department personnel are responsible for removing aircraft from the barriers and resetting the barriers. The barriers are connected and disconnected by barrier maintenance personnel who can connect any of the barriers in about 15 minutes. The BAK-13 (Cable #3 or #4) is the desired approach end arrestment cable.

8-38. Istrana AB Local Divert Procedure.

8.38.1. There is a GCA to GCA Istrana divert procedure in the 31 FW pilot aid. Istrana AB is a nearby military airfield with barriers and DOD approved instrument approaches.

8-39. Aircraft Recall.

8.39.1. Aircraft flying from Aviano will be recalled via GUARD in the clear. Upon notification, aircrews will contact the SOF with fuel remaining in minutes.

8-40. Hot Brakes.

8.40.1. The hot brake areas are taxiways Alpha South and Delta South. Do not taxi into the loops if hot brakes are suspected or confirmed.

8.40.2. Following any abort above 90 knots (regardless of configuration), the brakes are glowing hot, smoke exists, or the tires deflate, 31 FW pilots will assume hot brakes

and start hot brake procedures. Pilots will declare an emergency, contact the SOF, and abort the aircraft.

8-41. Hung Ordnance.

8.41.1. Primary jettison for all ordnance is over the Adriatic. If unsecure, jettison suspension equipment. If possible, fly a straight-in approach with chase. Make every attempt to avoid populated areas. Unsecure live and/or heavyweight should land RWY 23 if conditions permit. If you require cables to be reconfigured, notify Approach/Tower ASAP. After landing clear the runway to the south. Await EOD personnel to safe the aircraft. With hung forward firing ordnance, after clearing runway point the nose of the aircraft down the grassy area between the runway and the south parallel. Aircraft with unsecure bombs stop on the runway until safed, then shut down. Aircraft with secure bombs that have been pinned may taxi back.

8-42. Inadvertent Release.

8.42.1. Mark the point if possible and notify the SOF. Pilots will have the EOR ground crew hookup on the headset and explain the particulars of the occurrence. Pilots are reminded that once the aircraft is safed and is back in parking, it will be impounded IAW the 31 FW Pilot Aid.

8-43. Ice FOD Procedures.

8.43.1. If an F-16 ice FOD alert is in effect, the SOF will direct the first aircraft to conduct an ice FOD check in accordance with the 31 FW F-16 Pilot Aid. If inlet icing is observed, flying operations will terminate (except airborne flights). The SOF will direct all ground F-16s to shut down.

8-44. Weather Watch/Weather Warning.

8.44.1. Should Aviano ground or the SOF advise you of a Weather Watch, all personnel may continue operations as normal, but must be ready to implement Weather Warning procedures immediately. Should Weather Warning procedures be necessary, the SOF will declare WX hold. Pilots will not step to their aircraft or crank engines. Aircraft that have not taxied will shut down. Taxiing aircraft will hold at EOR and contact SOF/Sq Ops for words. Contingency sorties may continue only with OG/CC and CAOC approval. All sorties that are armed may continue with their mission. There will be no servicing of aircraft. Do not use comm cords if outdoors. All recoveries and de-arming may proceed without the use of comm cords. Contact SOF with any questions.

MARC E. ROGERS, Colonel, USAF
Commander

Pages 584 through 585 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosure (4): to Exhibit (70): Referred to the Department of the Air Force

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RECEIPT OF JAGMAN FOR A-6E MISHAP IN SAUDI ARABIA

On 27APR98, participating agent [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) obtained a copy of the JAGMAN Investigation into a 1990 A-6E mishap which occurred in 1990, in Saudi Arabia. The report is entitled "Investigation of VMA (AW)-224 Mishap Concerning Whiskey Kilo 500 (WK 500), Bureau Number 161687, at Approximately 132005C September 1990", and a copy of the investigation is appended as enclosure (1).

ENCLOSURE

(1) JAG Memorandum, Subj: Request for JAGMAN Investigation into the VMA (AW)-224 Mishap Concerning Whiskey Kilo 500 (WK 500), Bureau Number 161687, at Approximately 132005C September 1990/27Apr98... (Copy)

PARTICIPATING AGENT

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SA, NCISRA Washington, DC

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
OFFICE: NCISFO CAROLINAS

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Pages 587 through 647 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosure (1) to Exhibit (71): Referred to Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

STATEMENT

DATE: April 28, 1998

PLACE: Aviano, Italy

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, make the following free and voluntary statement to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will, without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand this statement is given concerning an aircraft mishap occurring on 03 Feb 1998. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) identification purposes, I am NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), born on NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). I have a Secret security clearance. I am assigned to the 31st Operational Support Squadron (OSS). My social security number is NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). I reported to Aviano in June of 1997. I have approximately three years experience as an air traffic controller. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was working in the air traffic control tower on the day of the aircraft mishap. I reported to work at 1000 that day. I recall when the mishap aircraft was cleared for take off. This occurred toward the afternoon on that day. I did not personally clear the aircraft, as I was occupied with other duties. I do not recall who in the tower cleared that aircraft for take off. I do not recall anything unusual about the aircraft's take off. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Approximately one hour later, we received a report from Radar Approach Control (RAPCON) that an aircraft was squawking emergency. It had the same call sign as the aircraft that I had witnessed take off from the base. I do not recall the call sign, now. We started noticing the aircraft on the radar at about 20 miles out. I thought I heard the aircraft had flight control problems, and later on that it had a hydraulic failure. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not speak to the pilot. I believe SSgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) working in the tower, spoke to the aircraft as it was coming in. My duty was to coordinate emergency services for the landing. I think someone mentioned the pilot had requested an approach-end cable for an emergency landing. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) As the aircraft came in for a landing, I noticed damage to its vertical stabilizer. At first I thought it was a "bird strike", but the Supervisor of Flying (SOF), said he had witnessed something like that before, when an aircraft hit a power line. I witnessed the aircraft land. This occurred about 15-20 minutes after we first heard the report of emergency. The aircraft came in fast for a landing. I observed no erratic behavior on the part of the aircraft as it came in. As soon as the plane landed, the aircrew quickly exited the aircraft. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Within an hour, the SOF called the squadron, and asked to speak to the pilot. The person who answered the phone identified himself as the mishap aircraft pilot. I heard about half of the conversation between the SOF and the pilot. From what I can recall, I heard the pilot state that he had hit a gondola cable. He said he was kind of confused at the time. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] ment, and that there was a lot going on in his mind. He then ended the phone conversation. This is all that I remember of that phone call. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] have read and understand this statement, consisting of this and one additional page, typed for me by Mr. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] from information we discussed. I have made and initialed any corrections. This statement is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge and belief. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted]

28 April 98, 1156

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of April, 1998 in Aviano, Italy

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted]

AUTHORITY:
SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04Jan93

WARNING

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U S NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

STATEMENT

PLACE: NATO BASE
GEILENKIRCHEN, GERMANY
DATE: 28 April, 1998

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

make the following free and voluntary statement to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) information regarding the EA6B Prowler incident of 03FEB98 near Cavalese, Italy, which allegedly caused the deaths of twenty people in a ski gondola accident.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

For purposes of identification, I am a NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) years old, born in NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). I am a German citizen and am a Chief Master Sergeant in the German military, assigned to NATO, here in Geilenkirchen, Germany. I also have an American Social Security Number, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), issued in NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). I hold security clearances with NATO. My work telephone number is country code NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) then NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

and I discussed issues concerning the AWACS' time clock. The system's time is retrieved by a Control Power Supply, which is just an interface adaptor unit. Simply though, the power source is the plane's own electric system, with a backup system which runs between 2 and 5 minutes in the event of a power failure.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

At the beginning of each flight, the DT (Display Technician), who is an on board crew member, sets the clock which is that used by the AWACS' recording system. The DT's American counterpart is called a computer display maintenance technician (CDMT). The DT sets the clock by his own wristwatch, which ideally has been synchronized with the aircraft commander's own watch during the preflight brief. If the DT did not attend the brief, he is required to nonetheless synchronize watches with the commander before setting the clock. Either way, it is a manual process and has room for error regarding it's synchronization with perfect GMT.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Once the DT sets the AWACS' clock, among other tasks, the AWACS can then be brought up. This ensures that the AWACS is never running without a clock counter also running. As for the accuracy of the clocks when running, they are state of the art and reflect a true 3600 second hour. The tail number of the E3A flown in the respective area on 03FEB98 was 459. To my knowledge and from review of applicable maintenance records, there have been no reported problems or malfunctions with the AWACS clock in that particular aircraft.

mission system NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT (73)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

to other facts regarding the AWACS clock system, timehack is a term referring to the initial setting of the clock. The timehack can differ from plane to plane simply because of the inaccuracy of the wristwatches (wrong times) from which the AWACS clock is set. The procedures for aligning the onboard clock are spelled out quite clearly in the respective manual. I will attempt to provide a copy of those procedures and provide them to Agent [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

to the calibration of the actual clock, this is not done as the clock is a very accurate time piece and unless malfunctioning, will always keep perfect time, based on the time the DT sets. On board, the DT and the mission crew all have clocks reflecting this same time on their respective displays [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

have read the preceding 2 page statement prepared for me at my request by Special Agent [redacted] from information that I provided. I have been allowed to make any necessary changes that I see fit. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted signature block]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Date: 28 Apr 98 Time: 0840

Subscribed and sworn before me this 28th day of April, 1998 at the NATO base, Geilenkirchen, Germany.

[redacted signature block]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

28 Apr 98
Agent, NCIS

AUTHORITY: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

28APR98

STATEMENT

PLACE: NATO BASE

GEILENKIRCHEN, GERMANY

DATE: 28 April, 1998

[REDACTED]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] make the following free and voluntary statement to [REDACTED] whom I know to be a Special Agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended.

I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) information regarding the EA6B Prowler incident of 03FEB98 near Cavalese, Italy, which allegedly caused the deaths of twenty people in a ski gondola accident.

[REDACTED]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

For purposes of identification, I am [REDACTED] years old, born in [REDACTED]. I am a Dutch citizen and am employed as a senior computer systems analyst with NATO, assigned to Mission Support Wing, here in Geilenkirchen, Germany. I am also a former air traffick controller (ATC) with the Dutch Air Force. I hold security clearances with NATO. My work telephone number is country code [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)[REDACTED]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] and I discussed the actual AWACS tapes recorded from the E3A mission flown in that area on 03FEB98 which located the Prowler in question. Those tapes are classified NATO SECRET, currently, and are encoded in a unique binary manner. That encoding makes the tapes virtually unreadable and non reproducible from any other source aside from specific NATO equipment, unavailable to the US military at large. Therefore, while NATO is not necessarily opposed to releasing those tapes for evidentiary purposes, we have discussed the issue and are resolved to maintain the actual tapes in NATO's possession. For the record, since that particular E3A returned from the mission on that day, those tapes have been maintained in my office's possession, secured, and have not been released at all. I can affirm as to their integrity. Also, they have been previously analyzed, and that information has likewise been previously provided to Italian investigative authorities to the best of my knowledge. That information will likewise be provided to NCIS as soon as it's release is approved by NATO management and is available. It will include at least positional data, airspeeds, as well as many other recorded pieces of information.

[REDACTED]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

In layman's terms, the AWACS system is an airborne sensor platform holding various electronic systems performing surveillance and weapon control tasks. It's primary function is to detect, locate, and identify other aircraft within it's range of coverage. The maximum [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT (74)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Range of coverage is a classified figure, but I can affirm that the coverage of the Prowler in this case was about 280 nautical miles, within the range from which the E3A flew that day as well. Additionally, the AWACS utilizes several different inputs to accomplish it's tasking. It uses navigational data, ESM data, IFF (identification friend or foe), and RADAR data. I will also provide to ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ an unclassified document which better describes the AWACS system ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

AWACS records system and flight data throughout its operational mission. Various stages of the Prowler track can therefore be reproduced. I advise to use the uncorrelated IFF data in this case for it's the purest form of identification. Symbology data is a term used by the operational community and refers to the systems interpretation of the extrapolated flight paths of identified aircraft based on known sensor data points. It utilizes the raw data from the AWACS to provide educated "guesses" as to the likely future path of such an aircraft. Therefore, I have elected not to further discuss symbology data regarding this incident as I'll just refer to the factual information. I mention it because the E3A operator's symbology for the Prowler was likewise recorded on the E3A tapes and is still retrievable. Further, that operator can be easily identified and should be interviewed for information regarding the significance of this particular Prowler flight, if warranted. The only data that is not recorded is voice data ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

AWACS RADAR sensor needs line of sight "contact". This means that when it's target is "terrain masked" it is of little benefit, except to advise that a target is in fact at a level lower than whatever is concealing it. The AWACS shows the sensor plots indicating the course of a moving object. Computer generated symbology continues even when the actual sensor hits disappear because of for example terrain masking. Thus when the sensor plots are interrupted and later resume, it is a safe assumption the aircraft very well may have been masked. In this case in particular, the Prowler disappears from E3A's "sight" just east of the Lake Garda's eastern coastline and for some time thereafter while flying in a northerly pattern before it is picked up again. A reasonable explanation is that it was masked within the mountain range during that time. The AWACS cannot determine the actual altitude of the Prowler during that unplotted interim, but it can be concluded that it was lower than the respective terrain, else it would have been "seen," that is, plotted with coordinates ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

AWACS can use two independent systems to verify altitude. First, and less accurate is the RADAR measured altitude. It is used when the very accurate IFF altitude indication is not available. IFF altitude, a.k.a. Mode C (Charlie) is extremely accurate, also at low levels, with a negligible margin of error. This is so because it obtains it's data directly from the targeted aircraft itself. There is simply no electronic guess work with IFF, as it's source of information is the targeted aircraft's altimeter. The only factor to consider with IFF is the "difference of perceptions" of that altimeter, referring to with which air ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

pressure the altimeter was set. Before flight, the Prowler crew should have set the altimeter to either read Mean Sea Level (MSL) altitude or local airpressure altitude. In the type of flight that the Prowler took, the local altitude is commonly used. The Prowler's altitude data as furnished by NATO to the Italian authorities, as well as to NCIS, are those based on the IFF systems Mode C. I reiterate that this system's margin of error is negligible and altitude data are in fact accurate. As to the horizontal plotting, the accuracy is one nautical mile. Further of interest, the AWACS system is refreshed every 7 to 8 seconds. This cycle is the time in which the computer reads and processes the data and also the time it takes for the radar to scan a full circle.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

The data printouts pertaining to the Prowler's flight, there are numerous descriptive data, called attributes. Attributes are grouped in identification data, positional data, performance data, and other data groups which are not of interest for this investigation. Identification data is covered by the following. DLRN is the Data Link Reference Number, SRN in the System's Reference Number, TKD is the Track Identification Number. Positional data contains LATD which is the latitude in degrees, LOND: the longitude in degrees. Also GEOREF (geographical reference) positions are supplied. On the performance front the following attributes are supplied: ALT is the accurate altimeter reading from the targeted aircraft, SPEED is the ground speed in knots (nautical miles per hour), and HEADING is given in degrees true north. As far as the IFF modes are concerned, Mode 1 refers to a two character mode identification of the aircraft. Mode 2 is used for classified military identification, while Mode 3 is used for general ATC identification. The Mode 3 has several subcodes to it, for example 1000 is a "valid" code, indicative of a flight in progress, while 77, the emergency code, indicates serious trouble and essentially means the aircraft is squawking "mayday." A or M refers to the target's either being airborne or maritime, while Mode 4 is unique to US forces and provides further identification features.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

The analysis software used by me in the Mission Support Wing is American by design, and should have no problem standing on it's own merit within US courts as it was approved by the FDA for recognized statistical purposes and validated results. This software, supplied by the SAS Institute is used to supply NCIS with the reduced mission data.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I am aware that a plane flies under one of two sets of rules, visual flight rules (VFR), or Instrumental Flight Rules (IFR). In either case, a pilot should know his route before flying it and I state this because I am familiar with the aeronautical maps for that area, which reflect utility lines and cable car lines. To demonstrate, I pulled out an aeronautical map of that area to show agents an example of how such lines are marked, and in fact the area near Cavalese reflects an "aerial cable line."

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

asked me about tapes from AWACS for 29DEC98. We no longer have those from that day. Our policy is that tapes are maintained in secured holding for 28 days after recording, then recycled for new use. This period can be extended upon special request. The recording tapes of 03FEB98 were maintained because of this incident. Further, tapes of other significant dates are likewise maintained for unrelated NATO purposes. Another request from NCIS involved other aircraft in the vicinity that day. From prior review, I am aware that one other plane crossed Lake Garda west bound at about the same time the Prowler turned northbound over Lake Garda. I have not as yet had the chance to identify that other aircraft but will attempt to do so as soon as I can. Also, I have been asked to review our holding library for other dates in which flight route AV047 was flown, to include low level flights. This request will be handled as soon as possible, but will take some time. I will notify Agent ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ soon as the results of that search, and any other legitimate requests by NCIS which cannot be completed at this time, are indeed fulfilled. ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

have read the preceding 4 page statement prepared for me at my request by Special Agent ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ from information that I provided. I have been allowed to make any necessary changes that I see fit. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

Date: 28 April 1998 Time: 14:21

Subscribed and sworn before me this 28th day of April, 1998 at the NATO base, Geilenkirchen, Germany.

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

28 Apr 98
Special Agent, NCIS

AUTHORITY: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

STATEMENT

DATE: April 28, 1998

PLACE: Aviano, Italy

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I, Major NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, make the following free and voluntary statement to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will, without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand this statement is given concerning an orientation brief given to VMAQ-2 NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) For identification purposes, I am a NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), born on NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have a Top Secret security clearance. My social security number is NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I am currently assigned to 31st Fighter Wing, Aviano Air Base, Aviano, Italy. I am Chief of Standardization and Evaluation (Stan/Eval) for the Operations Group. In this capacity, I run the Supervisor of Flying (SOF) Program, as well as the Orientation Program for new squadrons to the Aviano Air base. I have had this position since around 01 Jun 97. I first arrived in Aviano in March of 1998 NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) When a new squadron comes in, I give a Local Area Orientation (LAO) brief to that squadron. The brief typically includes information on weather, base orientation, intelligence support sources, emergency fields, and low flying procedures. I try to tailor the LAO briefs to the type of flying the unit anticipates doing. I have delivered the LAO brief between 5 and 8 times to different squadrons that have arrived on the base since I have been Chief of Standardization/Evaluation. These commands have all been temporary duty (TDY) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I recall giving an LAO brief to VMAQ-2 on 25 Aug 97. The reason I recall the specific date is because my secretary logged the appointment in her calendar. This calendar is still at my office. The calendar entry is the only documentation that I have concerning this brief. I had no sign-in, or attendance sheets, and I didn't need to report out to anyone that I had given this brief. If the squadron itself had its own sign-in sheet, I didn't see it. The DGOC - 'Deliberate Guard' Operations Center - a command center for Deliberate Guard air sorties to Bosnia - initiated and lined up this LAO brief for the squadron. The brief was given in the Wing Conference Room in the Headquarters building on base. The calendar entry scheduled this brief for a 1300 local start time, I believe this to be the correct time. The Director of DGOC was also present at this brief, and sat in the back of the room. DGOC may have had some sort of attendance sheet, although I am not sure of this NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) My brief consisted of a Power Point presentation to the squadron. The brief lasted for the better part of an hour. I was assisted during the presentation by a Sgt. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, Air Traffic Controller Standardization/Evaluation Liaison. I believe Sgt. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recently transferred from Aviano. Sgt. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had a small portion of the power point presentation dealing with air traffic control NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The audience for this brief were members of VMAQ-2: pilots, navigators, and electronic warfare officers. I did not personally know anyone in the audience. I would estimate that there were about 35-40 people in all. I know the Commanding Officer (CO) and Operations Officer were present, because I remember speaking to them. I do not recall their names. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) During the initial portion of the brief, possibly right after the introduction, I asked whether or not this squadron was planning to fly local sorties, or only CAOC directed sorties – meaning sorties in support of Operation Deliberate Guard (DG) missions over Bosnia. I believe either the Operations Officer or the CO responded that the squadron was primarily doing DG sorties. He also said that the squadron would possibly go on local sorties in six to eight weeks. At first I did not recall exactly the time period that was told to me for the local sorties. However, I subsequently learned that the CO for VMAQ-2 stated that the six to eight week time period was told to me at the time of the brief. This statement by the CO refreshed my memory, and I am now almost certain this time period was indeed stated to me at that time. Because of the six to eight week time frame given to me as to when they would begin flying locally, I decided not to give that part of the brief dealing with local training sorties and low-flying procedures. I wanted that part of the brief to be fresh in their minds when they were ready to fly in the local area. I asked the audience to contact me when the squadron was ready to fly local sorties. Either the Operations Officer or the CO responded that I would be contacted when the squadron was ready to go on local flights. I was never subsequently contacted by VMAQ-2 concerning that part of the brief dealing with local and low-flying procedures. If I had given this part of the brief to the squadron, I would have mentioned specific altitude restrictions for low-flying aircraft. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I do not remember being asked questions by members of the squadron during the brief. I do not recall any of the questions asked, but the audience did not just sit there like a bump on a log. I had gotten feedback that they were actively listening during the brief. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) A few days before the briefing in question, I was given a message concerning altitude restrictions in the Trentino Alto Adige region, which is just North of here (the aircraft mishap occurred in the heart of this region). It was the scuttlebutt that the Italian Governor of this region asked for a 2000 feet altitude restriction for flying over his region. This restriction was staffed through the Italian Air Force, and came down as an action message for us. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) During the briefing to the VMAQ-2 members, I remember I stopped somewhere in the local training portion of my Power Point brief, and told the squadron assembled in the room that the local Nationals were noise-sensitive, as evidenced by the action message I had just received, and would be publishing soon as a Flight Crew Information File. I told them we could not fly lower than 2000 feet above ground level (AGL) while flying through the Trentino Alto Adige region. I do not recall if I said "Trentino Alto Adige". NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) "region", or "The Alps" when referring to this altitude restriction. I do not recall if any questions were asked by the command concerning the 2000 foot altitude restriction. I probably did not mention any other altitude restrictions during this brief, although I am not certain of this. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) A few days after the briefing, 29 Aug 97, I wrote a formal restriction in Flight Crew Information File (FCIF) 97-16. After I published FCIF 97-16, I distributed it to the permanent squadrons on the base. I also gave copies to the DGOC, who has the responsibility to distribute it to the DG units, which included VMAQ-2. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) During the brief, I also told the audience that they had to be familiar with local operating procedures, detailed in Chapter 8 (the Aviano supplement) of Air Force Instruction MCI 11-F16. Chapter 8 is about 14 pages in length. I believe I provided 6-10 copies for the squadron, and handed them to the Operations Officer. Instructions for low-level flying are contained within Chapter 8, and are about one page in length. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Most of the low flying procedures in Chapter 8 are Italian rules handed down to us. The Operations Group Commander adds some procedures such as a 10-mile corridor (maintain plus/minus 5 miles of the "black line" during low level flight). It is my job to recommend new policy and procedures to the Ops Group Commander. The 2000 altitude restriction rule is an Italian rule. Before this rule, we had a 1000-ft altitude restriction when flying over the Alps – meaning no one without authorization was allowed to fly below 1000 feet during the months of October to April. This altitude restriction is found in Chapter 8. The Operations Group Commander instituted this policy. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I also ensured that the squadron received copies of the Pilot Aid. I asked how many copies of this they needed. I don't recall how many they said they needed, and I don't recall who gave me this number, but I know I provided at least the specified amount of copies of the Pilot Aid to the DGOC for distribution to VMAQ-2. I do not know if the DGOC properly distributed the Pilot Aid to the squadron. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I also mentioned during the brief that any maps they needed of the local area were available in the Intelligence section of the 31st Fighter Wing. No specific flight routes were discussed, nor any ski resorts mentioned during the brief. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The brief included the following topics: an Air Traffic Control section (presented by Sgt. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a section on how to get around the Aviano base; miscellaneous administration items; intelligence support assets; weather information, and various weather information sources; local weather hazards; local emergency fields; a discussion of the airfield itself; emergency cables (for emergency landings); and the Supervisor of Flying (SOF) and his duties. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Before the briefing in question, I heard of two complaints concerning flights from this base. Sometime in the summer of 1997, the Wing had received a complaint from the air traffic control tower in Bolzano, Italy. The tower had seen several F-16 fighter jets in their vicinity. There was no communication between the fighters and Bolzano Tower as the fighters, who were physically clear of the Bolzano Air Traffic Area, would have been on another frequency. We checked that particular complaint out, and found that the F-16s were on an authorized route. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The other complaint was also received in the summer of 1997 concerning a flight of four F-16s from Point Sierra (on the Adriatic Coast near Caorle) to Point Fermo, which lies about 20 miles south of Aviano. I was personally on this particular flight. Apparently the complaint came from one of the towns along the route about the noise the flight made. I recall it was a duly authorized low-level flight. These complaints are usually routed through our Italian Liaison officer, Captain NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have mentioned these two noise complaints during the VMAQ-2 brief, but I do not specifically recall if I did or not. I never discussed radar altimeter settings for flights, that being an operational issue for the command. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have read and understand this statement, consisting of this and three additional pages typed for me by Mr. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from information we discussed. I have made and initialed any corrections. This statement is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge and belief. *JQ*

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

28 APR 98
1358LCL

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of April, 1998 at Aviano Air Base, Aviano, Italy

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

28 APR 98
1358

AUTHORITY:
SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04Jan93

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

STATEMENT

DATE: April 28, 1998

PLACE: Aviano, Italy

I, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) make the following free and voluntary statement to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will, without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand this statement is given in concerns to my knowledge of the Italian judicial system and in particular, the elements of an Italian document called "verbale" or written statement of testimony.

I wish to point out that as part of my duties as an Intelligence Operations Specialist for the Naval Criminal Investigative Service operating in Italy for the past seventeen years, I have had in many occasions the opportunity to assist with both Italian and U.S. law enforcement officials in the compilation of a fundamental document in the Italian judicial system called the "VERBALE", or written statement of testimony. During the course of my official duties, I have been called upon to act as an official interpreter acting for the Italian Public Prosecutor in such important investigations such as the "Achille Lauro high jacking". On that occasion, I was called upon to translate the statements of the American passengers of the Italian cruise liner witnesses to the hideous terrorist act. Those statements were given in English before an Italian magistrate, verbally translated into Italian and consequently formulated in the documents called VERBALI. On numerous other occasions, I have been subpoenaed by Italian officials to appear in Italian court to testify on behalf of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service on cases that my office had investigated. I have translated for many American victims who were called upon to give a VERBALE to the Italian officials and I have myself given VERBALI on information received by my office and deemed necessary for Italian investigations. I also wish to point out that in this particular instance I have sought the professional advice of a senior member of the Italian law enforcement organization called the Italian "CARABINIERI" or the military police. The official in question is Italian Carabinieri Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) commanding officer of the Carabinieri Company in Sacile, Italy. I would also like to advise at this time, that Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was closely involved in the initial phases of the Italian investigation into the military EA-6B mishap in Cavalese, Italy. Finally, while posing questions to Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was assisted by my NCIS colleague [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Firstly, the Italian judicial system contemplates two different situations in which a statement is taken: 1) statement taken from a witness and 2) statement taken from a suspect. In the case of a statement taken from a suspect, the statement must be recorded or verbalized (from which the term "VERBALE" derives) in the presence of an officer of judicial police. Not all law enforcement officers qualify as officers of judicial police. It is a title which Italian law enforcement officers qualify as after participating and passing an extensive training course in Italian judicial procedures. Statements may also be taken by Public Prosecutors or "Publici Ministeri" as referred to in Italian. A Public Prosecutor

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in the Italian judicial system is comparable to a United States Attorney in the U.S. judicial system. Of note, is that there is no swearing of the individual giving the statement under the Italian system. The Italian system considers three separate articles of law which state that the Italian citizen is obligated to tell the truth to any law enforcement official. Under the Italian judicial system, ignorance of the law(s) is not a justification for not telling the truth or for not abiding by any law for that matter. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related that in the case of a suspect, it is assumed that the person giving the statement is going to give false testimony in his own defense and therefore those same articles of law do not apply to his case.

Articles 197/198 of the Italian code of Penal Procedures (Codice di Procedura Penale) obligates the citizen giving a statement to a court judge to tell the truth. Article 362 of the same code obligates the citizen before the Public Prosecutor and finally article 351 specifies that same obligation for the truth to be told before officers of judicial police. Any Italian citizen who makes a false statement before a judge during a hearing or before a Public Prosecutor, is culpable of the crime of false testimony. A false statement made in other than the two situations above fall under the charge of aiding and abetting.

Another difference in the two types of statements is that whenever a person who is considered a suspect gives a statement, all persons present during the taking of the statement must undersign the statement. The concept here is that those same persons may later be called upon to act as witnesses to the statement made by the suspect.

A statement taken from a simple witness does not necessitate the signatures of all persons present at the time of the taking of the statement. Only a signature of the witness, the person taking the statement and one other witness to the signing are necessary.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) required as the significance of the stamp which is generally affixed to the bottom of each statement, whether that be of a suspect or a simple witness. It was explained to me by Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) that the ink stamp affixed to the bottom of each statement signifies that the statement is a document which was written and recognized by the Italian government administration. The stamp in the center depicts the symbol of the Italian government, while the verbiage around the stamp specifies the particular section of the Italian administration that the statement taker represents, i.e. the Carabinieri or military police would have the words Carabinieri written around the seal of the Italian government. It is also of interest that the lack of ink stamp on the bottom of any statement does not void that statement. This would be considered simply an administrative informality and could be corrected at a later time. Contrarily, a missing signature of a statement giver or an incorrect date could and would constitute [REDACTED] statement.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

2/2/98

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

I have read and understand this statement, consisting of this and additional pages, typed for me by NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from information we discussed. I have made and initialed any corrections. This statement is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of April 1998 in *Ayiano*, Italy

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

AUTHORITY:
SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04Jan93

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STATEMENT

PLACE: *Aviano Air Base*

DATE: *28APR98*

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) , make the following free and voluntary statement to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of the moving of the EA-6B mishap aircraft at the Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the purpose of identification, I am NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) inches tall, weighing approximately NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) pounds. I have NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hair and NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) eyes. My social security number is NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I was born on NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) approximately two (2) weeks ago, I am not sure what time it was, I was involved in the moving of the EA-6B mishap aircraft from Hardened Aircraft Shelter (HAS) Z-1 to HAS T-29, Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT. Apparently, the U.S. Air Force was going to perform maintenance in HAS Z-1 and consequently the mishap aircraft needed to be moved to HAS T-29. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the time, the mishap aircraft was moved, I was sitting in the pilots seat and a Carabinieri member, whom I cannot identify, was sitting in the ECMO-1 cockpit. To the best of my knowledge, the Carabinieri member's person for being in the cockpit was to observe me in the pilot's cockpit and insure I did not tamper with anything, although this was never told to me. My purpose for being in the mishap aircraft during this move was to apply the brakes to the aircraft in the event this was needed. Staff Sergeant NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, was in charge of the move, Major NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, and LtCol NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, Commanding Officer (CO), VMAQ-4, were also present during this move. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I climbed into the pilot's cockpit of the mishap aircraft on the day of the movement, there was a camera bag and a flight bag inside the pilot's cockpit, that I believe was either on the seat or in the center console of the cockpit. The flight bag is where the pilot's keep all their flight books. Upon entering the cockpit, I moved the camera bag and the flight bag up on the glare shield or more commonly known as the dashboard of the aircraft. Subsequently, I attempted to pump up the mishap aircraft's brakes; however, because there was no hydraulic fluid in the combined reservoir of the aircraft, the brakes did not work. Without brakes for the aircraft, I was just another set of eyes for the movement. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Carabinieri member sitting in the ECMO-1 seat at the time of the move was pointing to various instruments and parts of the cockpit. At one point, I observed the Carabinieri member reaching into the radar hood or black out screen, and he pulled out a pair of gloves. I looked over and told him that they were flight gloves and I believe he put the gloves back in the hood. I did not observe the Carabinieri person touching anything else. The mishap aircraft finally reached HAS T-29, we backed the mishap aircraft in and I tried applying the brakes to the aircraft, but with no success. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) entire evolution regarding the move of the mishap aircraft from one HAS to another took approximately one (1) hour from start to finish. Upon finishing the evolution, I checked the cockpits for security, I secured the boarding platforms, then put the boarding ladders up, took the camera bag and flight bag from the glare shield and put them back near the center console of the cockpit. After the plane was secured, I then walked out and sat in the truck. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), prior to moving the mishap aircraft, I observed Carabinieri personnel bagging and tagging evidentiary items which had been lying on the ground behind the aircraft in HAS Z-1. I cannot identify any of the Carabinieri persons. In addition, while I was in the pilot's cockpit of the mishap aircraft, I did not open the camera bag or the flight bag nor did the Carabinieri person. I did not open anything and I did not touch anything other than the items mentioned. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) statement, consisting of this page and one other was typed for me by Special Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as we discussed its contents. I have read and understand the above statement. I have been given the opportunity to make any changes or corrections I desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes or corrections. This statement is true and correct. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

30 APRIL 98

Date

0903

Time

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 28th day of April, 1998 at Aviano Air Base.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

30 APR 98 / 0903

Special Agent, U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
AUTH: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INTERVIEW OF SSGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC

On 28Apr98, reporting agent interviewed SSgt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), regarding the VMAQ-2 EA6B Prowler mishap which occurred near Cavalese, Italy on 03Feb98. This interview was conducted at the request of the Trial Counsels assigned to this case. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at the NCISRA Cherry Point office located aboard MCAS Cherry Point, NC.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he is in the Quality Assurance section of the Maintenance Department at VMAQ-2, MAG-14, 2DMAW, MCAS, Cherry Point, NC.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related the information he previously provided to the JAGMAN investigation board, as well as to the Italian Magistrate, was true.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he first became aware of the mishap flight when he overheard the radio traffic at Maintenance Control indicating aircraft 02 (the mishap aircraft) was going to "take a trap" (make an arrested landing). He stated he did not know who it was that he heard on the radio. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated the radio traffic he heard gave no details about the type of problems the plane was having.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) explained that he assumed the plane was having some kind of problem because he knew the flight schedule, knew the plane was returning early, and knew that it was taking a trap.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) noted he was responsible for getting to the trap site and ensuring everything ran smoothly after the landing. For example, he ensures the tail hook is removed correctly, the seats are pinned and the aircraft is properly prepared to be towed back to the hangar.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) noted he drove to the trap site in his truck with LCpl [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). He believed GYSGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and another Marine from Powerline Section drove to the site on the Two Tractor. He also recalled a Cp [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and an ordnanceman responded the site to pin the seats and the stations on the aircraft.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated the plane landed and the four aircrew conducted an emergency egress. He recalled the crew walked away from the plane and remained in the general area.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated as he approached the plane, he came across Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) first. He recalled making a comment [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) about the damage to the plane, but [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had no response at that time.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled the Crash, Fire and Rescue Crews which responded to

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the site were comprised of USAF personnel. He stated they kept the Marines away from the aircraft until they had the situation secured. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) noted it was about 15 minutes from the time the plane landed until Crash, Fire and Rescue let them approach the plane.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled Sgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) pinned the seats. He stated NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also gave him the classified tapes from the cockpit, which held onto until giving them to Sgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) later that day.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled at one point, he approached NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as they were talking to the head of the Crash, Fire and Rescue personnel at the scene. He approached them in order to determine what had happened to the plane so he could relay that information to Maintenance Control.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he heard NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) say that "he thought he hit a cable car cable," and "he thought we need to check the other end to make sure nobody got hurt." NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not hear NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) say how it happened.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) noted Capts NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) were not with NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) when NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) made those comments.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he was present when the aircraft was moved from the landing strip. He noted the Crash, Fire and Rescue personnel first wanted the plane moved to the "Charlie Loop" area aboard base. This area was in the opposite direction of the VMAQ-2 spaces. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated his crew was notified to move the plane back to the "Mike Loop" area, which was the VMAQ-2 area. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not know who gave that order.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled that he drove back to the VMAQ-2 Maintenance area in a vehicle with Maj NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and possibly Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) believed another officer was also in the vehicle, but he could not remember who.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was not near the VMAQ-2 Ready Room after the mishap. He advised he had no direct conversation about the mishap with the aircrew after they landed, except for what is mentioned above. He advised he did not hear any conversation between the aircrew and any of the other VMAQ-2 officers that arrived on the scene.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he had never heard any of the pilots discuss low level training flights in the past, nor had he ever heard any pilots/ECMO's discuss intentionally flying low over/under any structure, building or populated area.

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NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related it is not uncommon for aircrews to take cameras, both video and still cameras, into the cockpit on flights. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not know whose cameras were inside the cockpit of aircraft 02 after the mishap.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) could not recall LTCO NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) being out at the scene after the plane landed.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not remember seeing the mishap aircrew back at the maintenance area after the mishap, although he thought they could have been there at some point and he just didn't see them.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided no additional information pertinent to this investigation during this interview.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Sean

SSN:

DOB:

POB:

UNIT

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

WKPHI

REPORTED BY:

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE:

NCISFO CAROLINAS

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TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO
MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INTERVIEW OF GYSGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 28Apr98, GYSGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at the NCIS office at MCAS Cherry Point, NC. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he is a Jet Mechanic and plan captain with VMAQ-2.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he was around the squadron when he heard something over a hand held radio about aircraft 02 taking a trap, but did not know the nature or reason for them needing the trap. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he grabbed a Tug and associated gear and started out toward the runway, and did not hear anything further on the radio. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said his responsibility was to make the aircraft safe and get it removed from the runway. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he observed the aircraft land and it was straight and level though appeared very fast. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said as soon as the aircraft caught the wire the canopies were popping open and the crew were eggressing. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said one of the crewmen jumped from the aircraft and was limping, and all four ran from the aircraft off in the grass.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said they had to wait for crash crew to tell them it was safe to approach the aircraft, then they started doing their jobs to safe the aircraft. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said this included people from the seat shop (SGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ECM (unknown), Ordnance (LC [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and himself. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said all this was happening while he was getting the Tug hooked up to the aircraft.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said prior to starting their work they were all gathered in the grass around where the four crewmen were at. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said all the crew seemed scared and shook up and their eyes were very large.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he was unsure who, but heard either Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) or Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) say something like, "I think we hit a cable." [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said other things he heard during this time though he could not directly attribute to any of the crewmen were, "that's a strong aircraft"; "hope nobody got hurt"; and something about a gondola.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said all this talk was going on while a person who he assumed was an Air Force official was asking them questions and writing things down on a clipboard. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said there was also a lot of general conversation about hazmat issues and possible loss of classified information from the damaged electronic pod. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he was busy with his job and did not remember when or how the crew left the area.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he eventually pulled the aircraft to the end of the runway and the first off taxiway where he waited for about an hour. At this location they were involved in hazmat removal via absorbent pads cleaning up fuel and hydraulic fluids which were leaking from the aircraft. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he eventually towed the aircraft back to the "mike" loops which were the normal area for VMAQ-2's aircraft

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EXHIBIT (79)

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where it was parked on a pad. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he did not see the aircraft again until about 5 days later in an Air Force hanger.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was asked if he remembered that there had been a delay in the launch of the mishap aircraft that day. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he did remember it and specifically remembered he was upset by this because they had rushed to insure the aircraft could be launched on time. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he could not remember who or how he found out, but they were ready for launch and had to wait on something. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he assumed they were waiting on something that was mission essential. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he remembered a vehicle driving out to the general area of where the aircraft was at. He said he saw someone get out of the vehicle and approach the aircraft. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he could not remember who the person was and did not specifically see them deliver anything to the air-crew, but knew this person was delivering whatever was needed for the launch. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said it was a routine launch other than the delay.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he has had no direct contact or conversations with any of the mishap crew, and had not heard anything 2nd or 3rd hand they may have said about the mishap. However, Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) held an informal meeting with all the maintenance personnel sometime after the mishap where he thanked everyone in the maintenance section for doing a good job in maintaining the aircraft. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said because they did their job right, the aircraft got them home safely.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said there was no doubt by anyone in maintenance that the aircraft was 100% airworthy. He said the general consensus of the enlisted Marines in maintenance was that the air-crew was up there screwing around which caused the mishap, and now none of them were man enough to admit it. He said it seemed to him and others that maintenance was being highly scrutinized which they took to mean the air-crew was blaming the aircraft for the mishap. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said the training missions in addition to the AOR missions were putting undue stress on all the people in maintenance which amounted to about 40 man hours just to get a flight launched. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said as a GYSGT it was unusual for him to have to act as a plane captain, but the section was so short, and under so much pressure to perform, he had to be involved in these duties that are normally handled by CPL's or SGT's.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he had seen personally owned video cameras in the cockpit before, but on a very limited basis. He said still cameras were much more common and were used to document things for the squadrons cruise books.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said the mishap had caused morale in the squadron to be at

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

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an all time low. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said none of the younger troops were re-enlisting, and many career Marines were looking for orders out of the squadron.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: GYSGT, USMC, VMAQ-2, MCAS Cherry Point, NC

SSAN

DOB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB:

REPORTED BY: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
OFFICE: NCISFO Carolinas
DATE TYPED: 30APR98

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SERVICE

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INTERVIEW OF SGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 28Apr98, SGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at the NCIS office at MCAS Cherry Point, NC. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he had been with VMAQ-2 since Sep92, and currently worked as an expeditor in ordering aircraft parts and other related aviation materials for the squadron.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he was in the maintenance control section of his squadron in Aviano when he heard something come over the radio about the mishap aircraft having problems. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he did not remember specifically what he heard as he was not paying attention when he first heard it, but he took it to mean the aircraft had something missing from it.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he accompanied LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and someone else whom he could not remember to the area of the runway. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said they drove along a service road in a government vehicle. The service road paralleled the runway the mishap aircraft was landing on. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said they were off to the side and observed the aircraft make what appeared to be a normal landing, but took the trap. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said the first thing he noticed was the football on the vertical stabilizer was missing a huge chunk out of it. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he saw the canopies immediately pop open on the aircraft, and although he did not actually see the crew men do so, knew they had egressed by jumping off the wings of the aircraft. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said they were located off to the side and could not immediately get up to the aircraft. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he eventually assisted with unhooking the tail-hook, and chaining it. He later walked the port side wing until he was relieved by an unknown person. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he could not remember specifically who all else was present, but he did remember LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and GYSN [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) being present.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said while they waited for clearance from crash crew to do what they needed to do with the aircraft, they were all moved to the side of the runway in a grassy area. During this time he was within 4-5 feet of the mishap crew at times. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said the crew left within 5-10 minutes of the landing in a white military van driven by an unknown person. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he had no personal contact or conversation with the crew and did not overhear anything they were saying. He said they were just looking at the aircraft and appeared to be in shock or scared.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said neither he or any other enlisted personnel were told anything about the mishap and everything they saw or heard came off of CNN. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said about 3-5 days after the mishap they heard a rumor that there was a personally owned video camera in the cockpit and an associated rumor that the crew was involved in doing a video like the one that VMAQ-3 personnel had made. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he did

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not know where the rumor was coming from and never heard any solid information on this.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he and others were just wondering why the hell they were flying so low over a ski resort area. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he has not heard anything from other pilots or ECMO's about what might have happened. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he had never heard of pilots taking video cameras in the cockpit, but still cameras were fairly common and the photos were used for a squadron cruise book. He said he had never heard any rumors or talk about any of the pilots in the squadron intentionally flying lower than they should.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said a few weeks after the mishap Captain NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) called an informal formation in the maintenance spaces of their squadron. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) addressed the maintenance personnel and said they were the best squadron around, did excellent work on the aircraft, and just let them know he appreciated all the good work they did on the aircraft. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) told them if it were not for all the good work they did he would not be alive, and he appreciated it.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: SGT, USMC, VMAQ-2, MCAS Cherry Point, NC

SSAN

DOB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB:

REPORTED BY: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
OFFICE: NCISFO Carolinas
DATE TYPED: 29APR98

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INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INTERVIEW OF LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC

On 28Apr98, reporting agent interviewed LCpl [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) regarding the VMAQ-2 EA6B Prowler mishap which occurred near Cavalese, Italy on 03Feb98. This interview was conducted at the request of the Trial Counsels assigned to this case. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at the NCISRA Cherry Point office located aboard MCAS Cherry Point, NC.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he works in the Flight Equipment Shop under the Maintenance Department, VMAQ-2, MAG-14, 2DMAW, MCAS Cherry Point, NC. He noted a SSgt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) his supervisor in the shop, and a Cpl [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is also assigned to that shop.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he was in the Flight Equipment Shop when the mishap occurred on 03Feb98. He advised SSgt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was out of the shop at chow, and Cpl [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had already returned to the U.S. with the advance party.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled a Sgt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was with him in the Flight Equipment shop at the time of the mishap. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was from VMAQ-4, and he was in Aviano as part of the VMAQ-4 advance party.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled he was working on the computer in his shop when Capts [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) all entered the shop together. At that time, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was unaware there had been a problem with their flight.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) noted under normal circumstances, a plane lands, the crew goes to Maintenance Control, then the crew goes to the Flight Equipment shop to undress (out of flight suit), and then the crew goes to the Ready Room to debrief.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) thought this was a normal situation. He advised the crew was getting undressed and there was no talking between them. He saw nothing noticeable about their appearances, except that [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was limping. He heard [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) if he could help him, and he saw [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) assist [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) getting out of the flight suit. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated there was no one else with the four crew members in the Flight Equipment shop.

According to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) after the crew had been in the shop about 6-7 minutes, the telephone rang. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) explained that he answered the telephone, and the caller said he was from the Air Traffic Control Tower (ATC). The caller told [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) he needed to speak to the Commander or the Pilot of the plane that just landed.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he was a bit confused by the request to speak with the "Commander" of the plane, so he asked the caller if he

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wanted to talk to Capt [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the pilot who actually flew the plane. According to [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the caller said yes, and [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) handed the telephone to [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated the caller did not go into any details with him on the telephone as to why he wanted to talk to the pilot. He also noted the caller did not say anything to him about a mishap.

[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) took the telephone and spoke with the caller. According to [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) he heard [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) make the following statements to the caller over the telephone: "We're going to get drilled pretty hard for this...for hitting that wire..." and he "didn't see a tower or anything resembling something with wires or cables hanging off of it."

[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) might have had additional conversation with the caller, but he got off the phone pretty quickly.

[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he tried not to listen to the conversation, but he couldn't help listening to it when [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) spoke about the wires, and getting drilled pretty hard. [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled his first impression was [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had struck a wire over by the ATC Tower.

[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said when [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) got off the phone, he asked [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) if he had to catch the wire, meaning the trap on an arrested landing. [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) noted [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) replied by saying something like, "Well, I had to catch the wire...wish that was all I had to catch."

[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he had no other conversation with [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in the shop. He also related that [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not say anything in the shop. [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) noted [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was in and out of the shop very quickly.

[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he did not talk to any of the others in the shop. [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added Sgt [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) sat on the couch in the shop the entire time and did not say anything to the crew while they were there.

[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) believed the four aircrew went to the Ready Room after leaving his shop.

[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related he has never heard the pilots or ECMO's discuss low level flights in the past.

[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he has never heard any pilots or ECMO's discuss intentionally flying low over/under any structures, buildings or populated areas.

[redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he did not talk to the Maintenance Dept personnel outside his shop often, but has never heard any of them

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make any comments about the pilots or ECMO's flying low over anything.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he has seen pilots and ECMO's take cameras up on flights in the past. He noted he has only seen them take regular (still) cameras with them, vice video cameras. He advised he had never seen pilots or ECMO's take a video camera up on a flight.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he had no idea whose cameras were found in the cockpit of the mishap aircraft after it landed.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added he was present when the mishap aircraft took off for the flight on 03Feb98. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled prior to the take off, all of the ECMO's and the pilot were checking the plane out and getting into it. He recalled they (the pilot and ECMO's) were waiting for someone to bring something for Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled hearing someone there say NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was waiting for a tape, but NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not know what type of tape.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) noted the crew waited 5-6 minutes in the plane, and were about to leave without whatever they were waiting for, but at the last minute someone brought it to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related the person went right up to the plane on NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) side and handed the object to him.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled the person who delivered the item drove up in a green vehicle. He described the vehicle as the type the USAF had given the officers to drive while they were stationed in Aviano.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) thought the vehicle could have been a Nissan make, but he was not sure.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated the person carried the object in a white plastic bag, which he described as the kind one would get when making a purchase at the exchange.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) described the person who delivered the object as short and stocky. He believed the person was an officer because of the car he saw him arrive in. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) thought it is possible LT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was the person who delivered that object to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) but he was not sure.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated there were several other personnel out with the plane prior to take off. He noted each section has a "trouble shooter" out there prior to take off. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled there were members of his squadron as well as some members from VMAQ-4 who were present. He noted LCpl NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from Powerline Section was the Plane Captain. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled Sgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from VMAQ-4 accompanied him on the launch. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) noted the other sections which had personnel present at that launch were Ordnance, COM/NAV,

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Airframes, Electronics and Q/A.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated aircraft 02 had flown earlier that day, and no problems with the flight equipment were reported to him after that first flight.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added the Flight Surgeon, Lt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USNR, did not come by the Flight Equipment shop to check on the mishap crew's flight gear after the mishap. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated the Doc did not come by at all that day prior to 1700, when NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) shift ended and the night crew came on duty.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided no additional information pertinent to this investigation during this interview.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) /LCpl USMC

SSN:

DOB:

POB:

UNIT:

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

WKPHD

REPORTED BY:

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE:

NCISFO CAROLINAS

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INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INTERVIEW OF LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC

On 28Apr98, reporting agent interviewed LCpl [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), regarding the VMAQ-2 EA6B Prowler mishap which occurred near Cavalese, Italy on 03Feb98. This interview was conducted at the request of the Trial Counsels assigned to this case. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at the NCISRA Cherry Point office located aboard MCAS Cherry Point, NC.

NCIS [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) assigned to the Ordnance Section, Maintenance Department, VMAQ-2, MAG-14, 2DMAW, MCAS Cherry Point, NC.

NCIS [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he was in Aviano on 03Feb98. He first became aware of the mishap flight when he heard radio traffic in Maintenance Control indicating the plane was going to take a trap.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he hopped into a truck with LCpl [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and Sgt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and drove out to the site. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) accompanied [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) because they wanted to watch.

NCIS [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled GySgt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and SSgt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also responded to the landing site.

NCIS [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he watched the plane land, saw the damage to the plane. He advised he also saw the aircrew egress from the plane.

NCIS [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he did not talk to any of the aircrew after the landing.

NCIS [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled while the aircrew was standing around outside the aircraft, he heard Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) make a comment to the effect of, "Looks like I'm gonna have to take a piss test." In addition, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled hearing Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) say something like, "If I had a map I could point out where it happened."

NCIS [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he instructed by the EOD personnel at the site to check on the Cartridge Actuated Devices (CAD's) on POD 5, so from that point on he did not hear much of what the aircrew was saying.

NCIS [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he did not see the aircrew later that day.

NCIS [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) noted he was not near the VMAQ-2 Ready Room later that day.

NCIS [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not know who drove the aircrew back to the VMAQ-2 Ready Room.

NCIS [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related he had never heard any pilots discuss low level flights and/or flying low at all.

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NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also stated he had no knowledge of cameras being taken into the cockpit on flights.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he was present on at the launch of the mishap flight. He noted he was present to trouble-shoot for the Ordnance Section.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled the aircrew was waiting around for a tape prior to the flight. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) estimate they waited for 15-20 minutes.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not know if the tape ever arrived, and if it did, he did not know who delivered it.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) believed the tape the aircrew was waiting for was an ECM tape for the back seaters. He assumed the tape was a mission essential tape. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) could not recall exactly who indicated the crew was waiting for a tape, but he noted that information got spread by word of mouth. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also indicated everyone around the plane was joking and talking during the delay, and he did not pay much attention at the time because it had nothing to do with his job.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided no additional information pertinent to this investigation during this interview.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) /LCpl USMC

SSN:

DOB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB:

UNIT: Ordnance Section, Maint Dept,
VMAO-2, MAG-14, 2DMAW, MCAS Cherry Point, NC

WKPHN: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

REPORTED BY: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: NCISFO CAROLINAS

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INTERVIEW OF SSGT [REDACTED] USMC

On 28Apr98, reporting agent interviewed SSGT [REDACTED] USMC, [REDACTED], regarding the VMAQ-2 EA6B Prowler mishap which occurred near Cavalese, Italy on 03Feb98. This interview was conducted at the request of the Trial Counsels assigned to this case. [REDACTED] was interviewed at the NCISRA Cherry Point office located aboard MCAS Cherry Point, NC.

NCIS [REDACTED] advised he is the senior Marine assigned to the Flight Equipment Shop, Maintenance Dept, VMAQ-2, MAG-14, 2DMAW, MCAS Cherry Point, NC.

NCIS [REDACTED] advised he was in Aviano on 03Feb98 at the time the mishap occurred. He noted it was late in the day, and he was in his hooch when he first heard of the mishap. He recalled SSGT [REDACTED] informed him of the mishap. [REDACTED] related LCpl [REDACTED] and Sgt [REDACTED] (on advance from VMAQ-4) were in the Flight Equipment Shop at the time of the incident.

NCIS [REDACTED] stated he returned to the Flight Equipment Shop briefly where he found out that the plane was on deck, there were no ejections and everyone was okay.

NCIS [REDACTED] advised he got all of the flight equipment files, log books and records together, as well as all of the aircrew and aircraft log records, from his work center. [REDACTED] explained he later gave those records to Capt [REDACTED] who in turn provided them to the AMO, Maj SLYMAN.

NCIS [REDACTED] recalled the mishap aircraft had also flown a morning flight. He advised there were no complaints about the flight equipment by Capt [REDACTED] or his crew after the morning flight.

NCIS [REDACTED] noted if they had problems on the morning flight, regardless of what the problem was, the Flight Equipment Shop would have generated a work request and fixed the problem.

NCIS [REDACTED] related after turning the above mentioned records over to Capt [REDACTED] he turned over the shop to the night crew.

NCIS [REDACTED] stated he had nothing else to do with the case until later, when the JAGMAN board investigating the mishap requested the flight crew's gear. [REDACTED] related that he gave the aircrew's gear to the JAGMAN board personnel and later gave a statement to the board regarding the chain of custody for the gear. [REDACTED] stated a few days later the JAGMAN board returned all of the aircrew's gear, except the helmets and masks.

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: /MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he had no conversations with the mishap aircrew after the incident, nor did he hear any of them make any statements after the mishap.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he has never heard the pilots or ECMO's specifically discuss low level flights. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) explained that he knows they enjoy those flights when they can get them in, but he has heard no unusual talk about flying low.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related he has never heard any aircrew discuss intentionally flying low over buildings, towns, ski areas or schools; however, he advised the officers don't talk freely about flights to the enlisted Marines while in the shop.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated there are no "hot-dogging" crews to his knowledge in VMAQ-2.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised it is not uncommon for aircrews to carry cameras in the cockpit on flights. He noted he has never really seen them carry video cameras before, and the majority of the time he sees them carry still cameras in flight.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he did not know whose cameras were inside the cockpit of the mishap plane after the incident.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided no additional information pertinent to this investigation during this interview.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) /SSgt USMC

SSN: [REDACTED]

DOB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

UNIT: Flight Equipment Shop, Maint Dept,
VMAQ-2, MAG-14, 2DMAW, MCAS Cherry Point, NC

WKPHN: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

REPORTED BY: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
OFFICE: NCISFO CAROLINAS

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INTERVIEW OF LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 28Apr98, LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at the NCIS office at MCAS Cherry Point, NC. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he had been with VMAQ-2 since 17May97, and worked in maintenance admin maintaining the technical publications library.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said on the day of the mishap [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) came to him where he was working in the QA section and asked if he wanted to go and see an aircraft catch the trap. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he heard it was due to a bird strike, but he was unsure who he heard this from. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he and [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) got in a pickup truck and drove out to the area of the flight line. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said they stopped at a location parallel to the first trap, but the aircraft flew past this area and took the second trap. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said the landing looked a little wobbly to him, but said he did not watch many landings so it was hard to judge. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said persons he remembered being in the area when the plane landed and immediately thereafter included himself [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SSG [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and GYSG [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said immediately after landing he saw the canopies pop open and the crew egressing from the aircraft. He said he thought two went off one wing and two went off the other wing while exiting the aircraft. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said the crew came towards them where they were gathered off the runway, and they all looked nervous and scared like they had just hit something. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he had no direct contact or conversation with the crew, but overheard Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) say something like, "Thank God we are alright."

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he just watched everyone do their job, because he was not trained or qualified to do anything with the aircraft. HE said the aircraft was eventually towed down the runway and on to the Mike loop area where it was roped off.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he has not heard anything about what happened to cause the mishap from anyone, and had never heard any rumors about the pilots or ECMO's intentionally doing anything against policy or unsafe.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he was not present when this occurred, but heard sometime after the mishap that Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had come to the maintenance spaces and addressed everyone. He said he heard he just thanked everyone for doing such a good job in maintaining the aircraft, and because the aircraft was maintained properly they were able to make it back alive. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he heard [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was teary-eyed while he spoke.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said the general feeling or consensus of the enlisted

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

members of the command were that Captain [REDACTED] was doing something he should not have been doing that lead to the mishap. [REDACTED] said this was just speculation among enlisted members, as they had really not been told anything specific about the mishap.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: LCPL, USMC, VMAQ-2, MCAS Cherry Point, NC

SSAN [REDACTED]

DOB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
OFFICE: NCISFO Carolinas
DATE TYPED: 30APR98

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Pages 683 through 708 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosures (1 -4) to Exhibit (85): NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), Withheld

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO AVIANO
MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: REVIEW OF COMPUTER BRIEF
PRESENTATION

On 28Apr98, a PowerPoint computer presentation was reviewed by Major [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, and reporting agent [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) presented this PowerPoint brief to VMAQ-2 on 25Aug97. [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated the Air Traffic Control (ATC) representative, MSgt [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, presented a portion of the presentation dealing with ATC. That part of the brief not covered by MSgt [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was presented by [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) himself. In addition, a section of the brief dealing with local flying procedures and low-level flights was not covered (according to [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) he "flipped through" these slides). A computer diskette containing the PowerPoint brief in question has been provided, along with a print out of a summary of the slides. See enclosures (1) and (2).

The following indicates the PowerPoint slide topics, and whether or not they were presented to VMAQ-2 during their LAO brief:

SLIDES	TOPIC	STATUS DURING BRIEF
1-4	Introduction/overview	Presented by Major [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
5-24	Air traffic control issues	Presented by MSgt [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
25-36	Weather	Presented by Major [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
37-40	Safety Issues	Presented by Major [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
41,42	USAF Europe Regulations	Skipped by [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) does not apply to VMAQ-2
43	Air base flying regulations	[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated this is where he may have handed out Aviano Supplement (Chap. 8), and ascertained the number of Pilot Aid manuals needed by the squadron

Missing enclosure 2 diskette

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

<u>SLIDES</u>	<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>STATUS DURING BRIEF</u>
44-60	General operational matters	Covered by Major [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
61, 62	Low-level flying procedures	Not presented during brief; this is when [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) would have stopped the brief and mentioned the 2000 foot altitude restriction
63	Ending slide	shown

ENCLOSURES

- (1) Print out of PowerPoint slides
- (2) Computer diskette containing slide presentation

Reporting Agent: [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Office: NCISFO Naples, Italy

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Pages 711 through 721 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosure (1) to Exhibit (86): Referred to the Department of the Air Force

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE
AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: Receipt of Aviano Air Base Italy Fire Alarm
Communications Center Log for 03FEB98

1. On 28APR98, Master Sergeant [REDACTED] USAF, the Assistant Chief of the Aviano Air Base, Italy, Fire Prevention Flight, was interviewed and provided a statement concerning the 03FEB98 recovery operation of the USMC VMAQ-2 EA-6B mishap aircraft. During the interview, [REDACTED] provided a copy of the Aviano Air Base Italy Fire Alarm Communications Center Log for 03FEB98, enclosure (1) pertains. [REDACTED] also provided a copy an Aviano Air Base Airfield Diagram, enclosure (2) pertains.

2. The Aviano Air Base Italy Fire Alarm Communications Center Log for 03FEB98 reflects the Fire Prevention Flight personnel on duty on 03FEB98 and recounts all significant Fire Department activity from 0730 03FEB98 to 0720 04FEB98.

Enclosures

- (1) Fire Alarm Communications Center Log/03FEB98 ... (Copy All)
- (2) Aviano Air Base Airfield Diagram ... (Copy All)

Reporting Agent: [REDACTED]
Office: NCISFO Europe Naples, Italy

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Pages 723 through 727 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosures (1 -2) to Exhibit (87): Referred to the Department of the Air Force

STATEMENT

PLACE: NCISRA CHERRY POINT, NC

DATE: 29 APR 98

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

, make the following

free and voluntary statement to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my answers to the questions asked of me by Special Agents NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) regarding the investigation into the VMAQ-2 EA6B Prowler mishap near Cavalese, Italy on 03 Feb 98. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for the purpose of identification, I am NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) tall, weighing approximately NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) pounds. I have NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hair and NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) eyes. My social security number is NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I was born on NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). I am currently assigned to MWSS-274, MWSG-27, 2D WMAW, MCAS Cherry Point, NC. On 02 Jun 98, I will check out of MWSS-274 and will be transferring to MATSG at Whidbey Island. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was assigned to VMAQ-2 between Nov 95 and Nov 96. I was an Electronic Countermeasures Officer (ECMO) while with VMAQ-2. I deployed to Aviano, Italy with VMAQ-2 between Mar 96 and Sep 96. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to that deployment to Aviano, I flew some low level training flights in the United States. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on that deployment to Aviano, I flew one low level training flight. I believe this flight occurred within the last month that I was over there. I do not recall the specific low level route I flew. I also do not recall who the pilot or the rest of the crew was on that low level flight in Italy. After reviewing the records, I am aware that I actually flew 12 low levels in Aviano. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) flew some low level flights with Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) after our squadron returned to the United States from Aviano. I also flew low level flights with other pilots in the squadron. I know I can say I flew at least one low level flight with Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) after returning from Aviano. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Special Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) asked me about a term "Cross Compartment." That is not a term I heard being used very often when I was in the squadron. This is just a guess, but it could mean something like cross-checking the instruments on one side of the cockpit from the other side of the cockpit. It could also mean a division of responsibilities among the aircrew during an emergency. Those definitions are purely speculation on my part. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

DATE: April 29, 1998

Page: 2

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was also asked about the term "Spike." I do not recognize that term. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) wrote a couple of Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) witness reports in 1996. I recall commenting in one of those Fitreps that Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had a "cavalier attitude". I will clarify that comment at this time. That comment had to do with his performance as a ground officer, specifically with his duties within the S4 shop. I expected him to set a better example, particularly when the troops were working 12 hour days, and he wasn't. I felt there were times he should have been more of a presence in the shop. I counseled him on that made the "cavalier attitude" comment on his Fitrep. I also noted on his Fitrep that he was a "skilled pilot". NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) never witnessed any unprofessional and/or unsafe actions by Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) while he was flying the airplane. I have also never heard any second hand information that indicated Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had ever acted unsafe and/or unprofessionally in the airplane. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) have never heard Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) described as a "Cowboy", or as having a "Cowboy attitude." I have also never heard of Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) actions in the plane described as "Cowboy" actions. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) After I went over to MWSS-274, I had a couple of occasions to fly with VMAQ-2. There were times that I made low level flights with VMAQ-2. On one of those occasions, I was in a Prowler that was in a formation with another plane being flown by Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I was in the back seat, and I do not know who the pilot was, or who else was in the airplane with me. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) During this low level flight, I remember Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) flew over a noise sensitive area. It was one of the last points on the low level route, to the best of my recollection, but I do not remember which noise sensitive area it was, or what type of noise sensitive area it was. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not make any comments before flying over the noise sensitive area, and he made no comments after flying over it. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) In my opinion that Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) actions at that time were not intentional. I believe that when the planes made the turn, during the shuffle of planes, Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) plane went over the noise sensitive area by mistake. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Capt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not make any statements to the effect of "waking up the school children" or "they like that stuff", after flying over the noise sensitive area. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) During the week of the accident, I was talking to MAJ NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from the Joint Law Center aboard MCAS, Cherry Point, NC on the telephone. I called him to ask about an Admin Sep

package for a Marine from MWSG-27. During that conversation, we got on the topic of a mishap. At one point I asked ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ what he thought was going to happen to the aircrew on that flight. He mentioned that there was an ongoing investigation, and that there were a lot of variables and he just couldn't say for sure. I asked ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ what could happen to the aircrew, given the worst case scenario...that they were out flathatting. I recall him telling me they could face jail time ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ and I covered several topics during our telephone conversation. ^{In my opinion} We were both trying to get information from each other. When I say that, I mean ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ was trying to find out what I knew about the aircrew from VMAQ-2, and I was trying to find out what he could tell me regarding the whole situation ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ asked me about Capt ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ in particular, and wanted to know if I knew of Capt ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ ever doing anything wrong in the aircraft. I told him about the low level flight over the noise sensitive area I mentioned above in this statement. However, I embellished the information when I told it to MAJ ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ I told ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ the noise sensitive area Capt ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ flew over was a school, but I am not sure it was. I recall saying that Capt ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ made the comment about "the kids at the school, waking them or scaring them..." I can't recall exactly what it was that I told ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ I did not tell ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ that I counseled Capt ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ after the flight. In reality, I did counsel him. In general, I emphasized the fact that if we fly over noise sensitive areas, even by accident, then there will be more complaints and we'll end up losing the few routes we have left. It was not a severe ass chewing, but more of a re-emphasis. I wanted him to make sure that he realized he had flown over ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ believe that some of this information that I told ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ was taken out of context by him and ^{I did embellish some} ~~some was embellished by me~~. This is the truth about that conversation with MAJ ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ have nothing further to add to this statement at this time ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

This statement, consisting of this page and 3 other was typed for me by Special Agent ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ as we discussed its contents. I have read and understand the above statement. I have been given the opportunity to make any changes or corrections I desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes or corrections. This statement is true and correct.

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

Date 29 Apr 98 Time 1704

~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ I would like to add that I was told that the conversation was "close hold" between the two of us and shouldn't go any further on either part. ~~NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 29th day of April, 1998 at NCISRA CHERRY POINT, NC.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

29 APR 98

Special Agent, U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
AUTH: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was never any conversations about the mishap. There was a general order given not to talk about the incident with anyone but to refer them to the Public Affairs Office at Aviano NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) This statement consisting of this page and one other was typed by me as Special Agent and I discussed its contents. I have read and understand the above statement. I have been given the opportunity to make any changes or corrections I desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes or corrections. This statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

April 28 1 340
Date Time

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 29th day of April 1998 at NCIS/PM ANDREWS AFB, MD.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Special Agent, U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
AUTH: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

U. S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

STATEMENT

PLACE: Ramstein AFB, Germany
DATE: 29 April, 1998

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted], COL [redacted] USAF, make the following free and voluntary statement to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of events and/or circumstances involving the 03FEB98 incident near Cavalese, Italy, in which twenty civilian skiers died after their cabled gondola crashed to the ground. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] for purposes of identification, I am [redacted] years old, born in [redacted] I have [redacted] hair and [redacted] eyes. My SSN# is [redacted] and I presently am assigned as Executive Officer to the Commander, US Air Force Europe (USAFE), Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany, DSN PHONE [redacted] and my rate is O-6 in the United States Air Force. I have a top secret/SCI security clearance. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] the time of this incident, I was assigned to Aviano Air Base, Italy, as the 31st Operations Group Commander and was dual hatted as the 31st Expeditionary Operations Group Commander. I was assigned to Aviano from JUL96 until 11FEB98. I am also a trained pilot, having flown F-16's and other military aircraft, and am therefore quite familiar with aviators and their jargon. At Aviano I was familiar with the rotational US Marine Corps EA-6B Squadrons that were stationed in Aviano for approximately six month deployments. At the time of the mishap flight, VMAQ-2 was still in Aviano, nearly finished their deployment, having arrived last August. Advance party members from VMAQ-4 were also on the ground, though the rest of that latter squadron was not due to arrive for another week or two. Both squadrons were in Aviano from Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] would like to advise that at Aviano, for many reasons, including the fact that we had so many diverse and foreign flying activities present, we created the DGOC, an acronym for the Deliberate Guard Operations Center. The DGOC's primary purpose was for centrally keeping track of the various operational missions supporting Stabilization Forces (SFOR) in Bosnia, as each respective deployed unit input their data, and also to coordinate the activities of all the deployed units on the base. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [redacted] the record, I know that the minimum AGL flying altitude is restricted to at least 2000' for the area of this incident by all indications, and even at 1000' by other standards, as will be discussed below. For a fact, there is no authority to approve a flight in that particular air space at any altitude below 2000'. I understand this mishap occurred at around 364' and there is no readily apparent legitimate reason for that EA-6B to have been that low. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) my knowledge from having been in Aviano in my capacity for nearly two years, there are five sources of restricted altitudes of which I am aware. First, the Italian low level structure is defined at between 500' and 2000'. In the Italian SOP, ADD 8 or ADD 25 as I recall, this is so stated. Further, the differences in those altitudes depends upon the respective geographical areas. For example, any village reflected on a map with 1:500,000 scale, must be avoided by a minimum altitude of 1500', and a one mile lateral restriction.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) second, I am aware of USMC EA-6B policy stating that they have a minimum 1000' altitude, this I know because subsequent to the mishap I have seen documentation from before that date so indicating the minimum requirements.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) third, there is overall guidance from the Italians, from long ago agreements with NATO, that require a minimum 1000' AGL altitude in the mountains anytime between 01NOV and 30APR or anytime snow is present. This is reflected in the USAF pilot aid, a copy of which is provided to every visiting and PCS'd pilot at Aviano, as I understand it. The pilot aid is essentially a quick reference guide. Each visiting unit attends an in brief conducted by our Standardization Evaluation (STANEVAL) folks. This brief includes low level rules (for units planning to fly at such levels) as well as safety issues, area rules of engagement and so forth. The CAOC requires all pilots attend these briefs. As I recall, when the VMAQ-2 squadron arrived, they indicated they would not fly low levels for several months and therefore I think that particular briefing aspect was postponed for that unit at the time of the initial brief. They would/should have had the appropriate brief by STANEVAL later before they actually flew low levels. Major WATTEN at STANEVAL may be able to provide greater detail regarding this matter. I should also state that the USAF is there to offer and provide these briefs, but it is the visiting unit's responsibility to request them and ensure their pilots attend them.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the fourth reference to altitudes is the canned low level route restrictions that are published in advance. In Aviano, for example, AV047 is a coded name for such a route, and was in fact the flight route flown by the EA-6B that day. I know that several legs of the route have always had minimum altitudes of 2000' AGL. Such altitudes are determined long in advance when these routes are originally plotted as routes, and the respective altitudes are figured on things like population centers, power lines, beaches, and so forth. For a fact I know the spot where the cable line was struck was marked for 2000' on the Italian low level route diagrams. After the mishap, I checked this myself. A pilot, before flying this route, should use these Italian publications to plan his route. These diagrams are important because they reflect maximum air speed, estimated timings, minimum altitudes, course headings, and such. I know also that VMAQ-2 had these Italian diagrams in their possession for planning purposes.

low level route planning guidance and reprints of authorized low level routes and restrictions were provided to all deployed units via the DG Read File (DG Read File 97-01 dated 07APR97). Ideally, a pilot would use these diagrams to gather flight plan data and transfer information from it to a US navigational map for use in the cockpit. I also referred to a US map after the incident but could not locate the aerial cable line on that map. Additionally, while maps themselves are not constantly updated by the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), DMA issues CHUM's (Chart Update Manuals) which provide updated changes to maps in text and descriptive form. I am unaware if the CHUM's identified the cable, but am sure that VMAQ-2 had access to the CHUM's

The fifth way I am aware of, and the most recent and definitive, dates back to AUG97. At that time we received a message from the Italian government which mandated a minimum 2000' altitude for all flights within the Trentino Alto Adige area. The base CO, an Italian Colonel, and I discussed this and knew the information needed to be readily forwarded to all the units on base. I first needed to identify this region, which is politically based and therefore not identified as such on aeronautical maps, and convert it to terms for the aviators. When this was done, we defined the area in simplified language and terms easily understood by the aviators using cities and towns which were identified on their maps, and then issued an FCIF. To be on the safe side, my identified area encompassed the entire region spelled out in the Italian message, and extended that area a bit. Before releasing the FCIF, I went TDY. While TDY, the FCIF was completed and faxed to me for approval, which I did, and it was actually signed off on locally as I designated, then released. I instructed either MAJ LTC or LTC to ensure distribution of the FCIF via the DGOC to all flying units. I know this was done and that a copy went to the master DGOC read file too.

The VMAQ-2, as all visiting units, maintained a distribution box for all such information, and theirs was either located at the DGOC or at OSS on base. In either case, their box was provided a copy of the FCIF and they had a daily runner pick up all items from their box, as I have been assured by Additionally, the DGOC holds a weekly (Thursday) "stand up," or staff meeting, to which all tenant commands, including VMAQ-2, were invited. These meetings are held to discuss administrative items of interest, new procedures (such as this FCIF), and general information. Unit representatives are responsible for taking this information back to their units for dissemination to all crews. I cannot say for sure if a VMAQ-2 representative was present at the meeting in which this FCIF was initially discussed. I know in the past there had been some difficulty in getting prior Marine commands to attend, but during my Aviano tenure, the working relationship with the Marines was good and a Marine representative attended nearly 100% of these meetings, although often their CO may have sent a Captain as his representative. In any case, at several subsequent stand ups, the FCIF in question was identified as

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) best FCIF in effect and this is mentioned only to provide another source for the VMAQ-2's awareness of it's existence. I am certain that at least one subsequent command representative was present at these subsequent meetings, if not at the original one. However, until the mishap, I cannot recall any particular conversation between myself and anyone from VMAQ-2 about the FCIF. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was unaware of the LTCON (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) film that aired on Hard Copy after the incident, until that airing. Had I been knowledgeable of it before, I would have done something about it, as my record of non tolerance for such activity stands on it's own. I was surprised by that news because his reputation here had been excellent and from what I saw on Hard Copy and what I knew of the man in our limited professional capacity, it seemed incredible. His reported management ability and his "read and initial" program within the squadron seemed very much in order. After 03FEB98, I heard but do not know first hand, that VMAQ-2 which replaced WATTERS' squadron, did not require a read and initial program for unclassified information. Aside from that recorded flight of his, I am unaware of any similar type of flying by other units as well as the Marine Corps. I have no knowledge of a Cable Car club or a Cable club or anything like that. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) my duration at Aviano, I was made aware of something along the lines of seven to nine noise complaints, and when we followed up on all of them, only one had come back to American planes from Aviano. I should also state that several other NATO countries fly in this airspace, including the Dutch, Italians and the Spanish, to name a few. I recall in JUL97 Aviano's Italian CO took a complaint concerning a low level jet on 17JUN97, determined to be from the Marine Corps, which resulted in a letter from LTCOL (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in which he admitted he had an aircraft in the air that day. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) letter further stated that the Marine EA6B restrictions prohibit flight below 1000' AGL and that his aircraft had no after burners, which was contrary to the complaint. The complainant had stated that the aircraft in question used after burners. As to noise complaints in general, the Italian authorities would be able to provide more detailed information. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in the day in question, I had no prior knowledge of the VMAQ-2 flight. In fact, I was at home when I heard on the base radio that a USMC plane had an in flight emergency (IFE) and was returning to the Aviano runway. I called the SOF immediately and that information, with no details, was confirmed. I drove straight to base, and on arrival at the runway the Prowler was safely down and the air crew was being transported to medical for their respective physicals. I saw the damage and immediately knew this was serious. It was clear the Prowler had not just hit a tree or been fired upon or something like that, which had been my initial thought when I heard about the IFE. At the runway, an unidentified Marine stated that one of the crew had asked if anyone was hurt, and at the time I had no idea what this could have meant, but which I now understand meant that he possibly wondered if anyone had been hurt from the object they apparently were aware they struck. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on the runway, I asked another unidentified Marine to ensure the security of the Prowler. I also asked another Marine, a white male Captain in a flight suit, how low they had planned to fly, and the answer was "1000'." A short while later, the Marine CO, LTCOL NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was near me and I asked him about the FCIF discussing 2000' restrictions. He commented back words to the effect that he had never seen it or had never gotten it. I knew this could not be right, and immediately called the OIC at the DGOC (an unidentified TDYer, but who would be reflected on the DGOC log) to go straight to the USMC ready room and verify if the FCIF was there. About three to five minutes later he called me back and affirmed it was there, in the FCIF book NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also had the Italian base CO with me a short while later on the runway, and at first he knew nothing about the cable car. Only after we returned to his office within about 30 minutes of arrival did we see on his television teletext that near Cavalese, Italy, a cable car cable had been struck and that twenty people had died in it when it fell. This made sense to me based on the visible damage I saw on the aircraft NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the following morning, at a meeting about this incident, LTCOL NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) approached me and told me that the Marines had the FCIF regarding the 2000' restriction. When I asked something about what he had told me the previous day on the runway, he clarified by stating either "we had it all along" or "it was there all the time." I am unsure which quote was used, and perhaps both were said. We did not discuss the issue of possession of the FCIF beyond that matter. I did however ask him if the Unit had read the FCIF, and LTCOL NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) told me all but one had. I then asked who had not and he told me "the pilot." I asked if it was the mishap pilot and LTCOL NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) nodded affirmatively. He also told me he knew this because they had polled the squadron the night of the incident. This issue was discussed during the JAGMAN, and I was telephonically contacted by the Board while at home in Missouri while on leave, and the JAGMAN determined that it was simply a communication error or misunderstanding between NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and myself. I did not believe that to be the case, as I clearly understood LTCOL to mean what I have just stated about NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) should also mention that while on the runway after the EA-6B landed, I asked a Marine, the Major from Maintenance I believe, if there had been any film from the cockpit, meaning HUD (heads up display) film or the equivalent, and was told no. I have absolutely no knowledge of any still photography or video recording of this flight NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) In conclusion, I would state that the facts are the facts. The Marines had been made aware of all the flight rules, had been provided copies of them and had been invited to all relevant briefs on the issue when they were ready to begin low level training. It was the responsibility of the Marine unit to request the low level briefs before flying low level routes. This aircrew was clearly at 360 some feet, far below the 2000' restriction of which they were aware, and actually even far below the 1000' level the Marine on the runway told NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) they had planned to fly. A trained pilot can judge these differences and I cannot think of a legitimate reason for this training flight to have been so low. In the event the altimeter was broken, the SOP should have been to fly a higher altitude. From my understanding of the JAGMAN investigation, this aircraft was low over an extended period of time which discounts that "broken altimeter" excuse. Given the 2000' minimum, or even a 1000' minimum, a broken altimeter is irrelevant when comparing impact altitude to the minimum altitude allowed. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is an experienced jet pilot, and from what I know about this incident, I would say the crew was not proficient to be at the low level they were reportedly flying. A pilot can easily tell the relative difference between 350' and 1000', and dependent upon the terrain can probably tell the difference between 350' and 500' based also on his experience, though this may be more difficult. The bottom line in my professional opinion is that this pilot deliberately flew this plane well below published minimum altitudes. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have read the preceding six page statement prepared for me at my request by Special Agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from information that I provided. I have been allowed to make any necessary changes that I see fit. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Date: 29 Apr 98 Time: 200

Subscribed and sworn before me this 29th day of April, 1998 at Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 29 Apr 98
al Agent, NCIS

AUTHORITY: SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04JAN93

Page 6 NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

STATEMENT

PLACE: USAF Aviano, Italy

DATE: 29APR98

I, Senior Airman (SRA) [REDACTED] USAF, make the following free and voluntary statement [REDACTED] whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the EA6-B "Prowler" mishap that occurred on 03FEB98.

[REDACTED] For the purpose of identification, I am [REDACTED], [REDACTED] weighing approximately [REDACTED] lbs. I have [REDACTED] hair and [REDACTED] eyes. My social security number is [REDACTED] and I was born on [REDACTED]. I am currently assigned to the USAF Aviano Fire Department as a Crew Chief/Rescue [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 03FEB98, I was on duty and assigned to the rescue vehicle as a Rescue man. Sometime during the afternoon of 03FEB98, the flight tower reported to the Fire Department an In Flight Emergency (IFE). The IFE was an in bound EA6-B "Prowler" experiencing stabilizer problems and hydraulic failure. As we responded, [REDACTED] positioned the rescue vehicle on the north taxiway in front of the Fire Department [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] observed the EA6-B making it's approach on runway #23. While making it's approach, the aircraft appeared crippled and wobbly. The aircraft landed and hooked the #4 barrier arresting cable. ~~After coming to a stop, I drove the rescue vehicle towards the aircraft.~~ As I approached the aircraft, I noticed that the aircrew ~~was quickly exiting the aircraft~~ **HAD ALREADY EXITED** [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] reaching and chocking the aircraft, I walked around the aircraft to access damage and potential hazards. I observed damage to the aircraft's right wing, right jamming pod, and rear stabilizer. In addition, the aircraft was leaking hydraulic fluid. After completing my initial inspection of the aircraft, I approached the aircrew to ascertain if there were any injuries. They aircrew stated that they were alright. I do not think that any of the crew members were holding anything at the time [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (1) of the aircrew, who was approximately 6' to 6'1" in height and had brown hair, asked me if he could retrieve his flight chart from the cockpit so that he could mark the exact point of impact. After denying his first request, the crew member stated [REDACTED] "I've really got to get in there!" I again told him that he could not re-enter the aircraft. I then asked the crew member what he had hit. The crew member replied "Power Tower or Antenna Tower". I assumed he meant a power line. *SWC*

EXHIBIT (91)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I then turned my attention back to the aircraft and do not know what happened to the aircrew after that. Due to the crew member's response regarding the impact, the duty Crew Chief and I walked around the aircraft looking for pieces of electrical cable that might have been lodged in or wrapped around the aircraft, but did not see anything. We stood by until the arrival of the combat photographer and the tow vehicle. Once the aircraft had been towed away, we returned to the Fire Station. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) There were approximately ten (10) Fire Department personnel on scene at the aircraft. Although I do not remember who was there, it should be reflected in Fire Department records. The first person to arrive on scene after the Fire Department was a USAF Colonel. There was also an Italian Officer, an ambulance crew, and Base Security Police Officer. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) In addition, there were several U.S. Marines who I assumed were VMAQ-2 ground crew personnel. One (1) of the Marines who was present was tall, had dirty blond hair, and wore glasses. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I think he may have been a Gunnery Sergeant. This particular individual climbed into the aircraft's right intake to check for damage. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I did not see anyone enter the cockpit prior to it being towed from the runway. I don't know if anyone accessed the cockpit after it was towed away. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I WAS NOT DRIVING THE RESCUE VEHICLE I WAS THE THIRD SEATER OF THE CREW. SRA BRADUS WAS DRIVING THE VEHICLE. SGT FRITZSCHE WAS THE CREW CHIEF AND THIRD MEMBER OF THE RESCUE. - THE MARINE WHO WAS TALL WITH THE DIRTY BLOND HAIR WAS NOT THE INDIVIDUAL WHO CLIMBED INTO THE INTAKE, THE BLOND HAIR INDIVIDUAL STOOD BY WITH A PORTABLE IN HIS HANDS. THE ONE WHO CLIMBED INTO THE JET INTAKE WAS THE ONE WHO I BELIEVE WAS THE GUNNERY SERGEANT. HE STOOD AROUND 5'8"-5'4". - UPON ARRIVAL THE AIRCREW HAD ALREADY EGRESSSED THE AIRCRAFT. DVC

This statement, consisting of this page and one (1) other was typed for me by Special Agent [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as we discussed its contents. I have read and understand the above statement. I have been given the opportunity to make any changes or corrections I desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes or corrections. This statement is true and correct.

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

29 APRIL 98 0850
Date Time

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 29th day of April, 1998 at USAF Aviano, Italy.

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Special Agent, U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
AUTH: SECNAVINST 5520.38 OF 04JAN93

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

Statement: TSGT [redacted] USAF

Date: 29APR98

STATEMENT

DATE: 29APR98

PLACE: Wing Safety Office, BLDG#1369
Air Base, Aviano, Italy

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Technical Sergeant (TSGT) [redacted] USAF make the following free and voluntary statement to [redacted] whom I know to be a criminal investigator of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will, without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand this statement is given concerning my knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the EA6-B "Prowler" mishap that occurred on 03 FEB 98 [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) For the purpose of identification, I am [redacted] weighing approximately [redacted] I have [redacted] eyes. My social security number is [redacted] and I was born on [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I am currently assigned to the USAF Aviano Wing Safety office as a Flight Safety [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) On 03 February 98, I was performing normal duties in the office prior to the mishap. Sometime during the afternoon of 03 February 98, the secondary crash net phone rang and reported an Inflight Emergency on an EA-6 aircraft with damage to the vertical tail. The aircraft was inbound with intentions to engage the barrier and ground egres [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) When I arrived, the aircraft had already engaged the barrier and the crew emergency ground egressed because of fluids leaking from the wing. I proceeded to approach the On-scene commander, MSgt [redacted] (acting Fire Chief) and asked where the aircrew was. After being cleared to cross the runway I approached the group of marines and asked who was the pilot of the aircraft. I do not remember the name of the aircrew who responded; however, I can not recall his attributes to give a detailed description. I asked the pilot of the aircraft what had happened and he stated "his aircraft had hit a cable during a low level training mission". I asked the pilot at approximately what altitude he was at during the mishap, the pilot stated "around 800 -- 1200 feet". I asked him if he could show me where the cable was on his flight planning map, he was unable to retrieve the map from the aircraft because the On-scene commander had not deemed the aircraft safe. Instead I asked the pilot to draw a diagram on the back of my Inflight Emergency Checklist (IFE) to explain the aspect angle of the aircraft at the time of the mishap compared to the mountainous terrain, he also drew the direction the aircraft was flying, and approximately where it happened. The pilot also stated: "he was very concerned because the cable was near a ski resort". I also asked the whole flight crew, as a group, for additional information: they were "very concerned that the cable or pieces of the aircraft could have landed on the ski resort below". Later on I showed the diagram that the pilot, drawn on the back of my IFE checklist to one of the three following Interim Safety Investigation Board (ISIB) marine representatives (Lt. Col [redacted] USMC, pilot member ISIB; Major [redacted] and Capt [redacted] USMC, maintenance members ISIB) who convened in building 1369 later that evening of the 3rd of February 98. I don't recall [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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000742

EXHIBIT (92)

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

Statement: TSGT [redacted] USAF

Date: 29APR98

[redacted] what I did with the paper I might have shredded it, if I find the paper I will give it to NCIS [redacted]

[redacted] On-scene commander, [redacted] fire chief, authorized me access to the aircraft to take video of the damage. Prior to taking pictures I was briefed by the maintenance crew, who ensured the aircraft was safe. Their was also concern regarding the countermeasure pod that was cut in half, because of it's possible classifications [redacted]

[redacted] The combat photographer arrived on scene approximately 10 minutes after I requested their assistance through command post. The combat photographer and myself were cleared to take the necessary photo's for our accident investigation. I kept the original copy of the video. The tape was made available to the Investigation board (copy) but I kept the original for historical mishap data. The pictures the combat photographer took were picked up by the Investigation Board. I never saw the still photo's. The negatives of the still photo's should be at the base audio video lab [redacted]

[redacted] After taking the video. I asked the aircrew if they could meet me in their planning room so I could acquire a copy of the flight planning map. I received a photocopy of the map used during the mission from Capt [redacted] USMC, a weapon systems operator or navigator (not an aircrew member during the mishap flight) attached to VQMA-2. I received a copy of the flight planning map and proceeded to base intelligence to acquire a larger map of the area involved. While researching the map a news flash from CNN Live already had a news bulletin about a gondola cable being severed in Northern Italy involving several fatalities. We acquired the map that showed the area was ski resort. The Interim Investigation Board was assembled in building 1369, immediately after briefing [redacted] of the mishap [redacted]

[redacted] A mini-recorder was provided to the marine ISIB members to record the witness statements. I do not know which aircrew members were interviewed. Only the marine investigators were present during the interview due to possible conflict between Air Force and Marine investigation procedures. I never saw the tapes or recorder since then or who has possession of the items. The marine pilots were under constant supervision and monitoring after the interviews by marine members and medical members [redacted]

[redacted] On 04 February 98, at approximately 0530, a convoy of 16th AF and Aviano AB members from the Interim Investigation Board ([redacted] Capt [redacted]) TSGT [redacted] marine pilot members, Capt [redacted] Public Affairs), a representative from JA office, Combat photographer, 2 x drivers from transportation, and one or two others) proceeded to drive up to the mishap site to gather additional information for the investigation. We were unable to visit the site due to political problems [redacted]

NCIS [redacted]

Page 2 of 3

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

Statement: TSGT [redacted] USAF

Date: 29APR98

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Lt. [redacted] (16 AF/CC) met us at a small airport about 1 hour from the mishap site, he was to iron out all problems to provide us access to the scene, after he went to the site with Italian Dignitaries, he returned and told us there was nothing we could do to proceed back to Aviano AB. On his return trip (via helicopter) [redacted] with Lt. [redacted] to take a video shot from above to provide us with information about the mishap site. The tape was taken by Italian members of the Investigation Board [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] to the best of my knowledge the only people who had direct contact with the mishap aircrew were the three ISIB marine members. To the best of my knowledge I did not see any of the mishap crew members attempt to approach the aircraft [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

This statement consisting of this page and two other was typed for by Investigator [redacted] We discussed its contents from information we discussed. I have been given the opportunity to make any changes or corrections I desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes or corrections. This statement is true and correct [redacted]

[redacted]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29 day of April in 1998

[redacted]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] NCIS INVESTIGATOR

AUTHORITY:
SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04Jan93

cm

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP
JUDICIAL PROCESS
CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: Additional information from CON [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 29 April, 1998, reporting agent interviewed COL [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) regarding captioned investigation, and a sworn statement was obtained regarding his knowledge thereof. In addition to information provided in the statement [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised that he had viewed the Hard Copy release of LTCOL [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) flight and the USAF "Topscene" training films and that he recognized topography between the two, ie, believing that they were the same route or at least parts of them were. [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) who has many years of experience as a jet pilot, suggested the following for use in a courtroom to demonstrate to a non aviation jury how clear the visible differences are between 1000' and 350' [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) suggested still and video photography from a helicopter at these heights should be taken over the flight route at various intervals and enlarged for the jury's viewing.

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) further stated that regarding the Prowler's "bunting," it made no sense at all and would be the last thing a pilot inadvertently coming across cable wires at that altitude would do. [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added that given the altitude and probable airspeed of the Prowler, pushing over or "bunting" the aircraft would be "illogical and crazy." He noted that all training and pilot logic would indicate the pilot would "pull up" the aircraft to avoid such an incident. [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) suggested an aviation psychologist be interviewed further on this matter. He advised that USAF Captain [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) assigned at Aviano, is qualified as an aviation psychologist but may have personally interviewed the aircrew after the incident.

Further referenced in [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) statement (page two, second paragraph, and page four, third paragraph) is Marine Corps policy in which low level restrictions are discussed in a letter by LTCOL [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided a copy of that letter, enclosure (1) pertains.

Also discussed with [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) were concerns regarding the deployed Marines' chain of command, which was described as internal within the USMC, that is, as a deployed unit to Aviano, they did not fall under the USAF chain. [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided enclosure (2), a copy of a letter from VMAQ-2's Commanding Officer, LT [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) That letter defines that the unit's operational and administrative control were under NATO and the Marine Corps, respectively.

ENCLOSURES

- (1) COPY OF LTCOL [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) LETTER/12AUG97
- (2) COPY OF LTCOL [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) LETTER/12AUG97

EXHIBIT (93)

Page 1 of 2

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: Additional interview from [REDACTED] (continued)

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:

NAME: [REDACTED]

SSN: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

DPOB: [REDACTED]

DUSTA: XO TO COMMANDER, USAF, HQ, RAMSTEIN, AFB

WORK TELEPHONE: DSN: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Reporting Agent: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Office: NCISFO Naples, Italy

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Page 2 of 2

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Pages 747 through 749 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosures (1 - 2): Referred to the United States Marine Corps

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW - AVIANO SKI CLUB

On 29APR98, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), MSGT USAF, was interviewed by Intelligence Operations Specialists [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at the 603rd Air Control Squadron (ASC), Aviano AB, Italy, regarding the Aviano Ski Club.

As background [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) has been the Membership Chairman of the Aviano Ski Club for the 1997/98 ski season and has been an active member of the club for approximately two years.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reviewed a copy of the 1997/98 club membership roster and stated that crew members from the EA-6B Prowler Cavalese mishap were not members of the club. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) disclosed that the 300 member club has never been to the Cavalese area for ski outings. One day trips are scheduled closer to Aviano, while over night trips are scheduled for out of country outings to Germany, Switzerland and Austria. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added that approximately one third of the membership are "snow boarders," however, Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is not a member. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related that after seeing images of the EA-6B air crew in newspapers and television, he never saw any of them attend a ski club outing or function.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

SSAN [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: NCISFO EUROPE

DATE TYPED: 29APR98

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW (MCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C))

On 29APR98, MJR [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), USMC, was interviewed by reporting agent at the VMAQ-4 administrative office spaces aboard USAF Aviano, Italy. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) interviewed concerning comments allegedly made by CAPT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, during a gathering of VMAQ-4 personnel while in a Hardened Aircraft Shelter (HAS) aboard USAF Aviano. The comments were made approximately two (2) weeks after the VMAQ-2 mishap, which occurred on 03FEB98.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he was unaware that [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had addressed VMAQ-4 personnel and had absolutely no knowledge concerning the incident.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: VMAQ-4 Executive Officer

SSA: [REDACTED]

DOB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
OFFICE: NCIS Naples, Italy
DATE TYPED: 30APR98

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW (MAQ) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 29APR98, MJR [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, was interviewed by reporting agent at the VMAQ-4 administrative office spaces aboard USAF Aviano, Italy. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed concerning comments allegedly made by CAPT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, during a gathering of VMAQ-4 squadron personnel while in a Hardened Aircraft Shelter (HAS) aboard USAF Aviano, Italy. As background, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) allegedly made the comments approximately two (2) weeks after the VMAQ-2 mishap, which occurred on 03FEB98.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he was unaware that [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had addressed VMAQ-4 personnel and had absolutely no knowledge concerning the incident.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: VMAQ-4 Operations Officer

SSAN [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: NCIS Naples, Italy

DATE TYPED: 29APR98

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS/I
CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF RECEIPT OF MILITARY RULE OF EVIDENCE 902 (3)

On 29APR98, reporting agent met with LtCol [REDACTED] USAF, Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) and Maj [REDACTED] USAF, Staff Judge Advocate's Office, both assigned to the Aviano Air Base, Aviano, IT. During this meeting, reporting agent requested a photocopy of Military Rule of Evidence (MRE) 902 (3), Self Authentication of Foreign Documents. Maj [REDACTED] provided said document to reporting agent, enclosure (1) pertains. In addition, both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] indicated they had not seen or heard of a case where an Italian Verballi was accepted in an Article 32 hearing or Courts Martial hearing.

Enclosure

(1) One (1) photocopy of Military Rule of Evidence 902 (3)/undated

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

LtCol [REDACTED]
Employment: USAF, 31st Fighter Wing, Staff Judge Advocate, Aviano Air Base, Aviano,
IT
SSN: [REDACTED]

Maj [REDACTED]
Employment: USAF, 31st Fighter Wing, Staff Judge Advocate's Office, Aviano Air
Aviano, IT
SSN: [REDACTED]

Reporting Agent: [REDACTED]
Reporting Office: NCISFO Europe, Naples, IT

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO
MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS
CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 29Apr98, reporting agent interviewed Lt. [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) VMAQ-4 flight surgeon, in regards to who may have had contact with the mishap crew in the hour immediately following the mishap. [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) specifically asked which ambulance had responded to the scene upon the emergency landing flight EASY [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the only ambulance to respond to the scene of the flight line upon the landing of the mishap flight was the VMAQ-2 ambulance. According to [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) all ambulance personnel who were present at the landing are either TDY or have returned to Cherry Point [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) specifically indicated HM1 [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) who is currently in Germany. [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated that no other ambulances responded to the scene upon the landing of the aircraft.

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
OFFICE: NCISFO EUROPE
DATE: 29 April 1998

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW (LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C))

As background, LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, was previously interviewed by NCIS Special Agent [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on 25APR98. During that interview [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided a written statement in which he stated the following:

"Sometime after the accident, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), addressed the Q-4 squadron and stated something to the effect that when the accident initially happened they thought they hit a bird but found out sometime after returning that they had hit a cable. He also said that he and the crew were extremely sorry for the victims and their family members."

In an effort to obtain amplifying details concerning the above statement [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was re-interviewed by reporting agent at the VMAQ-4 administrative office spaces at USAF Aviano, Italy, on 29APR98.

Although unable to recall the specific date of [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) address, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that it had to have been after 13FEB98, the date that [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) arrived at USAF Aviano. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) addressed the VMAQ-4 personnel in the Hardened Aircraft Shelter (HAS), located on the flight line where the EA-6B "Prowlers" are maintained. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) could not recall who or how many VMAQ-4 personnel were present, or if it was the entire squadron or maintenance personnel alone.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) addressed the group after someone else had just spoke, adding that it may have been the VMAO-4 Commanding Officer or Executive Officer. According to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that they (the mishap crew) "felt a thud" at the time of impact. Although [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) thought that [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he thought they "hit a bird", [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was unsure if [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) actually said this or if he [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) heard this from another source. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled that [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) expressed remorse, stating that he felt very sorry for what happened. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) could not provide any additional details.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: Assigned to VMAQ-4

SSAN: [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: NCIS Naples, Italy

DATE TYPED: 30APR98

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INTERVIEW OF LT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC

On 29Apr98, reporting agent interviewed LT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), regarding the VMAQ-2 EA6B Prowler mishap which occurred near Cavalese, Italy on 03Feb98. This interview was conducted at the request of the Trial Counsels assigned to this case. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at the NCISRA Cherry Point office located at MCAS Cherry Point, NC.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is the S-2 Officer assigned to VMAQ-2, MAG-14, 2DMAW, MCAS Cherry Point, NC. He is also the Assistant Security Officer and the Intelligence Oversight Officer for VMAQ-2.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he returned to Cherry Point with the VMAQ-2 Advance Party at the end of Jan98, so he was not in Aviano at the time of the mishap.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he first learned of the mishap via CNN broadcast.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) explained his job, while deployed to Aviano, was to provide tactical intelligence about Bosnia to the aircrews at the start of every AOR mission flight.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he has never given an intel brief for a low level training flight, unless it was tied to a tactical training exercise. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) noted none of the low level training flights in Aviano were tied to tactical training exercises.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he has not discussed the mishap with any of the aircrew involved. He noted he has avoided conversation about the mishap with the aircrew, but he related he has also tried to be supportive of them.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he had never heard the mishap aircrew discuss low level routes, nor had he ever heard them discuss any unprofessional practices in the plane, such as intentionally flying low over anything.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he is good friends with Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). He noted he only met Capt [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) after the mishap. According to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the members of the mishap aircrew feel very glad to be alive.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated from what he has heard, the general consensus around the squadron is that the Aviano mishap is comparable to the EA6B mishap which occurred in Yuma, AZ in recent years.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) explained the squadron had access to e-mail while in

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Aviano. According to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the Marines could send e-mail on their system in Aviano to the server at Cherry Point. The title would start out with "SMTP:"...with the specific address attached. Once the mail made it to the Cherry Point server, it would then be routed to the SMTP address. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated the squadron members used that e-mail system frequently to contact friends and family in the U.S.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also indicated VMAQ-2 does not hold the Security Background Investigation files on the mishap crew in their security spaces. According to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SBI's were completed on all three of the VMAQ-2 officers prior to their arrival at the squadron. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related the squadron only holds paperwork indicating that the three officers have passed an SBI in the past.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided no additional information pertinent to this investigation during this interview.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) / LT USMC
SSN: [REDACTED]
DOB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
POB: [REDACTED]
UNIT: S-2 Officer, VMAQ-2, MAG-14,
2DMAW, MCAS Cherry Point, NC
WKPHN: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

REPORTED BY: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
OFFICE: NCISFO CAROLINAS

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INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INTERVIEW OF CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 29Apr98, CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at the NCIS office at MCAS Cherry Point, NC. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he was assigned to the Ground Support Equipment (GSE) section of VMAQ-2.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he saw the mishap aircraft coming in that day, and knew the runway they were taking was a runway where they would be taking a trap. He said he just figured they could not get a light indicating the landing gear was locked, so they were taking the trap as a precaution. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he had no advance notice the aircraft was coming in with a problem, but later heard over the maintenance control radio that they had wing damage, and he thought they had a bird strike or something. He said the landing seemed a little fast. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said as soon as the aircraft landed the canopies popped open and he observed the ECMO positioned behind the pilot jump off the wing on that side, and saw the pilot jump down from the cockpit. He said he could not see how the crewmen on the other side got out of the aircraft. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he was not involved in anything immediately, but later took orange reflective rope and roped off the aircraft after it returned to the "mike" loop area, where he was assisted by LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he had no contact with the mishap crew at all, and did not see them until several days later when they were accompanied by their attorneys around the squadron areas. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he had never heard anything about VMAQ-2 pilots intentionally flying low in Italy or anywhere else. He said on his first deployment to Aviano he remembered hearing from some VMAQ-4 guys (unknown who) that some of the Air Force jets had been flying low around ski areas and pilots had gotten in trouble for this.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he had never seen anyone take a video camera into the cockpit, but still cameras were fairly common. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was unaware a video camera had been found in the mishap aircraft.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) confirmed that the launch of the mishap aircraft had been delayed that day, but he was unsure why. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said GYSG [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was the plane captain on that launch, and [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was busy training LCPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on his duties, and was not paying much attention to anything else. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he did remember a vehicle pulling up to within about 50 yards of where the aircraft was, and remembered someone walking out toward the aircraft. He said because he was busy with his duties, he did not notice who it was or where they went around the aircraft. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he did not know if they were carrying anything, and could not remember what type of vehicle it was, but knew this had something to do with why the launch was delayed.

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NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said other personnel he remembered being present during the launch besides himself included GYSGT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), CPL NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), CPL NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (out of USMC), CPL NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (VMAQ-4 advance party), and possibly GYSGT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: CPL, USMC, VMAQ-2, MCAS Cherry Point, NC

SSAN: [REDACTED]

DOB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED]
OFFICE: NCISFO Carolinas
DATE TYPED: 30APR98

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INTERVIEW OF CPL [REDACTED] USMC

On 29Apr98, reporting agent interviewed Cpl [REDACTED] USMC, [REDACTED] regarding the VMAQ-2 EA6B Prowler mishap which occurred near Cavalese, Italy on 03Feb98. This interview was conducted at the request of the Trial Counsels assigned to the case. [REDACTED] was interviewed at the NCISRA Cherry Point office located aboard MCAS Cherry Point, NC.

[REDACTED] related he is assigned to the Aircraft Maintenance Administrative Section, VMAQ-2, MAG-14, 2DMAW, MCAS Cherry Point, NC.

[REDACTED] advised he was in Aviano on 03feb98 when the mishap occurred. [REDACTED] recalled he was standing outside Maintenance Control when he heard radio traffic indicating severe damage to an aircraft...possibly missing the station 5 POD.

[REDACTED] related he went to Maintenance Control after hearing the radio traffic. He advised he used to work in Maintenance Control and he knew there were certain things that needed to be done in a mishap situation.

[REDACTED] related that he wanted to be sure there was accountability in all of the log books. Specifically, [REDACTED] made sure all of the proper documentation was with the log books for the mishap aircraft (BUNO: 163045) in the case that those log books would be sealed.

[REDACTED] explained he then went downstairs where he saw SSgt [REDACTED] arrive in a white 9 passenger van. [REDACTED] stated the mishap aircrew was seated in the van.

[REDACTED] recalled Capt [REDACTED] were in the first seat behind the driver, and Capt [REDACTED] and the VMAQ-4 ECMO (Capt [REDACTED]) were in the next row.

[REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] got out of the van and told him to drive the aircrew to the Ready Room.

[REDACTED] related the aircrew did not exit the van at that time, and no one approached the van to talk to them.

[REDACTED] stated he got into the van and began to drive to the VMAQ-2 Ready Room. He recalled all four of the aircrew looked shaken up.

[REDACTED] noted the drive to the Ready Room was about a 5 minute trip. He advised the USAF Security Police (SP) had stopped traffic due to the arrested landing the mishap flight made. [REDACTED] noted he was about one block back from where the SP's stopped the traffic.

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

According to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) told him to pull around the stopped traffic to the SP and tell the SP that they were the mishap crew from that plane that just landed and they needed to get through. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he followed [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) suggestion and eventually got through the traffic stop with little delay.

While driving to the Ready Room [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) heard one of the mishap aircrew say, "I can't believe we didn't see it."

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he did not know which of the aircrew made that statement.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled the crewmen were talking, but in low voices. sp he could not hear what else they were saying.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he pulled through the gate at 'Tent City'. He recalled the VMAQ-2 Ready Room was the first building on the left after the gate. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) told him to go to the Flight Equipment Shop, and [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled one of the crewmen saying he wanted to get out of his flight suit before talking to the skipper. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not know who made that comment.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he drove the crew to the Flight Equipment Shop. All of the aircrew got out of the van. He believed they all entered the shop together. He also believed two of the aircrew were helping [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) across the drainage ditch and into the shop.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he has never heard the pilots/ECMO's make comments about low level flights.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also related he doesn't know of any pilot/ECMO who has intentionally flown low over anything.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added it is not unusual for the aircrews to take cameras up with them on flights. He noted they sometimes take photographs for squadron personnel who ask them to do so.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided no additional information pertinent to this investigation during this interview.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) /Cpl USMC

SSN: [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

UNIT: Aircraft Maint Admin Section, VMAQ-2,
MAG-14, 2DMAW, MCAS Cherry Point, NC

WKPHN: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

REPORTED BY:
OFFICE:

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
NCISFO CAROLINAS

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INTERVIEW OF SSGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 29Apr98, SSGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at the NCIS office at MCAS Cherry Point, NC. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he had been with VMAQ-2 since 01Aug97 and worked as a jet mechanic.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he was standing outside a hanger and heard something coming over a hand held radio that the mishap aircraft was taking a trap. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said the radio was being broadcast from maintenance control within the squadron. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he went back to maintenance control to be the phone watch and let the more experienced people go to the aircraft. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) explained that although he had been in the USMC for thirteen years, he had spent 8 1/2 years out of his primary MOS field and was just getting back into things.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he had no contact at all with the mishap crew and his only contact with them since the mishap was in the form of greetings such as "good morning sir". [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he had not heard any talk from anyone since the mishap indicating what really happened, and said everyone has been quiet about the mishap.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he had not heard anything about air-crews in his squadron intentionally violating any flight procedures, but everyone had heard about the video made by the previous squadron.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said to his knowledge, having video cameras in the cockpit was not a common occurrence, and said he had only seen this once before. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he had not speculated himself on what had occurred to cause the mishap, but he felt it was a terrible tragedy, and if the air-crew did anything negligently that caused the mishap they should be made to pay for it.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: SSGT, USMC, VMAQ-2, MCAS Cherry Point, NC

SSAN [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: NCISFO Carolinas

DATE TYPED: 30APR98

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INTERVIEW OF SGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 29Apr98, SGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at the NCIS office at MCAS Cherry Point, NC. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is a seat mechanic with VMAQ-2 and has been with the squadron since 04Dec95.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he was in his maintenance shop when he heard over the maintenance control radio that aircraft 02 was taking a trap on the day of the mishap. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he grabbed a Tug and met up with GYS [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on the flight line by their loop. He said they drove out to the wash rack area, which is approximately mid-field.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he watched the aircraft land with slats up so it was going a little fast, but otherwise looked like a normal landing. He said the canopies immediately popped open and he watched as the air crew exited off the wings and went to the grassy area at the side of the runway.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he started to do his job in securing the aircraft, but was told to wait by crash crew personnel. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said while waiting the OK from crash crew to proceed, everyone was in the same general area in a grassy area along with the mishap crew. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he had no direct contact or conversation with the crew, but saw what he thought was Air Force personnel talking to the crew.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said the only thing he overheard any of them say was, "Just glad to be alive." [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) could not say for sure who said this.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said when allowed to do so, he resumed his duties with the aircraft, and also removed the mission record tapes from the aircraft and provided them to SGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). He assisted in hooking the aircraft up to the tug and then returned to his duties.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he had never heard anything about any of the pilots doing anything unauthorized or unsafe before, and said he has not heard anything from anyone since the mishap regarding what really happened. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he had seen video cameras in the cockpit before, but not often.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: SGT, USMC, VMAQ-2, MCAS Cherry Point, NC

SSA [REDACTED]

DOB [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

OFFICE: NCISFO Carolinas

DATE TYPED: 30APR98

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INTERVIEW OF LCPL [REDACTED] USMC

On 29Apr98, reporting agent interviewed LCpl [REDACTED] USMC, [REDACTED] regarding the VMAQ-2 EA6B Prowler mishap which occurred near Cavalese, Italy on 03Feb98. This interview was conducted at the request of the Trial Counsels assigned to this case. [REDACTED] was interviewed at the NCISRA Cherry Point office located at MCAS Cherry Point, NC.

[REDACTED] is assigned to the Powerline Section, Maintenance Department, VMAQ-2, MAG-14, 2DMAW, MCAS Cherry Point, NC.

[REDACTED] indicated he was in Aviano when the mishap occurred on 03Feb98. He noted he was a "Plane captain Trainee" working under GySgt [REDACTED] who was the actual Plane Captain.

[REDACTED] recalled the mishap aircraft made a flight earlier that day. Afterward, [REDACTED] serviced the Constant Speed Drive (CSD) on that aircraft. According to [REDACTED] his work on the CSD was not the result of a problem during the earlier flight, rather it was time for routine service to be performed on the CSD.

[REDACTED] was present during the launch of the mishap flight. [REDACTED] also believed he was present for the launch of the earlier flight that day.

[REDACTED] noted just before the launch on one of the flights that day, someone approached the plane with an object and gave it to the crew.

He recalled while the power was on and the engines were turning, he noticed someone running away from the aircraft. [REDACTED] noted he was going through his Powerline checks at that time.

[REDACTED] believed the person running away from the plane was wearing blue coveralls. He thinks that person could have been running to Maintenance Control to get something the aircrew may have forgotten when signing for the plane.

[REDACTED] recalled a couple of minutes later, the same person came running back to the plane. He advised the person was carrying a small object in his hand. [REDACTED] believed the object was possibly square or rectangular. He could not determine the color of the object because he was wearing sunglasses. [REDACTED] opined the object being delivered to the plane was some kind of box containing something the crew needed in the back of the plane.

[REDACTED] indicated he was the Plane Captain at that time. He was responsible for granting permission for anyone to approach the

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TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
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CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

plane at that time. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he did not recall giving the person the hand signal to approach the plane, but he believed he must have done so because the person went up onto the platform and handed the object to the crew inside the plane. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) could not recall which side of the airplane the person was on.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he could not recall any other details about the circumstances before the launch.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) recalled later that day, he heard from Maintenance Control that the plane was coming in with problems and was going to catch a trap. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated at GySgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) direction, he accompanied SSgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a van to the site where the plane was going to land. He watched the plane land, and the Crash, Fire and Rescue personnel kept the Marines away from it for a little while. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised once they were allowed to approach the plane, he connected the tow-bar to the plane and rode along as GySgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) towed it to the lollipop area.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he had no conversation nor any contact with the mishap crew after they landed. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also noted he did not hear the mishap aircrew make any statements after they landed.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised SSgt NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) drove the mishap aircrew back to Maintenance Control.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he has never heard any of the pilots discuss low level flights in the past. He stated he has also never heard any of them discuss intentionally flying low over anything.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related once in a while, the pilots might take cameras up with them on flights.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided no additional information pertinent to this investigation during this interview.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) /LCpl USMC

SSN:

DOB:

POB:

UNIT: Powerline Section, Maintenance Dept.,
VMAQ-2, MAG-14, 2DMAW, MCAS Cherry Point, NC

WKPHN:

REPORTED BY:

OFFICE:

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCISFO CAROLINAS

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INTERVIEW OF CPL [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC

On 29Apr98, reporting agent interviewed Cpl [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), regarding the VMAQ-2 EA6B Prowler mishap which occurred near Cavalese, Italy on 03Feb98. This interview was conducted at the request of the Trial Counsels assigned to this case. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at the NCISRA Cherry Point office located at MCAS Cherry Point, NC.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) works as the night crew in the Flight Equipment Shop at VMAQ-2, MAG-14, 2DMAW, MCAS Cherry Point, NC.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he was back at Cherry Point with the VMAQ-2 Advance Party on 03Feb98. He indicated he had no knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the mishap.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was asked about comments he reportedly made to a LCpl [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from VMAQ-4, in which [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) alleged the mishap occurred as a result of the aircrew's "hot-dogging." [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) denied making that statement and he did not recall talking to a LCpl PERRY from VMAQ-4.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related many of the VMAQ-4 personnel were still at Cherry Point shortly after the mishap. He noted the media and many of the VMAQ-4 guys were saying a lot of things about the mishap. According to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) when the VMAQ-4 guys asked him what happened on the mishap, he told them they crew was "hot-dogging" because that's what the media and everyone else was saying at the time.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he did not have any knowledge of the mishap crew "hot-dogging" during the mishap flight, or on any other flight.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added the VMAQ-2 personnel who were back at Cherry Point on the Advance Party had a hard time getting any information at all about the mishap.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) opined the less he knew about the mishap at that time, the better. He claimed he did not know any details about the mishap and he did not want to know any.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related he had never heard any of the pilots discuss low level flights in the past.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he had never heard any of the pilots discuss intentionally flying low over anything in the past.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he had heard of pilots/ECMO's taking cameras in the cockpit on flights in the past, but only in other squadrons and not in VMAQ-2.

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PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided no additional information pertinent to this investigation during this interview.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Cpl USMC

SSN:

DOB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB:

UNIT: Flight Equipment Shop, Maint Dept,
VMAQ-2, MAG-14, 2DMAW, MCAS Cherry Point, NC

WKPHN: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

REPORTED BY: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
OFFICE: NCISFO CAROLINAS

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TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: INTERVIEW OF SSGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 29Apr98, SSGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at the NCIS office at MCAS Cherry Point, NC. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he had been with VMAQ-2 since Mar93, and worked as an aircraft hydraulics technician.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he was in maintenance control of the squadron when he heard something coming over the radio indicating the mishap aircraft was going to catch a wire, meaning they were making an arrested landing. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he heard they were going to catch the middle wire. He said he could not remember all the specifics that he heard, but knew the aircraft had no hydraulic power and needed to catch a trap.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he took a van out and went to the aircraft to pick up the crew. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he was just getting to the taxiway area about the time the aircraft landed. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said it was a normal arrested landing, but the aircraft was a little fast due to some of the systems not operating. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said as he pulled up approximately 100-150 feet from the aircraft the crewmen were egressing from the aircraft. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said a group of other squadron personnel were all arriving at about the same time and crash crew placed all of them in a grassy area next to the runway while they insured the aircraft was safe.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he told the crew he was there to pick them up and take them back to maintenance. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he believed it was Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) who told him they wanted to go to the ready room instead. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he heard them talking about hitting something and he thought it was Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) who had said he thought they had hit some electrical wires or guide wires. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he needed to go back to maintenance so he started driving there. On the way Captain [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) sat in the front seat, but said nothing. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he could see in [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) face that he was terrified. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said the only other thing he heard anyone say was one of the other crewmen in the back of the van who said, "we were lucky". [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he drove to maintenance where he instructed Cpl [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to drive the crew over to the ready room as they had requested.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he has had not contact or conversation with any of the crew since the mishap, and had heard no other pilots or ECMO's talking about what had happened to cause the mishap. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he has never heard anything in the squadron about air crews intentionally flying lower than allowed or violating any rules and regulations regarding flight. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said everyone in the squadron stayed very quiet and hush hush about the mishap, and he has not heard any rumors or speculation about what occurred to cause the mishap.

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said it was very uncommon to see video cameras in the cockpit, though from time to time still cameras were seen.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was asked if he remembered that there had been a delay in the launch of the mishap aircraft on the date of the mishap. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he did remember that there was a delay in launching the aircraft for some reason. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he thought it was either a tape or someone in the air-crew was missing a piece of air-crew equipment. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he was referring to an RS tape that was used for jamming, but he was not sure this was what caused the delay.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he did not remember a vehicle coming to deliver anything, and thought it was just one of the other trouble shooters who may have delivered something to one of the crewmen. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said some of the other people present included GYSGT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) LCPL NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and 1STLT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

EMPLOYMENT: SSGT, USMC, VMAQ-2, MCAS Cherry Point, NC

SSA: [REDACTED]

DOB: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

POB: [REDACTED]

REPORTED BY: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
OFFICE: NCISFO Carolinas
DATE TYPED: 30APR98

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: //MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: COPY OF VMAQ-2 MISHAP BINDER

On 29Apr98, reporting agent and participating agent NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) obtained a copy of the contents of the VMAQ-2 Aviation Mishap Binder. This binder was retrieved from the VMAQ-2 Ready Room by CAPT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) who provided it to participating agents. A copy of the information contained in the binder was made in the VMAQ-2 Admin Shop, enclosures (1) through () pertain. CAPT NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised some of the information currently in the binder, such as points of contact and telephone numbers, were different when the squadron was in Aviano.

ENCLOSURES

- (1) VMAQ Aviation Pre-Mishap Plan cover sheet/undated...(Copy)
- (2) IMMEDIATE ACTION CHECKLIST/undated...(Copy)
- (3) IMMEDIATE ACTION CHECKLIST with handwritten notes/undated...(Copy)
- (4) OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS FOR ODO/SDO WATCHSTANDERS/undated...(Copy)
- (5) STEP 1, INITIAL INFORMATION WORKSHEET/undated...(Copy)
- (6) STEP 2, CHRONOLOGICAL LOG/undated...(Copy)
- (7) STEP 3, SAR/MEDICAL/SECURITY ACTIVATION/undated...(Copy)
- (8) STEP 4, RECALL OF KEY PERSONNEL/undated...(Copy)
- (9) STEP 5, MISHAP CATEGORY DETERMINATION/undated...(Copy)
- (10) STEP 6, MISHAP SEVERITY DETERMINATION/undated...(Copy)
- (11) STEP 7, OPREP-3 DETERMINATION/undated...(Copy)
- (12) STEP 8, OPREP-3 TELEPHONE VOICE REPORT/undated...(Copy)
- (13) STEP 9, OPREP-3 MESSAGE/undated...(Copy)
- (14) Sample OPREP-3 Message/undated...(Copy)
- (15) STEP 10, NAVAL SAFETY CENTER TELEPHONE REPORT/undated...(Copy)
- (16) STEP 11, MAG-14 AVIATION FLASH REPORT/undated...(Copy)
- (17) Sample MAG-14 AVIATION FLASH REPORT/undated...(Copy)
- (18) STEP 12, MISHAP REPORT MESSAGE/undated...(Copy)
- (19) Directions for NAVSAFCEN Mishap Report Message/07JAN97...(Copy)
- (20) Mishap Report Worksheet (4 pages)/07JAN97...(Copy)
- (21) Sample Message (2 pages)/undated...(Copy)
- (22) STEP 13, WEATHER AT CRASH SITE/undated...(Copy)
- (23) COMMANDING OFFICER'S CHECKLIST GUIDE/undated...(Copy)
- (24) MISHAP CATEGORIES & INJURY CLASSIFICATION (2 pages)/undated...(Copy)
- (25) PRIVILEGED INFORMATION AND LEGAL INVESTIGATIONS/undated...(Copy)
- (26) GUIDE TO WITNESS STATEMENTS/undated...(Copy)
- (27) GUIDE TO WITNESS STATEMENTS (with handwritten notes)/undated...(Copy)
- (28) ADVICE TO WITNESS Form (OPNAVINST 3750.6Q)/28AUG89...(Copy)
- (29) RELEASE OF INFORMATION TO CIVILIAN NEWS AGENCIES/undated...(Copy)

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL
PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

- (30) ORDERS FOR SENTRIES/undated...(Copy)
- (31) SALVAGE AND PRESERVATION OF WRECKAGE/undated...(Copy)
- (32) FAA Involvement on Military Aircraft Mishaps/07JAN97...(Copy)
- (33) Aircraft Mishap Board Special Requirements/07JAN97...(Copy)
- (34) Mishap Reporting Away from Cherry Point/07JAN97...(Copy)
- (35) Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal/07JAN97...(Copy)
- (36) Procedures for Obtaining Planning and Estimator
Services/undated...(Copy)
- (37) Composition and Duties of Aircraft Mishap Board and
Departmental Responsibilities (4 pages)/07JAN97...(Copy)
- (38) Maintenance Instruction (4 pages)/09JAN87...(Copy)
- (39) Aircraft/Equipment Explosive Devices List EA6B
Aircraft/undated...(Copy)
- (40) Unidentified System List/undated...(Copy)
- (41) List of Items Located in Emergency Reclamation
Box/undated...(Copy)
- (42) Crash Kit Inventory & Inspection Record/undated...(Copy)
- (43) Retire, Death Imminent/undated...(Copy)
- (44) "AMB EYES ONLY!" Envelope/undated...(Copy)

PARTICIPATING AGENT

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

SA, NCISFO Carolinas

REPORTED BY:
OFFICE:

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
NCISFO CAROLINAS

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Pages 773 through 827 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosures (1 - 44) to Exhibit (108): Referred to the United States Marine Corps

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

DATE: 30APR98

PLACE: Aviano Air Base, Italy

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) make the following free and voluntary statement to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will, without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand this statement is given concerning my participation in the recovery of the mishap USMC EA-6B aircraft at Aviano Air Base, Italy, on 03FEB98 [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) For identification purposes, I am a [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male; date of birth [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C); place of birth [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C); height [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) inches; weight [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) pounds. I am a Senior Airman in the United States Air Force and I am currently assigned to the 31st Civil Engineering Squadron as an Electrical Power Production specialist at Aviano Air Base, Italy. My work telephone number is DSN [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). My home telephone number is [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I am an Electrical Power Production specialist and I assist in the maintenance of the flightline barriers. Normally when there is an in-flight emergency that requires an aircraft to use the barrier to land, members of my squadron are present at the recovery to ensure that the barrier works properly and to record necessary information for our maintenance logs. On 03FEB98, Aviano Base Operations notified our shop that an in-flight emergency was inbound and that a barrier would be used. Typically there are two people from our shop present on the flightline for a barrier landing. Senior Airman [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and I were sent to the flightline to assist in the recovery of the mishap aircraft. Senior Airman [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) since transferred to the 32nd Combat Command at Tinker Air Force Base. Additionally, there was a "sweeper" (a maintenance person that ensures the runway is clear of any possible FOD following an emergency landing) from the Heavy Equipment shop present. The sweeper was SGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Normally when an aircraft lands using the barrier, one of the aircrew will tell the control tower the aircraft's estimated weight and landing speed. These figures are then normally passed to the barrier maintenance personnel for the barrier maintenance records. (These figures are required for each barrier recovery for the barrier maintenance records.) However, when the USMC mishap aircraft landed they did not pass these weight and speed figures to the control tower. After the mishap aircraft landed I asked the control tower for these figures but was told that the tower had never received them. I then told the control tower that I would ask the aircrew for the information personally because there were situated only one hundred feet away from [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) then went to the white van where three of the mishap aircrew were sitting. I rapped on the window and then asked to speak with the mishap pilot. The mishap pilot [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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EXHIBIT 109

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

was Captain [redacted] explained to Captain [redacted] who I was and what information I needed. I asked Captain [redacted] what the mishap aircraft's landing weight and speed were, but he did not know. Captain [redacted] did not appear to be very coherent and seemed edgy. [redacted] responded to the effect "I don't know. I was flying by the seat of my pants." Normally pilots have these figures at their fingertips, but [redacted] appeared very distracted and did not have the information readily available. I then spoke with Captain [redacted] for a little while longer and we came up with rough estimates of what the mishap aircraft's likely weight and speed were. I did not speak with any of the other aircrew. The white van was being driven by what I believe was a USMC person but I do not know who it was. [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Other people that I saw near the mishap aircraft after it recovered were members of the base fire department and USMC ground support personnel. [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Around the time of the 03FEB98 USMC EA-6B mishap Technical Sergeant [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF Power Production specialist, temporarily assigned (TDY) to our shop at Aviano Air Force Base from Andrews Air Force Base. While [redacted] was TDY to our shop he regularly hung out with the VMAO-2 Marine detachment in their "Tent City". While he was here in Aviano [redacted] mentioned that he had heard a rumor from the Marines that it was a Marine Corps aviation tradition for squadron pilots to "fly under the wire" before ending their deployment and returning home. [redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I have read and understand this statement, consisting of this and one additional page, typed for me by Special Agent [redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from information we discussed. I have made and initialed any corrections. This statement is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge and belief. [redacted]

[redacted]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of April in 1998.

[redacted]
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

AUTHORITY:
SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04Jan93

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

DATE: 30 April 1998

PLACE: Aviano Air Base, Italy

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) make the following free and voluntary statement to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will, without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand this statement is given concerning my participation in the recovery of the mishap USMC EA-6B aircraft at Aviano Air Base, Italy, on 03 FEB 98 NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) For identification purposes, I am a NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male, date of birth NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and place of birth NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) height NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) inches, weight NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) pounds. I am a Master Sergeant in the United States Air Force and I am currently assigned as the Assistant Chief of Operations for the Aviano Air Force Base, Italy, Fire NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Prevention Flight. My work telephone number is DSN NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) My home telephone number is NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) On 03 FEB 98, I was Assistant Chief of the B-shift and on-duty at the Fire NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (Prevention) Flight at Aviano Air Base, Italy. At approximately 1520 (all times are expressed in local time on 03 FEB 98) the Fire NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (Prevention) Flight received notice from the Aviano flight line control tower that there was an EA-6 in flight emergency, call sign NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). As the duty Assistant Chief for the Fire Prevention Flight I assumed the responsibilities of Incident Commander On Scene for the EA-6 recovery operation. At 1523 the Fire NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (Prevention) Flight emergency crews and vehicles were mobilized and set-up to receive the mishap aircraft. All in flight emergency support agencies were notified at 1524 NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) By the time we received notification of the incoming mishap aircraft, the mishap aircraft was practically within visual range. When making its approach, the mishap aircraft made an unusually wide left-hand bank and landed on runway 23. At 1526 the mishap EA-6 aircraft caught barrier #4 and the aircraft came to a halt on the runway at the "Bravo" NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) taxiway. The aircrew immediately began egressing from the aircraft. The fact that the aircrew began to immediately egress from the aircraft was unusual and this indicated to us the severity of the damages to the mishap aircraft. By 1528 it was determined that the mishap aircraft was not carrying any ordinance and the only explosives were the 1.4 explosive (impulse) cartridges used to eject one of the aircraft's pods. Because of the possible dangers associated with the explosive 1.4 cartridges, I established a three hundred foot cordon was established around the mishap aircraft. Base Emergency Ordinance Disposal (EOD) personnel were notified at 1530 to safety the mishap aircraft NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) During the minutes immediately following the successful recovery of the mishap aircraft, I was approached repeatedly by a member of the mishap aircrew who stated that NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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maps to locate what they had hit. I did not allow them to go back into the aircraft because of safety concerns. I would not allow anyone to get back into the aircraft until after the recovery teams had finished their work. I was approached three or four times by the aircrew and at 1528 I was even approached by a Navy or Marine Corps commander who introduced himself as the squadron commander. The commander stated that the mishap aircraft was under his command and that he had to retrieve items from the cockpit. I denied the squadron commander access to the mishap aircraft until it was determined that the mishap aircraft was safe. The mishap aircrew persisted in their requests to get back into the cockpit of the mishap aircraft even after I had denied their requests repeatedly and eventually I had to ask the security personnel in the scene to move the aircrew away from the scene. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) During the course of the recovery operation I believe one of the mishap aircrew told me that they believed they had perhaps hit an antenna cable. I am not exactly sure who made this statement to me. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have Senior Airman (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, and Technical Sergeant (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, of the Aviano Air Base Fire Protection Flight might have also spoken with aircrew at the recovery scene. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) At 1558 Colonel (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the Operational Group Commander, arrived on scene. While I was coordinating the activities of the recovery operation, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was communicating with the Aviano Air Base Command Post with his cellular phone. At 1605 I coordinated with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to move the mishap aircraft from the runway and to the "Charlie" north taxiway. The mishap aircrew might have had access to the aircraft while it was at the Charlie taxiway while (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was assuming control of the scene, but I am not certain if they approached the mishap aircraft then or not. The Italian Aviano Base Commander, Colonel (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was present with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at the Charlie taxiway and they agreed to move the mishap aircraft to the Mike Loop. At 1619 the flight emergency was terminated. At 1620 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that the mishap aircraft was cleared to go from the Charlie taxiway to the Mike Loop. At 1620 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he would assume command of coordinating aircraft recovery operations with Command Post and the USMC Unit. At this time it was determined that no further Fire Department assistance was required. I then commanded all fire crews to return to the Fire Station. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have provided Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) with a copy of our Aviano Air Base Italy Fire Alarm Communications Center Log for 03FEB98. In the Fire Alarm Communications Center Log I am referred to as "Chief-2" and "MED-1" is the standby medical unit. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Page 2 of 3

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

MAY-05-1998 12:49

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P.09

007 007 00 - 102 10.00 FAX 011 00 707 00 7000 01 013/014 READINESS AND 010

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of April in 1998.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

AUTHORITY:
SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04Jan93

Page 3 of 3

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MAY-05-1998 12:50

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

STATEMENT

DATE: 30APR98

PLACE: AVIANO, ITALY

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, make the following free and voluntary statement to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will, without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand this statement is given concerning an aircraft mishap involving a Prowler and a gondola called NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) For identification purposes, I am NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), born on NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). My social security number is NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). I have no security clearance. I am assigned to VMAQ-4, on currently located at Aviano Air Base, Aviano, Italy. I am an Air Frames Mechanic, working in Air Frames NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) This statement is given in order to clarify certain points that I related in my first statement to NCIS, dated 26Apr98. I first arrived in Aviano in late January 1998, with the VMAQ-4 advance team that arrived in Aviano before the rest of the squadron did. The rest of the command arrived sometime in mid February, 1998. The advance team was here during the Prowler aircraft mishap. Capt. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from our squadron, and was on our advance team to Aviano NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The command has regular formations every one or two weeks. These are routine formations where the Commanding Officer may address the command, or awards may be given out, etc.. I recall sometime between 20-25 February 1998, we had a formation in front of the Hardened Aircraft Shelter (HAS), on the Aviano Base, where they are usually held. During this formation, I believe some awards were passed to some of the command members for promotions, although I'm not sure of this. I remember the CO talking at the formation NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The awards were given out, Capt. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) addressed the formation. He spoke for about five minutes. He thanked the maintenance people for doing a good job. Capt. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also mentioned that he was real sorry for what had happened (concerning the mishap). He said that when they were flying, he felt a bump. From where he was sitting (in the back of the aircraft), he couldn't see anything ahead of him. He didn't know what they hit until he looked back, and saw "all the damage" to the aircraft. He said he was pretty scared at that point, and had one hand on the ejection lever. I also remember him saying he would probably give his life for any of those people who died to come back. He said that they were not showboating. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also said that he and his crew were sticking together, hanging pretty tight, that he and the aircraft crew were all in this thing together. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) A couple of days after before spoke to the formation, as he was walking around the command grounds, the area known as "Tent City". I saw NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) talking to some NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) existed command member. I guess someone had asked him a question, and he started talking. I don't know what that question was, or who asked it. Some of the passersby, just guys in the command, started gathering around him, and listening. He probably spoke for about 15 minutes, to about eight guys, including me. I don't recall everything he said. I do remember he restated that he was very sorry, and would probably give his life to have any of those victims come back. He also said that the aircraft had no hydraulics whatsoever as they were coming back to the base. He commended the pilot for doing an excellent job in bringing the aircraft back. This was a totally informal talk by NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) do not recall the people who were at this gathering. I also remember NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said that he couldn't give any details about what happened. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Before the mishap, I don't remember seeing NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hanging around with the aircrew of the Prowler in question. But after the accident, I would see them together all the time. They even ate together. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I heard stories around the squadron that when the Prowler saw the gondola cable, they tried to go under it. If you do that at that speed (I also heard they were going pretty fast), you'd go into the ground. The story I've heard is that the cable caught on the aircraft, and slingshot it back up. I heard this story from an officer in our squadron, I don't recall his name. All I know was that he had a flight suit. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have read and understand this statement, consisting of this and one additional page, typed for me by Mr. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from information we discussed. I have made and initialed any corrections. This statement is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge and belief. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

30 APR. 98 1818

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30TH day of April 1998 in Aviano, Italy.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

30 APR 98 1818

AUTHORITY:
SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04Jan93

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO AVIANO
MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: CONTACT WITH UNITED STATES
SENDING STATE OFFICE (USSSO), AMEMBASSY ROME, ITALY.

ON 30APR98, REPORTING AGENT MET WITH MS. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) PARALEGAL ASSISTANT, UNITED STATES SENDING
STATE OFFICE (USSSO), AMEMBASSY ROME, ITALY. THE
PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING WAS TO REQUEST A COPY OF THE
MOST RECENT CLAIMS FILED BY THE RELATIVES OF THE
VICTIMS OF THE CERMIS AIR DISASTER. MS NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
PROVIDED REPORTING AGENT WITH A COPY ALL CLAIMS FILED
AS OF 27APR98. ATTACHMENT (1) PERTAINS.

ATTACHMENT

(1) COPY OF CLAIMS REPORT/DTD 27APR98

REPORTING AGENT: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), SENIOR RESIDENT
AGENT

OFFICE: NCISRU ROME, ITALY

DATE: 30APR98, ROME, ITALY

Pages 838 through 839 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosure (1) to Exhibit (112): Contact United States Sending State Office (USSSO), Amembassy Rome, Italy

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO AVIANO
MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: CONTACT WITH UNITED STATES
SENDING STATE OFFICE (USSSO), AMEMBASSY ROME, ITALY.

ON 30APR98, REPORTING AGENT MET WITH MS. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) PARALEGAL ASSISTANT, UNITED STATES SENDING
STATE OFFICE (USSSO), AMEMBASSY ROME, ITALY. THE
PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING WAS TO OBTAIN A COPY OF THE
CERTIFICATE OF GENUINENESS OF SIGNATURE AND OFFICIAL
POSITION OF DR. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), ITALIAN STATE
PROSECUTOR FOR TRENTO, ITALY EXECUTED BY CAPT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, JAGC, OFFICER IN CHARGE USSSO,
AMEMBASSY ROME, ITALY. MS [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) PROVIDED
REPORTING AGENT WITH A COPY THE CERTIFICATE OF
GENUINENESS SIGNED BY CAPT. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ON 30APR98.
ATTACHMENT (1) PERTAINS.

ATTACHMENT

(1) COPY OF CERTIFICATE OF GENUINENESS EXECUTED BY
CAPT. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) DTD 30APR98

REPORTING AGENT: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), SENIOR RESIDENT
AGENT

OFFICE: NCISRU ROME, ITALY

DATE: 01MAY98, ROME, ITALY

Page 841 redacted for the following reason:

Enclosure (1) to Exhibit (113): Contact United States Sending State Office (USSSO), Amembassy Rome, Italy

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO AVIANO
MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: CONTACT WITH UNITED STATES
SENDING STATE OFFICE (USSSO), AMEMBASSY ROME, ITALY.

ON 30APR98, REPORTING AGENT MET WITH MS. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) PARALEGAL ASSISTANT, UNITED STATES SENDING
STATE OFFICE (USSSO), AMEMBASSY ROME, ITALY. THE
PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING WAS TO OBTAIN A COPY OF THE
LETTER SENT TO DR. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), ITALIAN
STATE PROSECUTOR FOR TRENTO, ITALY EXECUTED BY CAPT.
[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), USN, JAGC, OFFICER IN CHARGE, USSSO
AMEMBASSY ROME, ITALY. THE LETTER ADDRESSES THE
MAILING OF THE EXHIBITS TO THE JAGMAN REPORT OF
10MAR98, AS WELL AS, A COPY OF THE QUESTIONS TO THE
CREWMEMBERS AND A COPY OF THE LETTER TO THE ITALIAN
MINISTRY OF GRACE AND JUSTICE THAT ADDRESSES
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES DATED 20MAR98. ATTACHMENT (1)
PERTAINS.

ATTACHMENT

(1) COPY OF LETTER FROM CAPT. [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) DTD 30APR98

REPORTING AGENT: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), SENIOR RESIDENT
AGENT

OFFICE: NCISRU ROME, ITALY

DATE: 01MAY98, ROME, ITALY

Pages 843 through 844 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosure (1) to Exhibit (114): Contact United States Sending State Office (USSSO), Amembassy Rome, Italy

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: CONTACT WITH UNITED STATES SENDING STATE OFFICE (USSSO), AMEMBASSY ROME, ITALY.

ON 30APR98, REPORTING AGENT MET WITH MS. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) PARALEGAL ASSISTANT, UNITED STATES SENDING STATE OFFICE (USSSO), AMEMBASSY ROME, ITALY. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING WAS TO REQUEST A COPY OF A MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY MAJOR NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) DEPUTY OFFICER IN CHARGE, USSSO ROME DELINEATING THE AUTHORITY OF JUDGE ADVOCATES AS CONSUL. MS. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) PROVIDED REPORTING AGENT WITH A COPY THE MEMORANDUM DATED 30APR98 TO REPORTING AGENT. ATTACHMENT (1) PERTAINS.

ATTACHMENT

(1) COPY OF USSSO ROME MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY MAJ.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) DTD 30APR98

REPORTING AGENT: NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), SENIOR RESIDENT AGENT

OFFICE: NCISRU ROME, ITALY

DATE: 03MAY98, ROME, ITALY

EXHIBIT (115)

Pages 846 through 847 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosure (1) to Exhibit (115): Contact United States Sending State Office (USSSO), Amembassy Rome, Italy

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: Screening Interviews, Fire Station Personnel

From 30 April to 05 May, 1998, reporting agent and participating agents interviewed the below identified personnel regarding captioned investigation. These individuals were on duty on 03FEB98 at the Fire Department, Aviano AFB, Italy, and their unit responded to the runway after the EA-6B Prowler had declared an in flight emergency (IFE). In addition to the noteworthy information from each which is described below, the first five individuals listed denied having any contact with the aircrew or USMC personnel on 03FEB98. None of these observed the aircrew egress from the aircraft with objects in hand, nor did they witness the aircrew or anyone else access the cockpit after the landing.

[Redacted]

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

SRA [Redacted] USAF, [Redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he drove crash truck #4 to the "Charlie Taxiway" and set up at a 45 degree angle, approximately 100 feet away from the Prowler's right side. [Redacted] recalled he was standing near the aircraft with a ladder when the crew egressed the aircraft. [Redacted] disclosed some of the crew had objects in their hands while egressing. [Redacted] thought this was normal procedure to remove any classified equipment or material from the aircraft. [Redacted] could not recall what the objects were and did not know which members of the aircrew had the objects. [Redacted] was certain the crew did not remove a video camera or photographic equipment. [Redacted] likewise denied contact with the crew or any Marine Corps personnel, but related he heard one of the crew members attempted to regain access to the aircraft. [Redacted] advised he heard this after his response team returned to the fire department building. [Redacted]

AIC [Redacted] USAF, [Redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) interviewed on 05MAY98, [Redacted] advised he responded with the fire department as "an extra body" after the IFE was declared. He stated his role was limited to rewinding in the barrier tape, and he likewise advised of no contact with the crew or USMC personnel, nor did he see anyone access the cockpit (although his view was minimal). He concluded he was still present at the scene after the Prowler was towed away. [Redacted]

EXHIBIT (116)

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INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: Screening Interviews, Fire Station Personnel

USAF MSGT [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), SSGT [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and TSGN [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) were also interviewed as members of the fire department. These individuals had contact with one or more members of the flight crew and reported their involvement in sworn statements. SSGT [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and MSGT [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) statements are attached to this investigative action, enclosures (1) and (2) pertain. These two individuals were aware of repeated attempts by the crew to access the cockpit of the aircraft after the landing, but were unaware of any successes in that regard. TSGT [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) statement, which will be reported separately in the NCIS report, advised he was aware of the repeated attempts but also of one of the crew members (NFI) succeeding in accessing the aircraft after it was determined to be "safe."

ENCLOSURES

- (1) STATEMENT OF [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 04MAY98 (ORIG) - *Please see Exhibit 141 of this ALS*
- (2) STATEMENT OF [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) APR98 (ORIG) - *Please see Exhibit 110 of this ALS*

PARTICIPATING AGENT

[redacted] INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS SPECIALIST, NCISFO
 [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS SPECIALIST, NCISFO
 [redacted] SPECIAL AGENT, NCISFO NAPLES, ITALY

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:

DUSTA: [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
 WORK TELEPHONE: DSN: [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Reporting Agent: [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
 Office: NCISFO Naples, Italy

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 WITHOUT THE SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION FROM THE NAVAL CRIMINAL
 INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE.

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT, NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO THE AVIANO MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS

CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: Receipt of Pertinent Aviano Air Base Security Police Desk Blotter Entries for 03FEB98 and 04FEB98.

1. On 30APR98, MSGT [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, the Aviano Air Base Security Police Superintendent of Weapons System Security, was interviewed and provided a statement concerning the Aviano Base Security operations of 03FEB98 and 04FEB98 following the 03FEB98 USMC VMAQ-2 EA-6B mishap aircraft. During the interview, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided copies of pertinent portions of the Aviano Air Base Security Police Desk Blotter for 03FEB98 and 04FEB98, enclosures (1) and (2) pertain.

2. The pages of the Aviano Air Base Security Police Desk Blotter obtained by reporting agent outline significant actions and events that took place during the 03FEB98 to 04FEB98 timeframe concerning the recovery and security of the mishap USMC EA-6B aircraft.

Enclosures

- (1) Aviano Security Police Desk Blotter/03FEB98 ... (Copy All)
- (2) Aviano Security Police Desk Blotter/04FEB98 ... (Copy All)

Reporting Agent: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Office: NCISFO Europe Naples, Italy

Pages 851 through 859 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosures (1 - 2) to Exhibit (117): Referred to the United States Air Force

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: I/MARFORLANT NORFOLK, VA/ASSISTANCE TO AVIANO
MISHAP JUDICIAL PROCESS
CCN: 15APR98-0023-0036-7HMS

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RE-INTERVIEW OF MAJOR [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

On 30Apr98, Major [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, was re-interviewed concerning the suspense/review date on Flight Crew Information File (FCIF) 97-16. As background, [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) previously provided FCIF 97-16 to reporting agent, which had a suspense/review date of 31Dec97.

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that FCIF 97-16 was reviewed on 31Dec97, and retained at that time. However, in response to the 03Feb98 Prowler mishap, FCIF 98-03 (dated 10Feb98) was issued. This document rendered FCIF 97-16 moot. Attached to FCIF 98-03 are two messages: the first is a memorandum from Colonel [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Italian Air Force, requesting a suspension of all low level flights in Italy. The second is a message from USAFE prohibiting all low level flights. See enclosure (1). The absence of a suspense/review date on this document was as a result of administrative oversight. Review dates are normally scheduled six months from the document's issuance date.

Although FCIF 97-16 was rendered moot as of the issuance of 98-03, it was formally rescinded by FCIF 98-17, dated 27Apr98. Enclosure (2) pertains.

ENCLOSURES

- (1) Copy of FCIF 98-03 with attachments
- (2) Copy of FCIF 98-17

Reporting agent: [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Office: NCISFO Naples, Italy

Pages 861 through 865 redacted for the following reasons:

Enclosures (1 - 2) to Exhibit (118): Referred to the United States Air Force

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

STATEMENT : [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

DATE: 01MAY98

PLACE: Aviano AB, Italy

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) make the following free and voluntary statement to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will, without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand this statement is given concerning the seizure of wire metal fragments from the EA-6B which was involved in the 03FEB98 mishap flight [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Identification purposes I am [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) born on [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I stand [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and have [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) My social security number is [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I am presently an Intelligence Operations Specialist with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, assigned to the La Maddalena, Sardinia, Italy resident unit. I have been at this assignment since August 1987 and I am fluent in the Italian language [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) approximately 1500 on 27FEB98, I was in hanger Zulu One at Aviano AB in Italy with Intelligence Operations Specialist [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The EA-6B Prowler that the Italian Carabinieri (military police) had seized as evidence and which was implicated in a mishap which occurred at Cavalese, Trento, Italy was stored in this hanger. This EA-6B, B# 163045, was known to me as the EASY-01 flight of 03FEB98. At the time, an expert appointed by the investigating Italian magistrate was conducting a mechanical examination of the EA-6B. Carabinieri, Italian and military defense attorneys for the accused crew members and other mechanical/aeronautical experts were also present [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) photographing various phases of the Italian examination as well as damaged areas of the EA-6B. I observed the court appointed Italian expert [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) remove wire which was imbedded in the aircraft's right wing [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he seized this wire because he was going to test it for comparison to the two cables which support the cable car system at Cavalese [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) explained that one of the cables, the heavier gage cable, was identified as the support or weight bearing cable while the smaller cable was the pulling cable. From my support to the JAGMAN investigation, I knew this to mean the gondola cable from the Cermis ski resort in Cavalese, Italy [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) cut samples from a piece of cable that Carabinieri officials seized at the mishap scene which he identified as coming from the cable car system. In my opinion, the samples of cable appeared to be identical in size, texture, flexibility and composition. While not an expert in this field, it appeared to me that the wire removed from the right wing matched that of the cable from the Cavalese cable car system [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) with identical samples of wire from both the aircraft and cable which was seized and entered into the NCIS evidence custody system. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have read and understand this statement, consisting of this and one other page. I have made and initialed any corrections. This statement is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge and belief. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

6 MAY 98

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day of May, 1998 at Aviano AB, Italy

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

D. J. [unclear]

NCISFO Europe

AUTHORITY:
SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04Jan93

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

STATEMENT

DATE: 01 May 1998

PLACE: Aviano, Italy

I, [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) make the following free and voluntary statement. [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will, without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand this statement is given concerning the samples of cable taken from the scene of the Cermis cable car mishap and the longitudinal profile of the cable car system in Cavalese.

For informational purposes I am an Intelligence Operations specialist for the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, stationed at Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy. My date of birth is [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). I am fluent in the Italian language and hold a title of official interpreter recognized by the Italian government. Due to my language capabilities and training and experience in law enforcement, I have given assistance to many Italian authorities in investigations regarding cases under the joint jurisdiction of the United States and Italy. I have been a representative of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service since 01 Aug 1981. I was initially ordered by the NCIS European Field Office to report to Aviano, Italy, to assist in the investigation of the EA-6B mishap which took place on 03Feb98.

I initially arrived in Aviano, Italy from Sigonella, Sicily, on 06Feb98 and immediately made contact with my NCIS colleagues who were already on the scene. Among the taskings I received while in Aviano was to assist Engineer [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the Italian expert for the Italian investigating prosecution on a technical survey of the EA-6B. This tasking was performed on 27Feb98 in the company of my colleague [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also of the NCIS [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) tasked by the Italian magistrate [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to provide all the technical information possible concerning the position of the cable car in Cermis at the time of impact with the Marine EA-6B aircraft [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) led by a group of assistants, photographed and measured the Marine aircraft [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I assisted him in his requests to the Marine officer who was present during the technical survey. The officer in question was Marine Major [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).

Upon completion of the technical survey, Engineer [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) offered the possibility of snipping a portion of the severed gondola cable taken from the scene of the mishap and presently held by the Italian prosecution as evidence. I wish to point out that the cable was photographed and the photo is appended to the present statement. I also wish to point out that I have initialed and dated the photograph I provided to [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). The clipping from the cable consisted in a strand of the wire wound into the main cable as well as fibers taken from the core of the same severed cable. The cable clipping and the fibers were entered into the NCIS European Field Office evidence system under log number 033-98.

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 01/01/98

Page 1 of 2

000868

EXHIBIT (100)

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) requested permission to extract a strand of wire taken from the right wing of the EA-6B aircraft. According to NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the strand was a piece of the severed cable from the Cavalese cable car system. A photograph of the cable in the position which NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) believes caused the damages to the right wing of the aircraft is appended to this statement. A piece of the wire extracted from the right wing of the aircraft was entered into the NCIS evidence system under log number 032-98. I have initialed and dated the photograph of the damaged wing where the strand was taken.

At the same time, NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided a copy of the profile longitude of the cable car system in Cavalese which was severely damaged by the Marine EA-6B flight. The Italian expert told me that the document was a copy of the same document which he provided to the Italian magistrate investigating the Cavalese incident. From the time I spent supporting the mishap JAGMAN, I know this survey to be of the cable car system that was struck by the EA-6B Prowler on 03Feb98. The profile was also entered in the NCIS evidentiary system under log number 035-98.

I have read and understand this statement, consisting of this and one additional page, typed for me by NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from information we discussed. I have made and initialed any corrections. This statement is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Enclosures:

- (1) Photograph of cable protruding from the wing of EA-6B Prowler;
- (2) Photograph of cable severed by the EA-6B Prowler.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)


Subscribed and sworn to before me this first day of May in Aviano, Italy.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

AUTHORITY:

SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04Jan93





U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

DATE: 01MAY98

PLACE: Aviano Air Base, Italy

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) make the following free and voluntary statement to [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will, without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand this statement is given concerning my knowledge of the Aviano Air Base Security operations and activities following the recovery of the mishap USMC EA-6B aircraft on 03FEB98 [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) For identification purposes, I am [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) male; date of birth [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) place of birth [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) height [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) inches; weight [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) pounds; Social Security Number [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I am a Captain in the United States Air Force and I am currently assigned as the Security Force Operations Officer for the Aviano Air Force Base, Italy, Base Security Force. My work telephone number is DS [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) My home telephone number is [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Initially became aware of the mishap aircraft around 1500 on 03FEB98 when I was alerted through the "Secondary Crash" network that there was an inflight emergency (IFE). I then alerted the Security Force and they prepared for the recovery of the mishap aircraft. IFE notifications to the Security Force normally come through me. The IFE notification was not unusual in and of itself as IFE notifications are somewhat routine given the high flight operations tempo at Aviano Air Base [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Around 1700 on 03FEB98 I went to check on what the Security Force personnel were doing at the scene of the aircraft. By this time the USMC mishap aircraft was located at the Mike loop of the Aviano Air Base. The Mike loop is the operational staging area near the Aviano Air Force Base flightline where the USMC aircraft are normally kept. When I arrived at the mishap aircraft there were two uniformed Carabinieri guards posted at the mishap aircraft and the mishap aircraft was roped off. LT [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, was the Security Force Flight leader on duty and the senior Aviano Base Security Force representative on scene. I believe the mishap aircraft's canopy was closed at the time that I arrived at the [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I arrived at the scene of the mishap USMC aircraft about ten minutes before the Aviano Base Carabinieri personnel (the Base Carabinieri Commander and Maresciallo) arrived at the mishap aircraft. At this point we were already aware that there had been fatalities as the result of the incident near Cavalese, Italy. I discussed with the Carabinieri the idea of moving the mishap USMC aircraft from the Mike loop to hangar #2 for greater security [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Carabinieri and I agreed to move the mishap aircraft and the Base Security Force, Carabinieri, and USMC personnel worked together to move the mishap aircraft [redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

WARNING

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[redacted] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT (21)

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

from the Mike loop to hangar #2. I established lead and tail security elements and we all escorted the mishap aircraft as it was towed to hangar #2 by the USMC maintenance personnel. [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) While the USMC personnel were preparing to tow the mishap aircraft to hangar #2, I remember seeing a USMC maintenance person reach into the cockpit area of the mishap aircraft. Before the USMC maintenance person reached into the cockpit of the mishap aircraft, he explained to me and the Carabinieri present that he had to work in the cockpit to prepare the aircraft for towing. The USMC ground person appeared to be fairly senior as many of the other supporting USMC maintenance personnel seemed to be following his instructions. This same USMC maintenance person rode in the cockpit of the mishap aircraft as it was towed from the Mike Loop to hangar #2. The USMC ground person who worked in the mishap aircraft's cockpit was a white male, around 6' tall, dark hair, clean shaven, and was wearing BDUs and a cranial. There were around five USMC personnel involved in preparing the mishap aircraft to be towed to hangar #2. [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The Carabinieri were very interested in what the USMC maintenance personnel were doing to the mishap aircraft and they were closely watching the USMC maintenance personnel as they worked on the mishap aircraft. [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) When we arrived at hangar #2 with the mishap USMC aircraft more Italian Carabinieri personnel, additional Marines, and the base photographer were waiting there. I did not allow the base photographer to take any photographs of the airplane and sent him away. At this time the Italians were photographing and videotaping the mishap aircraft. A short time later four plainclothes Italian Carabinieri investigators arrived at the hangar and conducted a walk around the mishap aircraft. [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) At some time between 1700 and 2000 on 03FEB98, I was told by the Aviano Base Carabinieri Maresciallo that the Italians had jurisdiction over the mishap aircraft and could therefore access it whenever they wanted. [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I spent about an hour working in hangar #2 with the Carabinieri setting up the security of the aircraft. It was not possible to secure the entire hangar, but I placed the mishap aircraft in a section of the hangar #2 that could be secured behind a locked gate and then also roped off the mishap aircraft within this section. The Carabinieri and USAF were responsible for the security of the mishap aircraft. The Carabinieri and I established a security watch team consisting of two Carabinieri soldiers, one USAF Security patrolman, and one USMC shore patrol guard. I allowed a USMC guard to be assigned to the security of the mishap aircraft only because it was a USMC asset. We also established an hourly mobile patrol to walk around the hangar. I left strict orders with the security watch that nobody was allowed within the restricted area around the mishap aircraft and that there were to be no photographs allowed. [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

← foot patrol

[REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Both the Italian Carabinieri and the USMC unit expressed interest in being the sole organization responsible for the security of the mishap aircraft. 1st LT [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, from VMAQ-2 approached me at hangar #2 and stated "My squad [REDACTED] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Commander wants me to put my guys on the [mishap] aircraft." The USMC unit wanted to post two Marines as the security of the aircraft and that they be solely responsible for the security of the mishap aircraft. I told them "no". I told the Marines that I would allow members of USMC shore patrol already working with the Aviano Base Security Force to be assigned to the security watch only because it was a USMC aircraft. Likewise, the Italian Carabinieri stated that they would post two guards to watch the aircraft and I told the Carabinieri that they could be part of the security watch, but that they would not be solely responsible for the security of the mishap aircraft. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

left hangar #2 around 2000 on 03FEB98 after the security arrangements had been established. I then went to attend to a base press conference and a protest scheduled for later evening. I never spoke to the aircrew of the mishap aircraft. I never saw anyone remove anything from or place anything inside of the mishap aircraft while I was with the mishap aircraft either in the Mike Loop or at hangar #2. I have not seen the mishap aircraft since the evening of 03FEB98, although I have continued to assist in the security of the mishap aircraft as necessary (such as when the aircraft was moved between the hardened aircraft shelters). NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

have read and understand this statement, consisting of this and two additional pages, typed for me by NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from information we discussed. I have made and initialed any corrections. This statement is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge and NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of May in 1998.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

AUTHORITY:
SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04Jan93

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT

DATE: 01APR98

PLACE: Aviano Air Base, Italy

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) make the following free and voluntary statement to [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will, without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand this statement is given concerning my knowledge of the Aviano Air Base Security operations and activities following the recovery of the mishap USMC EA-6B aircraft on 03FEB98 [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for identification purposes, I am [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C); date of birth [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C); place of birth [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C); height [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C); weight [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C); Social Security Number [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). I am a Master Sergeant in the United States Air Force and I am currently assigned as the Superintendent of Weapons System Security for the Aviano Air Force Base, Italy, Base Security. My work telephone number is DSN [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). My home telephone number is [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) At 0600 on 04FEB98 I went to hangar #2 on Aviano Air Base to oversee the USAF security personnel and security operation assigned to the security of the mishap USMC EA-6B aircraft. I had been told that the mishap USMC aircraft was being kept in hangar #2 and that a detail of security personnel had been assigned to secure it. When I arrived at hangar #2 at 0600 on 04FEB98 there were two uniformed Italian Carabinieri, one USAF, and one USMC security guard present. (This security post was designated "Special Post 1" on the Aviano Security Police duty roster for 03FEB98 and 04FEB98.) The mishap aircraft was positioned inside of the hangar and was cordoned off with rope. The rope barrier extended about twenty feet from the nose, tail and wingtips of the mishap aircraft; completely surrounding the mishap aircraft. I do not recall whether the mishap aircraft's canopy was open or closed when I arrived at hangar #2 [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) At approximately 0800 on 04FEB98 a number of senior American and Italian officers and their staffs arrived at hangar #2 to see the mishap aircraft. Among those present at hangar #2 were Brigadier General [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), USAF, 31st Fighter Wing Commander; Colonel [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), Italian Air Force, Aviano Base Commander; and Colonel [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), USAF, 31st Operations Group Commander [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Later in the morning a small contingent of USMC personnel arrived at hangar #2 to see the mishap aircraft. I believe these USMC personnel were from Naples, Italy. There were approximately 8-10 USMC personnel in this party, mostly officers [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) After the USMC personnel had departed from hangar #2, the Italian magistrate from Trento, Italy, arrived on the morning of 04FEB98 with his staff and a contingent of Italian Carabinieri from various local offices. The Italian magistrate's staff took a large number of photographs. It was also at this time that I believe the Italian magistrate [REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) announced his rules regarding what people were authorized to visit and work with the mishap aircraft. After the Italian magistrate finished taking pictures of the aircraft, a contingent of Italian Carabinieri personnel set up ladders around the mishap aircraft and took a large number of photographs and a lot of video. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I went to hangar #2 around 1400 on 04FEB98. I do not believe it had been determined at that time when or whether the mishap aircraft would be transferred to another location. Later that evening I heard that it had been decided to move the mishap aircraft to the hardened aircraft shelter (HAS) Z1 in the Zulu Loop. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I was later told that primary responsibility for the security for the mishap aircraft in HAS Z1 was assigned to the Italian Carabinieri. I was told that the Italian Carabinieri would entirely control the scene where the mishap aircraft would be secured. The USMC then submitted an entry authorization list for access to the aircraft for safety and maintenance reasons and this list was approved by the Italian Carabinieri. The Italian Carabinieri maintained the only set of keys to HAS Z1. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) In the record, HAS Z1 is located in an area (Zulu Loop) on Aviano Air Base that is positively controlled 24 hours/day. Additionally, the area around HAS Z1 (Zulu Loop) was regularly patrolled by a mobile Aviano Base police security patrol. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) The mishap aircraft is now located in Tango 29. The mishap aircraft was moved to Tango 29 because maintenance work was being done on the hardened aircraft shelters in Zulu Loop. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have no further involvement with the direct security of the mishap aircraft after 04FEB98. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) I have read and understand this statement, consisting of this and one additional pages, typed for me by NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) from information we discussed. I have made and initialed any corrections. This statement is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge and belief. NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of in 1998.

NCIS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

AUTHORITY:
SECNAVINST 5520.3B OF 04Jan93